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Abstract 
This thesis analyses representations of madness and mental illness in Scottish fiction from 1979. I 
begin by exploring the development of the relationship between Scottish identity on one hand, and 
madness and unreason on the other, arguing that in criticism of Scottish fiction, representations of 
schizoid experience are often understood as contributing to discourses centring on Scottish identity 
and the construction of a Scottish literary tradition. The contention of this thesis is that reading 
madness in this way often simplifies the complex relationship between representations of psychosis 
and other forms of unreason on the one hand, and political, philosophical and theoretical structures 
on the other. Its purpose is to proffer a corrective to this simplification and to develop a thematic 
mode of approaching Scottish writing. 
This thesis analyses representations of madness in the work of Alasdair Gray, Janice Galloway, Alan 
Warner, Elspeth Barker, Bella Bathurst, and Alice Thompson. In Chapter One, I discuss the 
relationship between madness, creativity and autonomy in Gray's Lanark, 1982, Janine and Poor 
Things; Chapter Two deals with the significance of traumatic experience to Janice Galloway's The 
Trick Is to Keep Breathing and Foreign Parts, and the environmental concerns of Alan Warner's 
Morvern novels form the basis of Chapter Three. The second section of the thesis deals with 
representations of madness in the work of three women authors. In my fourth chapter, I attempt to 
formulate an approach to Gothic stylistics by comparing the function of madness and other Gothic 
traits in Barker's O Caledonia and Bathurst's Special. The final chapter approaches Alice Thompson's 
enigmatic work by theorising how she aestheticises her concern with the limits of rational 
knowledge in The Existential Detective, The Falconer, and Pandora's Box.  
The purpose of this thesis is to place the writing of madness in Scotland within the context of broad 
literary and philosophical traditions. This contributes to the field of Scottish literary studies by 
widening its scope to think through questions raised by the representation of madness. In particular, 
it allows for the analysis of the ways these writers distinguish between madness and sanity, the 
nature of the distinction between reason and unreason, and the implications these questions have 
for wider epistemological inquiries into the nature of knowledge and narration. In doing so, it allows 
for engagement with current debates in literary theory, particularly feminist and ecologically-
orientated criticism, affect theory and trauma, as well as asking how a concern with literary style and 
genre can contribute to readings of unreason. 
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Introduction: 'All The Ills Of A Split Personality'—Madness and Literature in Scotland 
 
This thesis examines the significance of madness in Scottish fiction and criticism from 1979 to the 
present day. Scottish critics working in what might be termed the 'devolutionary period' between 
the first referendum on Scottish independence in 1979 and the second in 2014, have consistently 
linked Scottish national identity with madness, for reasons that I discuss later. They also use 
metaphors from the semantic field associated with it, especially the term 'schizoid', to describe 
qualities which they take to be specifically relevant to Scotland. To my knowledge, however, there 
has been no full-length work or article on madness in contemporary Scottish writing. This thesis sets 
out to fill that gap. Throughout, my contention is that the link forged between Scottishness and mad 
experience by critics working in a nationalist framework has been used, often in contradictory ways, 
to shore up a faith in the viability of a coherent Scottish literature, which has historically been 
understood as threatened with appropriation by its bigger and more powerful cousin south of the 
border. The central argument of this thesis is that such a position is not borne out by the significant 
examples of Scottish fiction under discussion here. Instead, I maintain that representations of 
experiences of madness are used to explore aesthetic, political and ethical issues pertaining to 
personal autonomy, the ambiguous role of the artist in wider society, class and gender relations, the 
relationship of the human to the non-human, and the iniquitous but compelling appeal of 
rationalised modes of thought. 
 
Throughout, I argue that approaches to literary criticism taking nationalism as their driving force 
have in part been detrimental to our understanding of Scottish literary texts, especially when 
addressing themes which are understood to have particular significance to the nation, such as 
madness. I do not take issue with this style of criticism because I am opposed to Scottish 
independence. Neither do I suggest that there is no value in critically evaluating literary texts from 
the perspective of struggles around independence and identity, or that we should abandon the 
notion of approaching literary texts with reference to nationhood altogether. In the same way that I 
accept it is valid to write criticism about Latvian or Israeli or Swiss literature, I have every faith that it 
is valid to write criticism using the criterion of Scottish provenance as an organising marker (clearly, 
since I have just done so).1 However, the desire to situate Scottish texts as primarily about Scotland, 
                                                                 
1
 I have chosen these examples because their flags appear, along with the Saltire, on the cover of Alasdair 
Gray's Why Scots Should Rule Scotland 1997 (Edinburgh: Canongate, 1997). Gray's rationale is that the flags 
each represent a country which has a population of comparable size to Scotland's, thus implying that Scotland, 
too, is a viable independent nation.  
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Scottish identity, or Scottish independence, has, I argue, led to an operation whereby texts that have 
wide significance and import are read simply as commenting on the national situation. My central 
conviction is that the issues arising from the representation of madness as addressed by Scottish 
writers pertain not only to Scotland and to Scottishness, but are at the heart of questions about 
what it means to be a human being. This is not to say that questions of madness in these texts are 
never relevant to nationalist concerns, but to note that this is not always the case, and that too 
singular a focus on issues of devolution and independence can be detrimental to other possible 
readings of the texts.  
 
Schizoid Scotland: The Caledonian Antisyzygy 
 
The link between Scottish literature and madness has a long and fraught history. Its locus classicus is 
the concept of 'Caledonian antisyzygy', coined by G. Gregory Smith in his discussion of the Scotti sh 
literary tradition, Scottish Literature: Character and Influence, in 1919. Initially an attempt to address 
the nature of Scottish writing as a whole, Smith came to the conclusion that there is no single 
coherent strain of Scottish literature; rather, it is a 'zigzag of contradictions' primarily characterised 
by a somewhat unexpected vein of fanciful whimsy that stands in contrast to the austerities of 
Calvinist attitudes towards art and aesthetic pleasure.2 Despite the fact that he set out to discern the 
underlying unity of the Scottish literary tradition, Smith contends that this contradiction or antithesis 
'need not, however, disconcert us', and goes on to describe this zigzag as 'antisyzygy', or a set of 
polar opposites.3 
 
The tone throughout Scottish Literature is light (it seems Smith is a proponent of the whimsical vein 
of Scottish writing), but later critics have taken the book, and particularly the notion of antisyzygy, as 
a comment on the problematic nature of literary endeavour in Scotland. The intimation that there is 
an essential contradiction at the heart of Scottish writing was noted by Hugh MacDiarmid, who, 
writing in the same year as Smith, claimed that ‘our national culture… suffers from all the ills of split 
personality’.4 Edwin Muir, who rarely found himself in agreement with MacDiarmid, concurred with 
him on this point: in his 1936 refutation of MacDiarmid's 'synthetic Scots' project, he describes the 
Caledonian antisyzygy as a ‘simple irresponsible feeling side by side with the intellect’ brought about 
by living in a ‘community which was not a community'.5 Muir's characterisation of Scottish culture 
                                                                 
2
 G. Gregory Smith, Scottish Literature: Character and Influence (London: Forgotten Books, 2015), p. 5. 
3
 Gregory Smith, pp. 5-6. 
4
 Hugh MacDiarmid, Aesthetics in Scotland (London: Barnes & Noble, 1985), p. 90. 
5
 Edwin Muir, Scott and Scotland (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1982), p. 110. 
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rests on the assumption that young children in Scotland would be brought up speaking Scots with 
their carers and then learn to use standard English while at school. As a consequence, the Scottish, 
in his famous formulation, 'feel in one language but think in another'.6 For Muir, the 'Scottish 
predicament' is thus intimately associated with a logocentric division between thought and feeling, 
and a subsequent sense of cultural inferiority evinced on the part of the Scottish middle class 
towards their English counterparts. This differs significantly from Smith, who sees the split in purely 
literary terms as a playfulness which can rather unexpectedly be found in much of the dour, austere 
writing of nineteenth-century Scotland. Although Muir offers some good evidence in his reading of 
the Scots Makar poetry to justify his claim, the entire argument rests on a set of circumstances 
specific to what must have been a minority of Scots, even in 1936. In an era in which the vast 
majority of Scottish people speak English as their first language (according to the 2011 census, there 
are currently 58 000 people living in Scotland who regularly speak Gaelic at home: about 3 % of the 
population), his thesis is tenuous at best.7 
 
This does not mean, however, that antisyzygy disappeared from Scottish consciousness. The next 
major writer to engage with the notion is Tom Nairn, in his well -known critique of British 
constitutionalism, The Break-Up of Britain (1977). Nairn reads the nationalism of Muir's book, Scott 
and Scotland, as having  a ‘bizarre dream-logic', where the dream is 'Romantic nationalism', and the 
logic is as follows: the only acceptable organisation of political life is the Romantic model of the 
nation-state, which Scottish society does not fit. Since, according to Nairn, the logic of Romantic 
nationalism is for Muir and Smith infallible, and Scotland does not adhere to its model of the nation-
state, it must be Scotland which is at fault.8 Again, The Break-Up of Britain associates Scotland with 
madness: Nairn divides Muir's understanding of Scottish culture into its 'failed' high culture and its 
'insanely sturdy' subculture.9 This phrasing, along with the duality suggested by the notion of 
antisyzygy, have combined to form a sort of schizophrenic stew, in which madness, duality and a 
split or psychically fractured self are all associated with Scottish identity and culture, particularly its 
literary productions. 
 
This characterisation of Scottish literature as peculiarly invested in questions of madness, especially 
schizophrenia, is further justified by recourse to two foundational texts of Scottish writing: James 
Hogg’s The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner (1824) and Robert Louis 
                                                                 
6
 Muir, p. 8. 
7
 'Census Shows Decline in Gaelic Speakers Slowed', BBC News Online, 26th September 2013 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-highlands-islands-24281487, accessed 27/6/2016. 
8
 Tom Nairn, The Break-Up of Britain (London: Verso, 2003), p. 110-111. 
9
 Nairn, p. 165. 
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Stevenson’s Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde (1886).10 The reading of both Robert Wringhim and Dr Jekyll as 
suffering from a form of madness is now so well noted as to be a critical commonplace. To take a 
few examples, D. H. Stewart understands Stevenson's work as a ‘schizophrenic harbinger of 
Beckett’.11 Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, argue Carey Federman, Dave Holmes, and Jean Daniel Jacob is, 
along with Dracula (1897) and Frankenstein (1818), demonstrative of ‘madness's presence at the 
intersection between man and creature’.12 Nancy Gish associates Stevenson's novel with nineteenth-
century theories of psychological doubling, arguing that Pierre Janet’s 'theory of dissociated 
consciousness...provides the most compelling conceptual framework for understanding Stevenson’s 
representation of duality'.13 For George Watson, 'Calvinism is also the source of the long tradition of 
double life or split personality in the Scottish consciousness, treated with humorous contempt in 
Burns's "Holy Willie's Prayer", and with sombre power in Hogg's Confessions of a Justified Sinner and 
Stevenson's Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde'.14 In devolutionary criticism, the characterization of Jekyll's 
humane rationalism as representative of ‘a civilising Britishness', while the Hydes act as the ghost of 
‘a more local inferiorism’, is widespread.15 Similarly, the way that Hogg’s novel situates an uncanny 
representation of doubled selfhood in the context of wider debates around the nature of religious 
justification, and the significance of Scottish contributions to religious thought in general, mean that 
his work is often understood as addressing itself to Scotland’s ‘culture of erasure’, in which Robert 
Wringhim’s divided self becomes a figure for the divided nation and a symbol of an 'inferior' culture, 
lacking the unity and wholeness of an authentic national tradition or an organic state of being.16 
 
Today, antisyzygy is still widely referred to in devolutionary criticism. Some critics, particularly those 
working in areas of the discipline heavily informed by the Gothic, with its emphasis on both madness 
and the notion of the uncanny double, have attempted to make a virtue out of  the proposition: 
Monica Germanà, writing on the Gothic tradition in Scottish literature, argues that antisyzygy 
produces the dualism that is 'the essence of (national) identity', an assertion based loosely on the 
well-known devolutionary critic Cairns Craig's reading of the dialectical nature of nationalist thinking, 
                                                                 
10
 James Hogg, The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010); Robert Louis Stevenson, Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde (London: Broadview Press, 2005). 
11
 D. H. Stewart, ‘Review of Dr. Jekyll and Mr Hyde After One Hundred Years ’, South Central Review, 
5.4 (1988), 85-87 (p. 86). 
12 Carey Federman, Dave Holmes and Jean Daniel Jacob, ‘Deconstructing the Psychopath: A Critical Discursive 
Analysis’, Cultural Critique , 72 (2009) 36-65 (p. 52). 
13
 Nancy K. Gish, 'Jekyll  and Hyde: The Psychology of Dissociation', International Journal of Scottish Literature, 2 
(2007), 1-9 (p. 1). 
14
 George Watson, 'Scottish Culture and the Lost Past', Irish Review, 8 (1990), 34-45 (p. 35). 
15
 Carole Jones, Disappearing Men: Gender Disorientation in Scottish Fiction 1979-1999 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
2009), p.16. 
16
 Cairns Craig, The Modern Scottish Novel (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1999), p. 76. 
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which I will discuss shortly.17 Most, however, profess frustration with the notion: writing in the 
journal Poetry Nation in 2010, Neal Ascherson has it that the 'notorious' antisyzygy is the 'easy, 
helpless definition of Scottish identity as a jammed knot of contradictions'.18 It is, for him, 'a term 
now fortunately out of fashion'.19 For Carole Jones, too, antisyzygy is a 'reductive characterisation' of 
Scottish identity as 'the conjunction of opposites'.20 The notion is, for Berthold Shoene-Harwood, a 
'stereotyping, detrimentally restrictive mode of representation'.21 With a note of weariness, Kirsten 
Stirling writes that: 
 the notion of the “schizophrenic Scot” has become almost a commonplace in Scottish 
 literary criticism, although it is generally based on a rather simplified understanding of 
 schizophrenia as “split personality” and which may therefore personify the splits supposedly 
 inherent in Scottish culture.22 
The liberal use of scare quotes and the qualifier 'supposedly' make it perfectly clear what Stirling 
thinks of the proposition. Parsing the development of Scottish Studies as a literary discipline, 
Matthew Wickman does not invoke antisyzygy at all, but it is from this that his interest in the 
'schizophrenic' nature of Scottish writing derives. For Wickman, Scottish culture's association with 
doubled or divided selves pre-empts the progression from modernist to postmodernist paradigms of 
subjectivity. Wickman sees the discipline as one which: 
 begins in schizophrenia, then passes through a period of uneven national 
 development and then leaves off with a Bahktin-enfranchised cultural heteroglossia [which] 
 inverts the conventional course of cultural history which proceeds from 'modernism' to 
 'postmodernism'. In Scottish Studies, the postmodernist moment in many ways comes 
 first.23 
Postmodernism and antisyzygy are also associated for Gerald Carruthers, although, speaking of 
Lanark, he invokes the notion only to dismiss it, arguing that instead the novel is 'better counted as 
representing a predominant mode of the Western novel, postmodernism, where uncertainty and 
scepticism about personal and social worlds are writ large'.24 As I discuss throughout this thesis, the 
relationship between postmodern understandings of selfhood and Scottish identity has led many 
representations of madness in Scottish texts to be taken as commenting on the national situation, 
                                                                 
17
 Monica Germanà, Scottish Women's Gothic and Fantastic Writing: Fiction Since 1979 (Edinburgh: University 
of Edinburgh Press, 2010), p. 99. 
18
 Neal Ascherson, 'Antithetical Folk', Poetry Nation, 36.3 (2010), 34-36 (p. 34). 
19
 Ascherson, p. 34. 
20
 Jones, p. 15. 
21
 Berthold Schoene, ‘Emerging as the Others of Our Selves : Scottish Multiculturalism and the Challenge of the 
Body in Postcolonial Representation’, Scottish Literary Journal, 25.1 (1998), 54-72 (p. 54). 
22
 Kirsten Stirling, Bella Caledonia: Woman, Nation, Text (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2008), p. 104. 
23
 Matthew Wickman, 'The Emergenc e of Scottish Studies', in The Cambridge Companion to Scottish Literature , 
ed. by Gerald Carruthers and Liam McIlvanney (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 248 -60 (p. 
249). 
24
 Gerald Carruthers, Scottish Literature: Edinburgh Critical Guide to Scottish Literature (Edinburgh: University 
of Edinburgh Press, 2009), p. 129. 
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despite the fact that many critics working in the area profess frustration with the notion per se. The 
problem, then, appears to be that although almost no critic writing today in Scotland has much 
sympathy with the notion of this antisyzygy, the idea is too compelling to let go of entirely. 
 
Scottish Criticism: A Cultural Amnesia? 
 
The most influential critic writing in the mould of formalist devolutionary criticism, by which I mean 
those who emphasise the affinities between the form of the novel and the form of the nation, is  
without a doubt Cairns Craig. His 1999 study, The Modern Scottish Novel, has had a profound effect 
on the criticism of Scottish literature throughout the new millennium and in the wake of the 
establishment of a Scottish parliament at Holyrood. He is also the critic with whom I develop the 
most sustained engagement throughout this thesis. Craig’s emphasis on the importance of a national 
tradition in which to situate individual novels is informed by the work of a number of nation 
theorists, including Ernest Gellner's Nations and Nationalism (1983) and Eric Hobsbawm and Terence 
Ranger's The Invention of Tradition (1983).25 His most significant interlocutor, however, is Benedict 
Anderson, specifically his work on national identity in Imagined Communities (1982). Anderson’s 
emphasis on the simultaneous rise of the nation-state in its modern form and print capitalism allows 
Craig to maintain that there is a profound sympathy and similarity between the way that we 
understand the meaning of nationhood, and the way that we read novels.26 It is this argument that 
has led me to focus on fiction in this thesis. Craig takes this position further than Anderson, 
suggesting, ultimately, that the failure of Scotland as a nation and the failure of Scotland to produce 
a coherent, organic tradition of novel-writing are mutually constitutive. His famous pronouncement 
on Alasdair Gray's Lanark (1981) is one of the most widely quoted observations about contemporary 
Scottish literature: for him, Thaw, the protagonist, 'is the inheritor of Scottish culture as erasure' in 
which all the cultural achievements of the past have 'disappeared in an all -encompassing cultural 
amnesia'.27 
 
My engagement with Craig is based largely on his understanding of Scottish subjectivity. Because he 
is at pains to show that Scottish writing is characteristically to do with negation and lack, he tends to 
read any failure or dissolution of identity as being about Scottishness.  A prime example of this is in 
his reading of Janice Galloway's The Trick Is to Keep Breathing (1989). For the most part, this is a 
                                                                 
25
 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, 
eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
26
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: 
Verso, 2006), p. 24.  
27
 Craig, p. 33. 
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sensitive and cogent analysis: Craig argues that the loss of selfhood experienced by Joy, the 
protagonist, is 'reflected typographically by the fact that the text begins to spill into the margins, 
trailing off the edge of the page and leaving the words truncated'.28 However, after discussing the 
role of Joy's substantially older sister, Myra, who is presented as a kind of 'bad mother' figure in the 
novel, Craig invokes the tradition of Scottish duality and negation in a way that is highly tendentious. 
He argues that: 
 Dubious parentages and blood relations are the modern equivalent of the 
 'doubleness' which characterised much Scottish fiction in the nineteenth century, 
 except that instead of a doubled identity what we get are characters whose ambiguous 
 position between alternative genealogies and alternative cultures is experienced as 
 displacement, absence and void. In this they match precisely the ways in which, from the 
 1930s until the 1980s, Scottish culture was regularly characterised as an emptiness, a 
 vacuum—whether in terms of the 'nothing' in which Edwin Muir believed Walter Scott to 
 have lived or the 'void' which Tom Nairn's The Breakup of Britain presented as Scotland's 
 modern culture.29 
There are many questionable assertions here. I do not accept, for example, that the doubtfulness of 
contemporary familial relations are the equivalent of the 'doubleness' of ninetee nth-century 
Scottish writing, nor that this doubleness is inherently or necessarily related to a sense of lack or 
displacement. Furthermore, I contest the implication that any sense of absence or void in a specific 
Scottish text necessarily has to do with the tradition of writing about Scottish culture in these terms. 
In Trick, for example, Joy's mental breakdown is far more productively read as an engagement with 
how women who defy cultural expectations by maintaining non-heteronormative relationships are 
silenced or ignored, than it is about the negation of Scottish culture. It is the former argument, 
however, that Craig chooses to pursue: referring to the Scottish independence referendum of 1979, 
he analyses Joy's description of the screen on which her pregnancy scan shows her body as 'a black 
hole among green stars' as 'not only the image of a woman negated by a patriarchal society but the 
image of a society living, in the 1980s, in the aftermath of its failure to be reborn'.30 This approach 
ignores the overall import of the text: there is only the very vaguest of evidence in The Trick Is to 
Keep Breathing that we are meant to understand Joy's distress as having to do with her position as 
living in the 'aftermath' of Scottish society's 'failure to be reborn'—although there is undoubtedly 
social failure in the text, this is specifically represented as a failure to meet the needs of the 
vulnerable and disenfranchised. To interpolate her work into a wider argument about the negation 
of Scottish culture effaces the specificity of her writing. I thus see Craig's reading here as 
symptomatic of devolutionary habits of reading, and it is this tendency that this thesis seeks to 
counteract. 
                                                                 
28
 Craig, p. 193. 
29
 Craig, pp. 197-98.  
30
 Craig, p. 199. 
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Feminist Devolutionary Criticism 
 
Critics who take a feminist approach to writing in Scotland usually fall into one of two categories. 
The first are those for whom the devolutionary or nationalist project is inherently problematic 
because it is likely to occlude the specificity of representations of feminine experience typified by 
Craig’s reading above. In fact, this section of The Modern Scottish Novel has now become something 
of a bête noir in feminist devolutionary criticism: Alison Lumsden, Aileen Christiansen and Kirsten 
Stirling have all taken issue with the interpretation it offers. As Kirsten Stirling puts it, it exemplifies 
the way that formalist devolutionary criticism is likely to take 'any Scottish woman, real or fictional, 
as a potential incarnation of Scotland'. 31 I would add to this that, given the long association between 
Scottish identity and schizophrenia, any manifestation of feminine mental distress is particularly 
likely to be read as being brought about through Scotland's status as a victimised nation, thus 
centring national concerns at the heart of novels, like Galloway's, in which I would argue there is 
little textual justification for doing so.  
 
The other mode by which devolutionary feminist criticism tends to operate is to make a claim for 
Scotland as a privileged site for the exploration of gender. This is the direction taken by Monica 
Germanà and Carole Jones, both of whom argue that the specificities of Scottish history make the 
country’s fiction particularly well-placed to deconstruct gender-roles. Although they work in 
different fields—Germanà is a Gothicist whose monograph on Scottish fiction is entitled Scottish 
Women's Gothic and Fantastic Writing Since 1979 (2010); Jones is a theorist of gender who writes 
interestingly about masculine anxieties of denaturing and degendering in Disappearing Men: Gender 
Disorientation in Scottish Fiction, 1979-1999 (2009)—both of their engagements with Scottish 
writing take as read the assumption that Scottish writers are deliberately attempting to construct a 
kind of critical counter-canon to English literature. These critics' subject matter is similar to 
Christopher Whyte’s Gendering the Nation: Studies in Modern Scottish Fiction (1995), Douglas 
Gifford and Dorothy McMillan’s A History of Scottish Women's Writing (1997), and Alison Lumsden 
and Aileen Christiansen's Contemporary Scottish Women's Writing (2000).32 
 
Postcolonial Devolutionary Criticism 
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Scotland’s problematic status vis-à-vis the depredations of the British empire has been addressed 
numerous times: in Scottish Literature and Postcolonial Literature (2011), edited by Michael 
Gardiner, Graeme MacDonald and Niall O’Gallagher; Douglas S. Mack’s Scottish Fiction and the 
British Empire (2006); and Stefanie Lehner's Subaltern Ethics in Contemporary Scottish and Irish 
Fiction: Tracing Counter Histories (2011).33 As Eleanor Bell has noted, books working within a 
postcolonial framework tend to hesitate between acknowledging Scotland's place as a power 
intimately involved in the creation of a British empire, and attempting to position Scotland as a 
subaltern nation per se. As she says of Lehner's book, this often makes it 'difficult to discern her own 
[Lehner's] position in a clear light apart from that of all of the others'.34 Gardiner's collection more or 
less avoids this problem by presenting a series of articles dealing with the affinities between one 
Scottish author and one writer from a country less contentiously understood as postcolonial; 
however, although these links are often individually interesting, they  certainly do not justify 
positioning Scotland as a subaltern nation in its own right. 
 
Synoptic Devolutionary Approaches 
 
Finally, some critics adopt an approach that attempts to synthesise these concerns and address 
issues of class, gender and race simultaneously. A recent example is Matt McGuire's Contemporary 
Scottish Literature.35 McGuire identifies concerns with class—particularly the representation of Scots 
(the language rather than the people)—gender, and colonialism, as important critical movements 
that have provided more space, as it were, for critics working on Scottish writing to address issues in 
the texts that do not fall under the rubric of nationalist concerns. He also acknowledges a lag 
between developments in Scottish criticism and developments in Scottish wri ting, and attempts to 
move away from the problematic devolutionary mode of criticism I have just been discussing. 
Unfortunately, however, the monograph ultimately reiterates it. This is, I think, attributable to the 
broad approach taken by McGuire, and is symptomatic of the general approach taken by other 
critics working in the field: all of these methodologies leave critics interested in writing about 
Scottish fiction seeking to identify the unique features of Scottish writing. As I have shown, 
monographs or collections on Scottish literature tend to take one or perhaps a collection of the 
following subjects as their guiding topics: gender, class, nationalism, postcolonialism, and language 
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or voice. As these subjects are extremely broad, the unifying factor around which their arguments 
cohere is the reference to Scotland, and thus gender, class and ethnicity all tend to be subsumed 
under the overarching rubric of Scottishness. This problem, then, is reiterated throughout 
discussions of Scottish literature. It seems that even when suspicious of it, most of the critics writing 
on Scottish fiction have not yet developed a way to move beyond the nationalist framework. 
 
Methodology:  What's Wrong With Devolutionary Criticism? 
 
One of the central intentions of this thesis is to attempt to develop a way to avoid the issues 
outlined above; an attempt I hope I have succeeded in by adopting a thematic approach which is 
attentive to the detailed representations of madness in the texts themselves. Throughout, my 
methodology is to situate my close readings within the various traditions of responses to literary 
madness which I outline in the next section of this introduction. The rationale of this approach is 
that Scottish writing has been peculiarly subject to forms of criticism that take as their object the 
questions of how literary texts can be mapped into a pre-existing Scottish tradition, their 
intertextual relationships with that tradition, and how they challenge or perpetuate previous 
constructions of Scottish identity. To use Linda Hutcheon's words, these forms of criticism 'work to 
create a sense of continuity between past and present, usually with an eye to promoting ideological 
consensus... literature is directly related to the specific "end" or telos of cultural legitimation.'36 In 
the instances with which this thesis is concerned, the telos is the legitimation of a Scottish 
tradition— whether that vision of Scottish literature is organic, coherent and unified or disparate, 
inclusive and far-ranging. 
 
The methodology of devolutionary critics, particularly Cairns Craig, and the methodology of the 
devolutionary critics in general, is an attempt to construct a counter tradition that can withstand the 
appropriative energies of the more established genealogies of English literature in order to develop 
an independent literature. The move is not by any means a new one: Ernest Gellner identifies this 
critical manoeuvre as typical of nationalist struggles, arguing  that it is very much to the advantage of 
smaller, politically or economically weaker, or newer 'cultural zones' to  
 hive off politically, when the opportunity arises, and to modernise under their own flag, in 
 their own sovereign territory... in the new unit, the intellectuals drawn from the cultural 
 zone which in the process of turning itself into a nation can also monopolise all attractive 
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 positions, instead of having to compete with more numerous and well-established members 
 of the group which had been dominant in the previous polity.37  
Gellner's  comments here are referring to nineteenth-century forms of nationalism, specifically 
German, but the situation is, I think, comparable.  
 
Although I do not feel that such a venture is inherently problematic, my suggestion is that the forms 
of criticism that such an undertaking produce tend to risk homogenising the interpretation of 
individual Scottish fictions in such a way that they fit the rubric of either a coherent and organic or 
postmodern, inclusive Scottish literature. In contradistinction to this, my project situates these texts 
within intellectual genealogies responding to madness, rather than to other Scottish texts. Thus, 
where a devolutionary approach might be to draw together representations of insanity under the 
rubrics of antisyzygy (G. Gregory Smith), the ‘Scottish predicament’ (Edwin Muir), the ‘insanity’ of 
Scottish kitschery and kailyard (Thom Nairn) or the pervasive Scottish ‘Culture of Erasure’ (Craig) into 
a synthesised discussion of what representations of madness can tell the reader about Scotland, the 
aim of this thesis is to discover what Scottish writers can tell us about madness. 
 
To return to Hutcheon: she (rightly) argues that newer literary histories focused on gender, ethnicity 
and sexuality adopt a similar model of legitimation to nationalist ones. Again, there is an attempt to 
confer legitimacy on a specific political or cultural position by tracing counter-histories or 
genealogies which then construct a 'teleological narrative of continuous evolution'.38 This, then, is a 
question of emphasis. To focus on a thematic issue such as madness as a way of cementing Scottish 
writing's status as a literature in its own right necessarily de-emphasises the claims of the other 
considerations mentioned above, as well as the other concerns which are characteristically 
addressed in critical responses to representations of insanity (for example, questions about the 
nature of personhood or subjectivity, the relationship of rationality or irrationality to normative 
ethical codes, and how creativity and madness are imbricated in one another in a literary context). In 
his article on Scottish devolutionary criticism, 'You Can't Get There from Here: Devolution and 
Scottish Literary History', Alex Thompson (borrowing from René Wellek and Austin Warren) terms 
this style of criticism 'extrinsic', using it to denote devolutionary criticism which takes Scotland's 
position as an ambiguous stateless nation as its primary interpretive impetus.39 The basic issue with 
such readings, as Thompson argues, is that they tend 'to dissolve literary history into something 
more like anthropology or cultural studies, in which the nation becomes an object of analysis... and 
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the literary artwork becomes an index to a particular configuration of social forces. '40 In this form of 
criticism, the work of art's primary value is neither aesthetic nor political, but simply a measure of 
cultural formations specific to the period in which the texts were written. Thus, the problem of 
responding to madness within a purely nationalist framework are twofold. Firstly, such an approach 
deligitimises other political, ethical or aesthetic considerations which under close consideration are 
more central to the texts. Secondly, it tends to treat works of art as indices of other political factors 
rather than being attentive to the complexity of their aesthetics. 
 
This problem has been acknowledged by a number of critics working in the devolutionary mode.  
Gerald Carruthers, Kirsten Stirling, Carole Jones and David Punter have all expressed an impatience 
with the nationalist or devolutionary 'impasse' and acknowledged that 'the need to disaggregate 
political from cultural nationalism has become apparent'.41 However, the calls for this move have 
usually been expressed through an attempt to articulate the problems with Scottish nationalism. So, 
for example, for Carruthers, the issue has been the 'over-determined, self-defeating essentialism 
fostered by Scottish criticism'.42 In his view, devolutionary criticism's problems derive from an 
essentialist attempt to establish a coherent Scottish tradition without reference to cross-fertilisation 
from other cultures.43 Similarly, Kirsten Stirling outlines the way that devolutionary criticism has 
occluded the specificities of gendered experience by turning women in the texts into 
representations of the nation. 
 
The logic to adopting a nationalist framework for a thesis which is essentially anti -nationalist is thus 
that the national focus of so many works of criticism elides the fact that the texts under discussion 
here are themselves often not especially invested in questions of Scottish national identity. Even 
when they are, as in Alasdair Gray's work, in criticism of his work the national is often privileged at 
the expense of other intriguing directions in which the critical responses could be taken.  This stands 
in contrast to representations of madness in other national literatures, in which madness need not 
necessarily be read as symptomatic of a problematic national identity (few critics, for example, read 
Sylvia Plath's The Bell Jar (1963) as primarily concerned with Plath's ambiguous national identity, 
despite the fact that throughout her work she engages with the problematics of being a post-war 
American citizen of German extraction). Throughout, my contention has been that the best criticism 
currently available on Scottish writing does not seek to establish a specific national terrain for its 
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concerns, but rather simply addresses itself to issues pertinent to the texts. Thus, my criticism of the 
nationalist paradigm is rather different to those mentioned above. In my view, an essentialist or 
cosmopolitan version of nationalist criticism makes little difference. Whether the framework 
adopted limits its attention only to those writers who were born and bred in Scotland, or whether 
we broaden that category, the problem remains the same: in working within this model, we fail to 
bring out the other redolences, other directions in which the texts can take us. This is not to say that 
a nationalist model has no relevance, but it is to argue that it is not the only hermeneutic by which 
we can understand these works, and nor should it be the overarching framework to which Scottish 
writing is always ultimately referred. An attempt to 'de-essentialise' nationalist criticism still takes 
the nation and nationalism as its motivating force, and is thus likely to reiterate the interpretive 
problems in the readings of Scottish texts that do not significantly concern themselves with these 
issues. This is the point David Punter makes in his excellent article on pity in Scottish Gothic writing,  
explaining that the piece:  
 does not attempt [...] to establish a specific national terrain for Scottish Gothic. This is not to 
 say for a moment that historical and national(ist) issues have passed away; far from it. But I 
 am more concerned here with laying out a ground on which we might treat an issue which 
 has come increasingly to seem to me to lie at the heart of the Gothic, namely the concept 
 (although ‘concept’ might not be the most apt word) of pity.44 
I stand with Punter on this point. He does not suggest that there is no need for national or 
nationalist criticism; rather, there are, for both himself and for me, more pressing issues at work in 
the discussion of the texts at hand. 
 
This raises the question of why I have not adopted a comparative approach in this thesis, comparing 
Scottish responses to English or American ones. The logic to this decision is that a structure of this 
type would be likely to imply that the thesis was devoted to establishing the 'specific national 
terrain' of Scottish madness which Punter identifies above. This is precisely the critical manoeuvre I 
have identified as characteristic of devolutionary approaches to Scottish literature, and as I have 
discussed above, it is this impetus that has, I feel, led to a tendency to misread instances of writing 
madness in Scotland as addressing Scottish national identity. Perhaps counter-intuitively, it seemed 
that the best way to ensure that the interpretations offered here did not slip into the habit of 
attempting to define a specific form of 'Scottish madness' was not to compare them to how madness 
is presented in literary writing from other countries. In other words, the concern was that adopting a 
comparative approach would reproduce the problems outlined above, rather than resolve them. 
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Instead, I have situated them within the framework of a set of critical and theoretical responses to 
madness, which are outlined below.  
 
Paradigms of Insanity 
 
In the next section, I offer an alternative to the devolutionary modes of reading madness which have 
been offered by nationalist critics. To develop this thematic approach, I have situated these Scottish 
texts within a number of different theoretical, critical and literary traditions of thinking about 
insanity, rather than choosing a single genealogy of madness and situating all the texts within it. This 
is because historically speaking, madness has operated as a powerful metaphor for a vast number of 
concerns, ranging from the oppression of women, through to the desire for creative power, to (in 
the Scottish situation) a sense of alienation and dislocation due to divided cultural affiliations. It has 
also notably been used as a way of understanding the act of reading and creating literature in itself. 
As Nicholas Royle and Andrew Bennett put it:  
 If literary studies is grounded in reason...it is also deeply given over to questions of 
 madness and magic, the irrational, uncanny and fantastical... Literature is mad. Literature is 
 a discourse in which people say and do crazy things all the time. It is not just a matter of 
 there being certain characters who speak or behave in irrational, even psychopathic ways. It 
 is about the very invention or creation of people who are not real, of voices that don’t exist 
 anywhere other than in the realm of the literary work.45  
To read each of these texts within one tradition of writing about madness, then, would be to ignore 
the richness of the ways in which the subject has been historically understood. 
 
In drawing on multiple genealogies of insanity, I am following a common practice amongst theorists 
of madness: most of the discussions of insanity engaged with here do not offer a single rubric of 
insane experience under which all forms of madness falls. The heterogeneity of insane experience is 
acknowledged throughout most theoretical (as opposed to clinical) responses to the problem of 
insanity. Ever since Michel Foucault's foundational attempt to write the 'archaeology of that silence' 
which is unreason in Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (1965), such 
texts have not usually attempted to offer a single orthodoxy of insanity. Rather, theory and criticism 
has focused on the heterogeneous iterations of the figure of the mad person and its meanings. We 
can see this, for example, in the seminal work Madness and Modernism (1992), by Louis Sass. Sass 
argues that madness has been  viewed as: 
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 a diminished capacity for logical inference or correct sequencing of ideas; as incapacity for 
 reflexive or introspective self-awareness; as inability to exercise freedom through 
 independent volition; as loss of contemplative detachment from immediate sensory input 
 and instinctual demands; or as failure of language and symbolic thought—to mention the 
 most common.46 
By drawing attention to the multifarious ways in which madness has been understood at the 
beginning of the text, Sass thus allows himself free rein to respond to a number of different 
genealogies of madness. Equally, in The Female Malady (1987), Elaine Showalter does not attempt 
to define madness per se, but to analyse how both the signifiers and content of madness develop 
over time, and to trace how such changes are related to political and ideological formations which 
provide a 'fundamental cultural framework through which ideas about femininity and insanity were 
constructed'.47 As with Madness and Civilisation, Showalter is concerned with how the manifold 
images, metaphors, traditions and superstitions deployed by and informing the practice of clinical 
psychiatry were in conversation with one another throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, ultimately constituting the mutually consolidating relationship between power, reason, 
and masculinity. For Phyllis Chesler in Women and Madness (1973), 'genuine' madness is 
schizophrenia, a condition which she does not discuss in detail but which functions as a catch-all 
term for any number of serious mental disorders.48 Writing in Madness in Post 1945 British and 
American Fiction (2010), Charley Baker argues that: 
the word madness represents the social, personal, and cultural context of the term as 
signifying a number of different meanings to different people. Were we to specify mental 
illness or mental disorder, or to name certain illnesses such as schizophrenia, we would be 
narrowing our focus to one that is mediated through a medical viewpoint.49 
Madness is a particularly apt term precisely because, unlike specific diseases such as schizophrenia 
or an eating disorder, it 'actively defies, as do many of the novels we look at, formal diagnostic 
classification'.50 Baker highlights madness's function as a kind of 'mythology', arguing that to insist on 
a single definition of the term would be to ignore the many differing, competing, and sometimes 
contradictory modes of being mad.51 Thus, most of the significant commentators on madness have 
argued that although it has many recognisable and specific features, to attempt to pin insanity down 
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to a single set of symptoms or one recognised condition would be to do a disservice to those who 
experience it and who write about it. Definitions of madness, in other words, vary from context to 
context. As such, the readings offered throughout this thesis respond to how madness is defined 
within the texts, rather than offering one overarching definition. 
 
The Heterogeneity of Schizophrenia 
 
Indeed, even where there are formal diagnostic qualifications available through the D.S.M. ( The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Disorders, used throughout North America) or the I.C.D. (The 
International Statistical Classification of Diseases, primarily used in Europe), there is a great deal of 
controversy regarding the classification of mental disorder. This is particularly true of schizophrenia, 
whose status as the (Western) form of madness par excellence is if anything cemented by its 
notorious resistance to diagnostic categories.52 The question of how to classify and diagnose 
schizophrenia is historically highly contentious: an excellent account of these debates is given by 
Richard P. Bentall in his study, Madness Explained (2003). Bentall identifies two antagonistic modes 
of understanding insanity. The first, which he terms 'Kraeplinian', holds that all forms of madness are 
nothing more than physical illnesses analogous to, say, Alzheimer's disease or dementia, except in 
that their specific aetiology has not been discovered. However, the Kraeplinian project was, he 
claims, 'doomed to failure from the outset'.53 To make his point, Bentall draws attention to the 
overlap between British and American definitions of schizotype symptoms and the modes by which 
diagnoses of schizophrenia and bipolar and personality disorders coincide.54 
 
In contrast to the Kraeplinians, Bentall claims that the difference between the 'mad and the sane is 
vanishingly small'.55 He proposes an account of the genesis of 'florid' madness (by which he means 
psychosis, delusions, communication disorder and auditory hallucinations)  in which both social and 
biological factors must be taken into account, arguing for a model of madness which recognises the 
importance of the 'social world'.56 For him, it is also crucially important that the victim seeks out 
medical aid themselves, arguing that people who experience auditory hallucinations, but who find 
these presences comforting or helpful, should not be pathologised. Here he draws on the stance of 
the 'Hearing the Voice' movement, which, rather than immediately pathologising 'auditory verbal 
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hallucinations', sees them as not necessarily requiring clinical intervention. As the research project 
'Hearing the Voice' currently running at Durham University puts it: 'Usually associated with severe 
mental disorders such as schizophrenia, voice-hearing is also an important aspect of many ordinary 
people’s lives. The experience has been richly described across cultures and historical eras, and 
raises profound questions about the neural foundations of language, the nature of thought and the 
unity of the self'.57 Both Bentall and the Hearing the Voice project, then, stress the 
phenomenological aspects of madness as key to how it should be understood. This stands in contrast 
to Kraeplinian psychiatry, in which the individual's experience, particularly the emotional distress 
which comes with it, is 'not usually considered to be [an] important feature of some of the extreme 
forms of mental suffering'.58  
 
This is important in terms of this thesis because Bentall, like Louis Sass, emphasises in his work the 
experience of madness: what it feels like to be mad. It is precisely this issue that imaginative 
literature is particularly well-placed to explore. One of the key concerns of this thesis, then, is to 
analyse the affective or existential 'lifeworld' of madness presented in the texts. It is also, I suggest, a 
question which tends to fall by the wayside in nationalist discussions of mad experience. There is an 
obvious sympathy between a psychiatrist who argues that the profession should pay closer attention 
the phenomenology of madness, and a thesis which seeks to investigate how insane experience is 
represented in literature. Equally, in denying that specific forms of madness can be traced to specific 
physical problems, Bentall adopts a model of understanding madness closer to the other theorists 
under discussion here than is usually expected of writers from a psychiatric or medical background. 
That even practising psychiatrists question whether it is possible to arrive at a unified definition of 
madness surely suggests that a similar move should not be undertaken in the context of literary 
analyses of insane experience.  
 
Madness and Policing of Behaviour 
 
Bentall's argument about the 'vanishingly small' distinction between sane and insane is also 
significant to this thesis. The point—which is reiterated throughout the feminist tradition of 
responses to women's madness—is that there is no clear distinction between one emotional 
response which can uniformly be characterised as 'insane' and another which can be regarded as 
functional. Emotions are always understood within a social context which defines their legibility, 
legitimacy, and, at times, whether they indicate an affective logic so disordered that it casts doubts 
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about a person's sanity. This indicates that madness is unequivocally, ineluctably, both a social and a 
personal experience. It is impossible to separate a claim that a person is insane from claims about 
normative beliefs and behaviours.  
 
As Michel Foucault, Elaine Showalter, Charley Baker, Jacqueline Rose and Phyllis Chesler have 
variously pointed out, madness, psychosis, neurosis and insanity are all labels which are at times 
used to designate inappropriate or troubling behaviour. This recognition has led to an awareness 
throughout the thesis of the relationship between madness and gender. In particular, it considers 
how madness has been used as a category to police gendered behaviour. Thinkers working in the 
feminist tradition often read madness in texts both as a product of oppressive social relations, and in 
terms of how the mad figure, particularly the madwoman, becomes a symbol of resistance to 
patriarchal power. They also often outline the connections between femininity, creativity and 
madness. At the same time, Phyllis Chesler and Elaine Showalter both contend that the labels of 
hysteria, neurosis and schizophrenia have, historically and into the present day, been applied to 
women who are not actually ill. For Chesler, madness is used as a label which specifically polices 
deviations from normatively gendered behaviour; following Marx's analysis of wage labour, the term 
she uses for this is 'sex-role alienation'.59 The thrust of Chesler's argument is that institutionalisation 
is likely to come about because of the patient's alienation from their 'gender-role':  
 What we consider 'madness' whether it appears in women or in men is either the 
 acting-out of the devalued female role or the total and partial rejection of one's sex role.60 
For Chesler, both women and men, but women in particular, are unjustly treated as mad when they 
take too literally the injunction upon them to behave in the ways prescribed for them by their 
gender, or misread the injunctions upon them to avoid behaviour that is prescribed for the opposite 
sex. Thus, although the title of the book proclaims it as an investigation into women and madness, it 
is in fact an exploration of how women who are not mad are treated as being so. Again, this is an 
important aspect of the thesis: I am interested not simply in the representation of madness, but how 
the power of the label of 'insanity' is deployed to privilege certain behaviours and discourage others. 
  
In some respects, Elaine Showalter's work represents an attempt to synthesise Chesler's political 
engagement with the concrete reality of women undergoing mental treatment with the theoretical  
rigour of Foucault. She evokes two traditions of interpreting (feminine) madness which exist in 
tension with one another: the lineage  arguing that 'women's high rate of mental disorder is a 
product of their social situation' (represented here by Chesler) and those philosophers, literary 
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critics and social theorists who have drawn attention to a 'fundamental alliance between women 
and madness', demonstrating that, within our dualistic systems of language and representation, 
women are 'typically situated on the side of irrationality, silence, nature and body, while men are 
situated on the side of reason, discourse, culture and the mind'.61 The figure of the madwoman in 
particular therefore becomes a metaphor by which writers are able to explore the limitations of 
rationalistic modes of understanding the world, and to posit other modes of being; being which, as 
Hélène Cixous argues in The Newly Born Woman (1986) disconcerts a dualistic or binary 
epistemology which privileges masculinity and rationality over realms of experience typically 
identified as feminine, such as modes of knowing and being which emphasise bodily experience and 
transcendent mysticism.62 This observation speaks to Charley Barker's comment that 'madness has 
been appropriated or reconstituted to suit different approaches to knowledge and modes of being in 
the world'.63 A substantial aspect of this thesis, then, is not simply to examine how madness has 
been used to police behaviour, but how it allows for an exploration of subjective possibilities beyond 
the model of the unified coherent subject associated with 'reason, discourse, culture and the mind' 
identified by Showalter.64 
 
Subjectivity 
 
This brings us to the issue of madness and subjectivity: in particular, it raises the question of what it 
means to be a mad subject; and, indeed, if the notion of 'the mad subject' is a possibility or a 
contradiction in terms. James Heartfield, drawing on a liberal conception of 'the subject' derived 
from the Enlightenment philosophers of liberal democracy of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, argues that subjectivity is that which enables  people to act as citizens: in other words, to 
enter into binding contracts such as buying and selling property or undertaking to complete a job of 
work. It is from here that the notion derives its name: 'subjectivity', to be the legal subject of  a state 
or set of institutions. The underlying assumption about subjectivity in this sense is that the subject is 
freely choosing, and therefore capable of being held accountable for the actions they have agreed to 
undertake. Agency, then, is a key feature of personhood. Subjectivity also, however, entails 
responsibilities not necessarily chosen by the subject: for example, if such subjects break the law, 
they are able to be held responsible for their actions, even if the law is one they feel to be unjust.  In 
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this case, Heartfield argues, the 'will of the collective' is held to be the higher good or power by 
which the subject must abide.65 As such, in liberal democracies 'subjectivity is not an optional extra. 
It is the basis upon which contemporary society reproduces itself'.66 It is what makes a person 
subject to law and it assumes a base level of ethical agency. It is, in other words, what makes the 
human animal a human person.  
 
This mode of Enlightenment subjectivity came under substantial fire from poststructuralist forms of 
critique. Jacques Derrida deconstructs the notion in his essay 'Différance':  
 what differs? Who differs? What is différance?....if we accepted this form of the question, in 
 its meaning and its syntax (“What is? “Who is?” “What is that?”), we would have to conclude 
 that différance has been derived, has happened, is to be mastered and governed on the 
 basis of the point of a present being as a Subject, a who.67 
Heartfield parses Derrida's point here as being that différance actually precedes the subject: as there 
can be no différance without the subject, so the subject cannot perceive itself—attain self-
consciousness, and thus the ethical agency attributed to it in the enlightenment mode outlined 
above—without différance. Subjectivity is thus constituted by a split: it cannot be, as the 
Enlightenment narrative has it, a 'unitary' entity, but must itself be available to deconstruction. 
  
Derrida's foundational deconstruction (or perhaps his defoundational deconstruction) of subjectivity 
has had profound implications for the understanding of the notion in the postmodern era. Jean-
François Lyotard lists 'the subject' as one of the major modern 'metanarratives' which 
postmodernism sees as ripe for critique: 
  I will use the term modern to designate any science that legitimates itself with reference 
 to a metadiscourse ... making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such as the 
 dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or 
 working Subject, or the creation of wealth... I define postmodernism as incredulity towards 
 metanarratives.68 
Subjectivity as the foundation of political choice has also come under fire from Michel Foucault, who 
in Discipline and Punish (1977) argues that modern institutions from the prison through to schools 
and hospitals, are all involved in the disciplining of bodies through techniques of  surveillance and 
interview. It is the power of these authorities which constitutes the individual, transfixes them with 
the gaze of authority and thus forms them as subjects. Such a critique is also evident in Louis 
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Althusser's notion of 'interpellation', in which the subject is 'hailed' by the forces of ideology: 
Althusser's central argument is that 'ideology interpellates individuals as Subjects'.69 In other words, 
there is no subject without the ideology of the subject which constitutes it. 
  
Debates around subjectivity are central to intellectual conversations around madness. Legally, 
madness is defined as precisely a lack of subjectivity: in pleading the madness defence in court, the 
defendant's lawyers argue that they could not have been legally responsible for their actions. If the 
plea is accepted they may not be punished for their crime, as they are no longer recognised as 
subjects in the legal sense. In Britain, a similar assumption is at work in the mechanisms by which 
people are 'sectioned' under the Mental Health Act: a patient may be detained against their will or 
without their consent if they are 'too ill' to consent or the assessing practitioners believe that they 
are incapable of making a sound judgement.70 The legal system for defining madness, then, operates 
on the assumption that patients may not be able to assess their own condition: they are not, in the 
terms of the liberal tradition outlined above, 'freely acting subjects'.  
 
This is complicated if we take into account the poststructuralist critiques of subjectivity outlined 
above. If, as Derrida, Foucault and Lyotard all suggest, subjectivity is both, as Judith Butler puts it , 
'the condition for and instrument of agency' and 'at the same time the effect of subordination, 
understood as the deprivation of agency’, then madness is not an individual pathology.71 Rather, it 
becomes, as Charley Barker puts it, 'a base cultural condition'.72 In this view, madness is a 'collective, 
inevitable experience' in which postmodern life has a profound impact on the postmodern subject's 
'increasingly disordered psychology'.73 The metatheoretical differences between these theorists is 
excellently delineated by Angela Woods in her book Schizophrenia: The Sublime Object of Psychiatry 
(2011). Her contention is that the model of madness propounded by Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari in Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1972), is 'a paradigm through which to understand 
subjectivity in the late capitalist era'.74 In other words, Deleuze and Guattari primarily address 
themselves to the schizophrenic quality of both sane and mad human subjectivity under capitalist 
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conditions: schizophrenia is associated with a world that 'has become chaos'.75 Deleuze and Guattari 
are fascinated by, and principally address themselves to, the play of (non)identity; the way that the 
multiplicity and lightness of both the subject and the world means that their unity falls apart if we 
examine them closely.  
 
The sense that schizophrenia is not so much an individual pathology as a foundational logic of 
postmodern subjectivity is also found in the work of Fredric Jameson. The notion is based in his 
conception of the postmodern relation to the historical: the 'crisis in historicity' which defines the 
postmodern moment is that the subject has lost its capacity 'to extend its protensions and 
retensions across the temporal manifold and to organise its past and future into coherent 
experience.'76 Following Jacques Lacan's definition of schizophrenia, he sees this as analogous to 'the 
foreclosure of the name of the Father'—in other words, a malfunction in the signifying chain or the 
'interlocking syntagmatic series of signifiers' which constitutes an utterance or meaning.77 
Proceeding from the analogy  between the schizophrenic's inability to form syntagmatic coherence 
in language with the postmodern subject's inability to grasp the historical, he thus defines the 
postmodern condition as one of schizophrenic dislocation, in which we are unable to 'unify' either 
'the past, present and future of sentence' (language) or 'the past, present and future of biographical 
experience' (temporality).78 The characteristic of postmodern experience is thus one of 'pure 
material signifiers' or a 'series of pure and unrelated presents in time'.79  
 
The schizophrenic mode, then, is the final expression of what he sees as 'the death of the subject', in 
which individual personhood is no longer a tenable cultural formation.80 It is also related to what he 
terms the postmodern 'waning of affect', in which the great modern preoccupation with 'alienation, 
anomie, solitude, social fragmentation and isolation' that depend on the presumption of a subjective 
'monad' in which it makes sense to speak of 'inside and outside', 'authenticity and inauthenticity' 
and 'appearance and reality'—typified in Jameson's work by Edvard Munch's painting 'The Scream'—
is displaced by a critique of the 'ideological and hermeneutic' assumptions which underlie it, thus 
leading to a collapsing of these distinctions.81 The effect of this collapse is that the powerful, tragic 
modes of modernist affect are abandoned, the 'psychopathologies' of the monadic ego left behind in  
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favour of a 'depthlessness' which betokens the end of the 'sense of the unique and the personal'.82 
Jameson, however, argues that along with this affectlessness we find new modes of euphoria which 
are derived from precisely this decentring of subjectivity. As I mentioned in my discussion of 
devolutionary responses to poststructuralist theory, the decentred subject of Jameson and Deleuze's 
critique is often taken as particularly germane to the Scottish condition, which is part of the reason 
why experiences of madness in Scottish texts have so consistently been taken as addressing 
themselves to issues of national identity. 
 
If schizophrenic insanity is a base cultural condition, however—if the postmodern subject is in some 
way fundamentally schizoid—this raises the issue of how it is possible to recognise madness in the 
texts under discussion here. If madness is all-pervasive, how are we to distinguish mad characters in 
texts from the sane? And yet, throughout the texts under discussion in this thesis, we encounter 
characters who are clearly represented as mad in a way that differs from this generalised schizoid 
character of postmodern subjectivity. In some respects, this means that it is equally possible to 
understand literary representations of madness in precisely the opposite way from the 
theoreticisations outlined here. If insanity is recognised as a deviation from 'normal' forms of 
subjectivity in which the agent is capable of making rational decisions, understanding themselves as 
a centred, unified subject and grasping their own biographical  history, then the representation of 
people who are recognisably mad in some respects implies that the agentic subject who is capable of 
making and acting upon their own rational decisions still exists. In this case, madness functions not 
as a model for all forms of human experience, but as specific to a character's circumstances and the 
representations of their psychology. Throughout this thesis, then, one of the central questions I ask 
of the texts is whether, in their representations of madness, the author is exploring what they take 
to be a universal aspect of the human condition, or if this madness is a deviation from a sane and 
normal sense of selfhood. 
 
As such, there are substantial differences between how the texts present the notion of subjectivity . 
Reading madness in these novels is thus a concise way of interpreting the variations between the 
underlying assumptions regarding personhood.  Again and again, the texts present the reader with 
figures who press the limits of what it means to be a subject. Responding to Morvern Callar, Adam 
Verver in The Existential Detective (2012), or Caz in Special (2003), the issue of madness functions 
such that we are forced to ask ourselves whether or not the person represented should be 
considered a human subject. If so, what does this imply about what it means to be human? 
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Madness, then, is inevitably bound up with the question of the definition of individual personhood. 
This is not to say that if we question a character's sanity we are necessarily bound to decide that 
they are lacking in subjectivity: rather, a key indicator that the notion of madness is at play in the 
text is that we are again and again prompted to ask that question. One of the major questions that 
this thesis asks, then, is what, in their representation of madness, of exclusion from the realm of 
subjectivity, do the writers under discussion here suggest that subjectivity consists of? 
 
My own conclusions about subjectivity and agency are that they are both the product of an 
individual sense of agentic control (although not necessarily the individual presence of agentic 
control) and produced by the subject's relationship with wider society (Heartfield makes this point in 
The Death of the Subject Explained, arguing that subjectivity is both held by the individual and 
precisely that which makes an individual capable of responding to and interacting with the social 
world).83 Thus, there are two major strands to this thesis: firstly, I explore madness as a form of soul-
death or 'death-in-life' in which the individual subject feels or experiences their subjectivity as in 
some sense compromised. Secondly, I analyse the ways that madness has been used to deprive the 
mad person of their subjectivity in the social world. In other words, the thesis investigates both the 
experiential (what R. D. Laing terms the 'existential' or phenomenological) mode of madness in 
which the mad person experiences themselves as having become somehow less than human, and 
the processes by which 'madness' is used to deprive those who do not consider themselves mad of 
their social agency.84 
 
Madness as Non-Being 
 
Although, as I have already said, I am hesitant to suggest that madness should be tightly defined, the 
way that madness pushes at the limits of what it means to be human indicates that a central aspect 
of insanity is that it is in some way an experience of or encounter with subjective death. In the texts 
under discussion in this thesis, madness is peculiarly associated with the threat of psychic 
dissolution: of a kind of death which is not necessarily bodily, but which is intimately concerned with 
the possibility or risk of subjective collapse. The relationship between the understanding of madness 
as a form of nothingness or non-being and its constitutive relation to rationality is theorised by 
Foucault, who, through analysing the forms of madness produced by seventeenth and eighteenth 
century medical and juridical discourses, attempts to approach the conceptual 'caesura' which, by 
the early nineteenth century, radically separates the sane from the mad, reason from unreason. For 
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Foucault, then, the study of madness is foundational because he regards the distinction between 
unreason and reason as a constitutive aspect of the development of modernity.  Madness thus 
becomes contentless—an empty category which exists only to shore up the claims of rationality and 
reason. This is concretised in the practice of confinement, which was, according to him, 
metaphorically appropriate because during the 'classical period' madness 'ceased to be the sign of 
another world' and became the 'paradoxical manifestation of non-being'.85 Confinement, then, 
returns madness to 'its truth as nothingness'.86 This suggests that for Foucault, subjectivity is defined 
by access to reason. To be excluded from reason is to become mad, to become part of the silence 
which is not available to rational discourse. 
 
Foucault's characterisation of madness as nothingness or non-existence chimes with the numerous 
theorists who have characterised madness as a form of death. Elaine Showalter, Jacqueline Rose, 
Maud Ellman and Phyllis Chesler all draw attention to the deathliness of feminine madness; similarly, 
Louis Sass is struck by the way that schizophrenia affects its victims as a kind of 'death-in-life' or 
'soul-death'.87 Chesler argues that the talented women she discusses 'buried their own destinies in 
romantically extravagant marriages, in motherhood, and in approved female pleasure'.88 The notion 
of 'approved female pleasures' as a 'burial'—a form of death—is echoed when Chesler invokes the 
figure of Persephone, who is carried into the underworld, the realm of 'non-being', as the organising 
metaphor for her text, a metaphor which proposes femininity as a 'half -life', a kind of living death, 
from which the talented or exceptional woman is likely to use madness as a form of escape.89 There 
is an intriguing slippage here between conventional middle-class femininity as a sort of death-in-life  
and madness as a kind of living death. Deathliness thus becomes the figurative link between 
femininity and madness: there is something deathly in both femininity and in madness per se. This 
suggests, then, that for feminist thinkers of this stripe, full or true subjectivity is inherently social: it 
depends not just on the coherence of the individual psyche, but on the recognition of that 
coherence in the social world. Furthermore, the non-recognition of this coherence can actually cause 
it to collapse, hence these writers' emphasis on women writers whose sanity has failed them after it 
has already been denied legitimation by the medical establishment.  
 
Similarly, in Madness and Modernism, Louis Sass argues that, despite its heterogeneity, madness has 
'in nearly all cases... been conceptualised as a diminishment or overwhelming of one's very 
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personhood'.90 For Sass, this 'personhood' is constituted by a decline in freedom of action and 
conscious reflection: qualities that he goes on to explore throughout Madness and Modernism in 
relation to how personal autonomy operates in mad experience. Sass argues that madness in its 
schizophrenotype forms should be understood not so much as a 'decline' in freedom of action as the 
result of too much autonomy: his contention, in short, is that there is a form of madness which 
derives from 'a heightening rather than a dimming of conscious awareness, and an alienation not 
from reason but from the emotions and instincts, and the body'.91 Like Showalter and Chesler, Sass 
subscribes to the view that madness is a form of death-in-life. For him, however, this death can be 
understood as the end of:  
 not so much the rational as the appetitive soul, not the mental so much as the physical and 
 emotional aspects of one's being; [resulting] in detachment from the natural rhythms of the 
 body and entrapment in a sort of morbid wakefulness or hyperawareness.92 
He goes on to note that schizophrenia might be better understood less as a brute contradiction 
between the life world of the mad person and 'reality' than of paradox: 'the paradoxes of the 
reflexive.'93 This is a complicated concept, but Sass seems to mean that too great a degree of 
psychological involution, self-consciousness and inwardness leads to a sense of subjective collapse. 
Too great an emphasis on the state of the mind isolates it from bodily experience, leading to a 
maddening isolation of the psychological from the physical. This suggests, then, that for Sass's 
purposes, subjectivity is inherently embodied; what is at issue in schizophrenia is not the collapse of 
the rational mind, but the relationship between mind and body. 
 
Another suggestive interpretation of the relationship between madness and death is adumbrated by 
Jacqueline Rose in The Haunting of Sylvia Plath (1991).94 Discussing the pivotal 'Poem for a Birthday', 
Rose argues that its primary subject is madness. 'What the madhouse threatens' she writes, 'is the 
subject's symbolic capacity, her being in language, whose frightening, but no less necessary, 
preconditions are represented by the poem as the (minimal) preconditions of (minimal) life'.95 If it is 
the case, as Rose suggests, that the precondition of language is the presence of the body, that in 
some sense language stabilises the presence of the body, turns the body into what we understand it 
as being, then madness threatens not only our existence in language, but our existence itself. 
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Madness, in Rose's terms, is thus the unavailability of language. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that 
Rose also foregrounds Plath's sense of madness as allowing her the possibility of creative rebirth: 
 in terms of her identity as a poet, Plath came more and more to view her recovery from 
 madness through shock treatment as a poetic rebirth in which the split between the 
 feminine and creative selves was resolved. In her journals in the late 1950s, she wrote 
 detailed descriptions of her shock treatment, describing 'the deadly sleep of her madness... 
 and waking to a new world, with no name, being born again, and not of woman.96 
This suggests, again, that such a living form of death can have positive consequences, too: a rebirth 
of creativity or creative thoughts. The collapse of selfhood brought about by her inability to access 
language actually precipitates a re-energised relation to the realm of language. 
 
The intuition that mad experience has affinities with deathliness, but that it can also bring about a 
reinvigorated and renewed relationship to the phenomenological world is one of the major 
theoretical contentions of R. D. Laing. As Angela Woods has shown, Laing's account of schizophrenia 
differs markedly between his two best known works, The Divided Self (1960) and The Politics of 
Experience (1967). In The Divided Self, Laing contends that unlike the ordinary person, the 
schizophrenic cannot take 'the realness, aliveness, autonomy and identity of  himself and others for 
granted'.97 He exists in a state of extreme ontological insecurity, interpreting his own existence in 
the world as lacking a secure 'existential status as a being among others'.98 Laing repeatedly 
emphasises that the risk inherent in schizophrenia is one of psychic death: the efforts of the 
schizophrenic at communication (which, unlike many of Laing's predecessors, notably Karl Jaspers, 
he takes to be comprehensible if appropriately contextualised in the schizophrenic's social world, 
particularly the immediate family), are addressed to 'keeping himself alive'; an effort, in other 
words, to 'prevent himself losing himself'.99 By contrast, The Politics of Experience famously posits 
the schizophrenic as voyaging in the 'inner space and time of consciousness'; madness, here, 'need 
not be all breakdown. It may also be breakthrough'.100 Thus we see one iteration of insanity as soul-
death, and, in Laing's later work, a form of soul-death that takes on a spiritual dimension 
foreshadowing a rebirth into a unified, transcendent consciousness. 
  
Throughout the literature on madness we therefore see a common association of the experience 
with death. However, unlike the finality of actual, bodily death, madness for Rose, Chesler and 
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Showalter and Laing is a form of death from which there is a possibility of return. Whether the death 
takes the form of a suicide attempt (which is doubly deathly, in that it suggests that life had become 
a form of death to which non-existence is preferable), the form of a death-in-life of vacuous 
femininity, or of a close encounter or narrow escape from death or non-being, as it does in trauma, 
an experience of madness is a death which (unless it ends in bodily death) maintains the possibility 
of a return to the world of the living.  
 
Throughout this thesis, then, I draw attention to the relationship figured between madness and 
deathliness. Certain texts, such as Gray's Lanark and Thompson's The Existential Detective and The 
Falconer represent a full psychotic break into a deathlike world, whereas others skirt the issue, 
raising it as a threat or possibility but stopping short of representing a moment of florid psychosis. 
Thus, although the thesis does not adopt a single theoretical framework for defining insanity 
(because, as I show in each chapter, the authors have drawn on an array of different paradigms of 
insanity) each of the texts under discussion here has to do with madness as a threat to the essence 
of selfhood: as an encounter with the possibility of psychic dissolution, from which there is 
nonetheless also the possibility of return. 
 
Selection of Texts 
 
The texts analysed in this thesis have thus been selected under two rubrics: firstly, for their 
representations of madness and mad experience, which throughout have affinities with madness as 
a form of death-in-life, and secondly, how they have been situated qua Scotland and Scottish 
literature. The first three chapters address writers who are well-established in Scotland: Alasdair 
Gray, Janice Galloway and Alice Thompson. The final two examine the work of Elspeth Barker, Bella 
Bathurst, and Alice Thompson, about whom there has been relatively little written, although both 
Thompson and Barker are now garnering more attention. Despite being known elsewhere too, the 
majority of the critical work on Alasdair Gray, Janice Galloway and Alan Warner, the writers whom I 
address in the opening three chapters, operates within what I have called a 'devolutionary' critical 
framework. I have co-opted the term to denote criticism which responds to Scottish texts within a 
nationalist framework. It is borrowed from Carole Jones, who uses it to describe fiction emanating 
from Scotland between the referendum of 1979 and the establishment of a Scottish parliament in 
1999.101 By 'devolutionary' I mean that these critics are most concerned to read the issues raised in 
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any text as pertaining to the specifics of Scottish national identity, Scotland's political relationship 
with the rest of Britain, or in relation to a specifically Scottish canon. 
 
There are a number of writers whose exclusion calls for an explanation. I have avoided addressing 
Irvine Welsh because I have chosen to focus on writers who have been the subject of a great deal of 
devolutionary or nationalist criticism, but who are not well-known to critics working outside this 
area. Welsh, along with Ali Smith and A.L. Kennedy, are all well represented in critical arenas both 
within and outside Scotland, and I therefore concluded that the significance of madness in these 
writers is securely established, although I am confident that further illuminating work on their fiction 
will appear in due course. Because of their international reputations, the representations of 
madness in their work are also not subject to the same forms of reading with such a keen 
devolutionary emphasis as the less well-known authors under discussion here. The same is true for 
Iain Bank's The Wasp Factory (1984). I have also, for reasons of space, chosen only to focus on fiction 
within this thesis. There are two other omissions which may need explanation: James Kelman and 
James Robertson. Although I admire his work, Kelman is not present because there are few 
representations of mad experience in his writing. Robertson I excluded precisely because his work is 
highly informed by the nationalist paradigms proffered by devolutionary critics. As this thesis is in 
part an attempt to correct readings that I see as problematic, there is little to be gained by engaging 
with a writer who is so explicitly influenced by precisely the models of criticism that create problems 
in the interpretation of madness in other writers. 
 
The Texts 
 
I begin with an analysis of madness in the major novels of Alasdair Gray: Lanark, 1982, Janine (1984) 
and Poor Things (1992), arguing that the representations of unreason and mental breakdown in the 
first two novels have to do with the central protagonists ’ overbearing desire for both self-control, 
and for control over the other. The relationship between death and madness plays out in Gray's 
work through psychotic episodes followed by suicide or a suicide attempt. This motif is central to 
Lanark, 1982, Janine and Poor Things. Contra those devolutionary readings of Gray's work suggesting 
that he celebrates the role of the creative artist in society, I maintain that the relationship between 
artistic endeavour and mental breakdown in his work indicates an ambivalence about the figure of 
the creative artist. The drive to produce a perfect aesthetic artefact is figured as a metaphor for the 
urge to gain complete control over the artist's environment. His work can, I argue, productively be 
read as proffering narratives of mental breakdown and recovery, in which the central character loses 
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and then reasserts a concrete sense of himself. In this respect, I position myself against those 
devolutionary analyses that emphasise Gray’s affinities with postmodernism.  
 
My next chapter deals with Janice Galloway’s first two novels, The Trick Is to Keep Breathing, and 
Foreign Parts (1994). In both, I address Galloway's representations of traumatic experience. The 
Trick Is to Keep Breathing and Foreign Parts both stage the effects of an encounter with the death of 
a loved one. In Trick, this takes the form of the immediate aftermath of a bereavement; in Foreign 
Parts, Galloway examines the longer terms of effect of a childhood encounter with death, which 
takes the form of a subjectivity which is preoccupied with the deathliness of major historical events, 
and in which even the most innocuous of cultural artefacts are understood as implying the threat of 
death and non-being. Galloway thus stages an encounter with death: death as a form of subjective 
non-existence which is brought about by an encounter with bodily, physical death. It is not simply 
the case, though, that the protagonists of both novels have encountered death and have gone 
through or are undergoing a period of mourning. Instead, their encounter with deathliness appears 
to, in Rose's words, undermine 'the (minimal) conditions of (minimal) life' for the protagonists.102 
The emphasis throughout both novels is thus how to bring these minimal conditions into existence: 
how, in other words, to make life bearable. 
 
Chapter Three takes as its subject the unsettling affectlessness of Morvern Callar, the protagonist of 
Alan Warner’s first two novels, Morvern Callar (1994) and These Demented Lands (1998). The entire 
effect of Warner's first text rests on the central ambiguity of Morvern's actions. Paradoxically, the 
fact that Morvern is never described as 'mad' in the novel intensifies the effect of the preoccupation 
with madness: in refusing to name Morvern's behaviour as either mad or sane, the novel raises the 
issue of whether Morvern is insane to the extent that she has passed beyond the Catch 22 threshold 
and is simply unaware of how deviant her actions appear to others, or whether she is in fact 
aggressively sane and simply disregards social conventions around mourning and the disposal of the 
dead because it is expedient to do so. In this sense, then, the text raises the question of the limits of 
humanity and human subjectivity identified as a key aspect of literary responses to madness above.   
In These Demented Lands, we see a representation of a kind of insane afterlife, in which an 
experience of deathliness leaves Morvern in a bizarre, hallucinatory death-world. First establishing 
that Morvern's lack of emotion disrupts our ability to read her as a sane subject, I use Sianne Ngai’s 
discussion of texts which concern themselves with affective gaps or illegibilities to situate the 
significance of Morvern’s flatness. In contrast to Craig's devolutionary reading of Morvern, which 
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sees her peregrinations through this world as drawing attention to Scotland's 'inconsequential 
history', I argue that the novels comment on the modes of subjectivity offered to Morvern as legible 
ways of being.103 
 
In the final two chapters, I move away from discussions of what might be termed classic 
devolutionary texts, (novels from authors that one would expect to see in any book-length 
discussion of contemporary Scottish writers) and towards three women authors who have been the 
object of relatively little critical attention either from critics working in a devolutionary framework or 
in the academy in general. Because there is substantially less criticism, devolutionary or otherwise, 
available on their work, these chapters address wider theoretical and generic questions rather than 
offering an alternative to nationalist interpretations of the novels.  
 
The first deals with Bella Bathurst and Elspeth Barker, two (somewhat problematically) Gothic 
writers. Bathurst's novel, Special (2002), begins by delineating the relationships between a group of 
teenagers  staying in an former lunatic asylum and the various forms of mental distress from which 
the girls suffer, specifically self-starvation, fear of their own sexuality, and a desubjectivisation 
related to self-commodification. In O Caledonia (1991) and Special, we see iterations both of the 
femininity as a form of death-in-life trope, and, in the presentation of cousin Lila in O Caledonia, an 
example of the madness as mental death brought about by the constraints placed on her behaviour.  
O Caledonia similarly shows the labels of madness or sanity are deployed as a form of a social 
control. Lastly, the novel examines the relationship between madness and the imagination, 
maintaining, even as it criticises, the possibility of a transcendent experience of aesthetic beauty 
related to the imaginative autonomy of the principle characters. 
 
In my final chapter, dealing with Alice Thompson, I begin with a discussion of  how death and non-
being are central to the novels: in Pandora's Box (1998), The Falconer (2008) and The Existential 
Detective (2012) the disappearance or murder of a key character forces the protagonists to confront 
the possibility of their own psychic non-being or collapse. Thompson, I argue, is the most 
theoretically informed writer under discussion here, with her work gesturing towards the 
postmodern decentring of identity identified as a key aspect of the poststructuralist (and 
postsubjective) mode delineated by Derrida, Foucault, Fredric Jameson and others. Even here, 
however, these postmodern madnesses are situated in a context which also foregrounds specific 
forms of insanity such as auditory and visual hallucinations. I argue that Thompson’s earlier work 
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sets up a concern with the relationship between logocentricism and the gender binary. In the later 
novels, the link between reason and gender is not as explicit; instead, Thompson thematises the 
aesthetic appeal of the rational through her striking use of visual patterning. Her later work is, I 
suggest, deeply concerned with the ramifications such conceptions of subjectivity have for modes of 
justice. The texts, I argue, maintain the central importance of this issue, even in a contex t in which it 
does not make sense to speak of the individual agentic subject outlined by Heartfield. 
 
Throughout, I have attempted to demonstrate both the heterogeneity of metaphors and 
representations of madness in contemporary Scottish writing, and how their underlying concern 
with the limits of subjectivity lends them a certain coherence in terms of the issues they address . 
These have been used to expose and contest patriarchal power relations, to explore the ambivalent 
nature of creativity, and to question the extent to which an individual can and should consider 
themselves an autonomous subject. Their uses are not simply political: the exigencies of 
representing mad experience in fiction lends itself to an exploration of how formal qualities 
contribute to our understanding of rational and irrational modes of thought, and to the 
development of formal innovation which is compelling and beautiful on its own terms. I have, where 
appropriate, made comparisons between the ways that the different texts deal with these 
questions; however, even where the texts are approaching a similar subject, as, for example, in the 
ways that the distinction between sane and mad, reason and unreason, is used to police behaviour, I 
have been careful to pay as much attention to the distinctions between the implications of these 
representations as their similarities. This is because, in the final analysis, this thesis is attempting to 
broaden the scope of Scottish criticism and to open new avenues of enquiry. 
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Chapter One:  'Sick of Domineering'—Bad Mental States in the Major Novels of Alasdair Gray 
 
As I discussed in my introduction, Alasdair Gray is the foundational figure of what came to be known 
as the second 'Scottish Renaissance': his magnum opus, Lanark (1981), was published in the 
aftermath of the Scottish independence referendum of 1979 and immediately heralded as the 
beginning of a new dawn in Scottish writing—what Janice Galloway in her introduction to the 2002 
edition refers to as the 'precursor of efflorescence of contemporary Scottish literature politics [and] 
painting'.1 His work is universally acknowledged to be some of the most significant ever to have 
emanated from Scotland: Anthony Burgess positions Gray as the 'greatest Scottish novelist since 
Walter Scott', underlining his point by drawing a comparison between Lanark  and Ulysses.2 As I 
discussed in the introduction, it is Lanark that is under discussion when Cairns Craig makes his 
famous pronouncement that Scottish culture can be characterised as 'erasure'.3 Christopher Harvie 
goes so far as to contend that Gray is a political symbol for Scottish independence in his own right, 
while Stefanie Lehner reads the subordinated and abused women in 1982, Janine as ‘allegorical 
emblems of Scotland’s pre-devolutionary political situation’, linking this with Gray's desire to 
inaugurate, in Lanark, a reborn Scottish tradition.4 In a similar mode, Camille Manfredi claims that 
from Gray's work there emerges the 'figure of artist as a cultural mender', who directs his 'boundless 
energy' away from Cairns Craig's 'culture of erasure'.5 
 
Many critics have also constructed Gray's work as paradigmatically postmodern: Donald Kaczvinsky, 
Randall Stevenson, Beat Witschi, Luis Juan and Neil James Rhind, inter alia, have all commented 
extensively on this relationship, arguing that he belongs in this category due to his interest in 'the 
primary fictiveness of fiction, the role of narrative and the problems of narration and the 
relationship between fictional structures and other structures of prose writing'.6 Throughout this 
chapter, I explore how Gray's presentation of madness complicates the understanding of him as a 
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postmodernist writer, instead suggesting that in some respects his vision of subjectivity rests on a 
humanistic conception of a 'true' or 'essential' self which can be compromised, lost, found or 
regained through different forms of salutary action such as a form of gently nihilist acceptance of 
death (as in Lanark), love (as in 1982, Janine), or political commitment (as in Poor Things). 
 
Lanark 
 
 In Lanark (1981), Duncan Thaw, the protagonist, ends his life, and possibly the life of a woman who 
has rejected his sexual advances, after a descent into madness precipitated by his perception that 
the first 'great' work of art he set out to create is a failure. Duncan's counterpart in the fantastic 
sections of the novel (Books Three and Four), Lanark, also has to face the threat of psychic collapse: 
his mental state develops into a psychosomatic condition called dragonhide, a psychic disease which 
is, I argue, born of the sufferer's desire to assert their autonomy and isolate themselves from any 
need of others. In both instances, crushing anxieties about the relationship between physical 
embodiment and psychic life are at the root of the problem: Thaw's experience of a psychotic break, 
for example, could be well described by Louis Sass's characterisation of the schizophrenic as 
simultaneously 'dead yet hyperalert—a sort of corpse with insomnia'.7 However, both instances end 
by suggesting that the possibility of an integrated, healthy subjectivity is possible, if not attainable 
for Lanark or Thaw. The interplay between Duncan's madness, his artistic practice and his sexual 
desire also indicate that despite the novel's well-established position as a foundational text in the 
devolutionary criticism's canon of Scottish postmodernism mentioned above, it nonetheless evinces 
a decidedly ambivalent attitude towards creative endeavour. 
 
In Chapter Three of Madness and Modernism, Louis Sass delineates a type of person that he deems 
'schizoid'.8 Although people of this character type do not necessarily suffer a schizophrenic break, he 
maintains that the majority of schizophrenic patients exhibit characteristic of this type before their 
first major psychotic episode. The schizoid character is typified, he argues, by 'both coldness and 
hypersensitivity, obstinacy and vacillation, rebelliousness and timidity'.9 They are 'cold and 
unfeeling', 'overly cerebral and calculating', but, beneath this apparent imperviousness to others, 
'highly sensitive, thin-skinned, and self-deprecatory, highly vulnerable to slights and criticisms'.10 
They tend to be intellectually ambitious, daydreaming how to 'prove their work to the world', and 
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are 'arrogant, superior and rebellious' as often as they are retiring and sensitive.11 In particular, their 
sexual being and romantic relationships are often highly vexed, indicating the problematic relation 
physicality which Sass takes to be at the heart of the schizophrenic condition. They tend to evince a 
yearning desire for human contact, yet promptly break such contact off at any perceived slight. 
 
Throughout the realist sections of Lanark, the protagonist, Duncan Thaw, is presented very much in 
this vein. As I mention above, Thaw undergoes a psychotic episode at the end of book 2, which leads 
ultimately to the murder of a woman and his own suicide. What the earlier sections of the novel 
suggest, though, is that this psychosis has been brewing for some time. Throughout books 1 and 2, 
Thaw wrestles with the maddening sense that there is something utterly scandalous about the very 
fact of his embodied existence. He characterises sexuality as 'so disgusting that it had to be indulged 
secretly and not mentioned to others. It fed on dreams of cruelty, had its climax in a jet of jelly and 
left him feeling weak and lonely' (p. 182). While on holiday in rural Scotland, he gloomily projects 
this sense of his own depravity onto the garden which his bedroom overlooks: 'In the corruption of 
the garden he sensed something friendly to his own malign fantasies.' (p. 181). The connection 
between his psychological state and his physical being is underlined through Thaw's recurrent 
respiratory problems. As his doctor briskly says to him: 
 I suppose you know that your kind of asthma is partly a psychological illness?... It's not 
 widely agreed upon yet, but there is evidence that nervous diseases are aggravated by 
 masturbation. The inmates of lunatic asylums, for example, masturbate very often.  
 (p. 181) 
 As such, his inability to breathe is directly related to his psychological state.  
 
This background of a vexed relationship between the mental and physical becomes acute once it is 
yoked to the possibility, and then the denial, of sexual release. His physical frustration is a major 
contributing factor to his psychotic break; after a visit from Marjory Laidlaw, an unremarkable girl 
with whom he was briefly involved, he exclaims that the painting on which he has been obsessively 
working over the past months is not art at all, but mere 'hungry howling' (p. 341). This realisation, 
along with further rejection by a prostitute, leads to an episode of psychosis, from which he emerges 
believing himself to have done 'something foul', quite possibly the murder of another woman, Big 
June Haig, who, like both Marjory and the prostitute, rejected his advances in the past (p. 350). 
Madness, then, is intimately related to an inability to cope with the physical world: like the schizoid 
personalities delineated by Sass, Thaw's psychological state and his physical illness are intimately 
                                                                 
11
 Sass, p. 77. 
36 
 
related to one other, mediated particularly through the 'malign fantasies' of his sexual imagination 
(p. 181). 
 
That said, Lanark's theme is not simply the representation of the psychotic crisis of a schizoid 
personality, but the intimacies between madness, a desire for power, and creativity. As Sass 
mentions above, schizoid personalities are often highly ambitious, viewing their work as the 
principle mode by which to justify their existence, and indeed we can see this very clearly in the 
episode immediately before Thaw's psychotic break, in which he is working on a mural representing 
the Book of Genesis. The tree of life is crowned with a phoenix, and in its branches are sheltered 
'crows, pigeons, wrens and squirrels' (p. 320). Duncan has no problem with his depiction of the 
denizens of the Garden of Eden; the trouble: 
 began in the background where history was acted in the loops and delta of the river on its 
 way to the ocean. The more he worked the more the furious figure of God kept popping in 
 and having to be removed[....] It would have been easy painting to the glory of Stevenson, 
 Telford, Brunel and a quarter million Irish navvies. 
 (p. 321) 
Perversely, it is the changing, evolving life that Thaw tries to rid himself of in his attempts to drive 
God from the picture. As he believes himself to be striving for a sense of wholeness and unity,  this 
sense of constant flux, this inability to see the mural as finished, in the end drives him mad. Thaw's 
imagination thus seems fundamentally corrupt, revealing a deep-rooted tendency towards stasis 
and ultimately, towards death. As such, the desire for power and perfection, for 'mastery' and 
complete creative control, are revealed as orientated towards madness, deathliness, and stasis. 
Thaw's descent into psychosis is thus linked with an inability to achieve the aesthetic control he 
desires. Furthermore, the text explicitly links his inability to finish the painting, and his rejection by 
two women, a former girlfriend and a prostitute he goes to see to alleviate the desire he experiences 
while working on the mural. This suggests that his madness is not just derived from a sense of sexual 
and artistic failure, but that its provenance is related to his failure to achieve aesthetic and sexual 
control of his surroundings. Thus, the relationship between madness and the desire for dominance is 
a major concern of Gray's, one to which he returns in 1982, Janine. 
 
The psychotic section is fractured and sinister, as if his consciousness cannot cope with ontological 
wholeness, but must instead break every object it encounters into its constituent parts. He sees the 
brain of a friend's cat 'in section, white and pink and pleated like the underneath of a mushroom', 
the tongue visible 'to its root in the thin corridor of her throat' (p. 347), and in an image that 
strikingly evokes a deathly crow or vulture, hallucinates that he has metamorphosed into a 'huge 
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black bird', swinging 'as if on trapezes across the city's cut honeycomb ' (p. 347). His visions reflect 
the experience of many psychotics: Sass, for example, shows that when asked to draw a human 
being, schizophrenics will often 'show the figure from external and internal standpoints at the same 
time, with both clothing and inner organs visible in an incongruous combination of perspectives'.12 
Thus, the deathliness of the psychotic moment is indicated in Thaw's very vision of living beings. 
Strikingly, too, his psychosis reflects his aesthetic ambitions: just as in the mural he attempts to 
develop a new perspective which will allow him to see his subject matter from all angles 
simultaneously, so his vision while mad allows him to see both the surface and interior of the cat's 
body and the households of suburban Glasgow at the same time. This, again, links his creative 
efforts to the desire for power: Thaw's psychotic break suggests a sinister form of transcendence in 
which his consciousness is convinced of its godlike ability to see from more than one perspective at 
once. Again, the parallelisms with Sass's version of schizophrenia are clear. 
 
The 'intricate compact life' of Glasgow that Thaw sees during his psychotic break 'fascinated, then 
appalled him' (p. 347). Particularly disturbing is the way that Thaw sees the minutiae of quotidian 
domesticity as if these homes have been dissected: his vision while mad has a clinical quality to it 
suggestive of vivisection. That the intimation of the 'intricate compact life' of the city both fascinates 
and horrifies him is evocative of the disgust at being able to see the inner workings of the living 
body, which is echoed by the way he sees the cat's brain in 'section'. It also recalls the time that 
Thaw spends studying 'morbid anatomy' to better grasp the muscular functions of the human body 
(p. 251). Both Thaw's aesthetic failure in the period leading to his psychosis, and the timbre of his 
vision while experiencing it, therefore imply that his imagination is inherently morbid: it depends on 
the dissection, and thus the death, of its subject.  
 
This is indicative of a highly ambivalent attitude towards creative work. As we saw in the 
introduction, Gray's role in Scottish literary history has always been understood as foundational. The 
publication of Lanark instantiated a new era in Scottish letters, banishing the perceived limitations of 
Scottish writing and establishing a new dispensation in which those like Thaw, 'the inheritor of 
Scottish culture as erasure' whose 'imagination encounters Glasgow as an unrecognised place, an 
unimagined place', can finally develop their creativity unimpeded by his country's lack of historical 
investment in literature.13 The sense that Lanark's representation of artistic work is uncomplicatedly 
positive is reiterated throughout almost all the devolutionary criticism on the subject: there is, to the 
best of my knowledge, not a single devolutionary critic who does not see Gray's project as centrally 
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addressing itself to widening the possibilities for creative expression in Scotland. As we can see from 
Gray's representation of the relationship between madness and creativity, however, the novel's 
attitude towards the latter is considerably more ambivalent than these readings suppose. In his early 
responses to the novel, Craig's view of the Lanark-Thaw character is that he is 'an eternal quester 
after love and creativity in an environment that denies him both'.14 As we can see from Thaw's 
psychosis, however, this 'quest' is by no means entirely salutary. Both the desire for creativity and 
for love, at least of the sexual kind, are revealed, through Thaw's madness, as imbricated in the 
desire for power and control which are not necessarily virtuous in their own right, but are deployed 
in the service of making the worker and the lover feel 'exalted and masterful' (p.  5). 
 
The novel's concern with the relationship between mental and physical breakdown is broadened in 
the fantastic sections of the novel. In Unthank, Thaw's avatar, Lanark, suffers from the disease 
dragonhide. Throughout, the malady is presented not as physical illness but as a diseased 
psychological state which is exacerbated by emotional disruption and suffering: the 'hide' itches and 
spreads when he is tired (p. 23) or humiliated and rejected (p. 28). It is also chronic and eventually 
fatal, causing both the psychological and then physical dissolution of its victims. Thus, through the 
dissolution of their psychological integrity, the sufferer of dragonhide comes to lose their bodily 
identity; this moment comes about at the point at which the mental state of the character is no 
longer bearable, leading to a psychological collapse similar to a mental breakdown,  but figured in 
both psychic and physical form.  
 
What is striking about Unthank in comparison to the realist sections of the novel is that it is not 
simply Lanark whose physical being and psychological state are in unhappy relation with one 
another. Everyone, in this section of the novel, is diseased. The fantastic sections of the text are thus 
not just a portrayal of an individual psyche under immense strain, but a world which is inherently 
pathogenic. In this sense, Lanark echoes R. D. Laing's comments in the preface to the second edition 
of The Divided Self (1965), in which he argues that in a world which is constituted by 'false realities', 
what is taken to be psychological normality is in some sense a 'pervasive madness'.15 Furthermore, 
Laing explicitly links this madness to the frustration of the sexual realm which, as we have seen in 
the realist sections of Lanark, and will go on to see in the fantastic ones, is also a major cause of 
insanity in the novel. Equally, as I go on to show later, both Laing and Gray retain the hope that this 
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madness may one day be resolved. Thus, the possibility of 'transcendence' and 'human freedom' is 
retained.16 
 
That said, Gray's initial delineation of a pathogenic world is if anything more pessimistic than Laing's. 
These Unthank illnesses are not simply represented as pervasive: they are in fact constitutive of 
individual identity. This is alluded to when, at the beginning of the Unthank section, Lanark is told 
that his dragonhide is a more reliable identifying feature than variable factors like height and weight, 
and is further indicated by the names of the Unthank illnesses, which designate the kind of person 
the victim is. Crustaceans, who suffer from dragonhide, are characteristically withdrawn, slow-
moving and resistant to change. Vertebrates, suffering from rigour, are upstanding and attracted to 
hierarchical and disciplined forms of employment, particularly the military, but ultimately unyielding 
and brittle. Those who suffer from mouths and softs are good-humoured, and indecisive, typically 
over-relying on the opinion of others to form a sense of their own selfhood. The kind of person one 
is, then, is in Unthank defined by one's psychological pathologies. 
 
This metaphorical nosological system recalls the Hippocratic theory of humours, in which sickness 
and health are related to characterological type. In other words, certain kinds of people are 
predisposed to certain forms of sickness. Roy Porter adumbrates how the Hippocratic humours are 
'responsible for bodily shape and physique' and 'the temperaments'; the typography, he claims, 
propounded historically convincing links between 'inner constitutional states (temper) and outer 
physical manifestations (complexion or, in the sick, disease systems)'.17 There is a key difference, 
however: in the Hippocratic system, a subject's responses to the world are governed by the 
humours, each of which has its place. The system recognises that each humour has a function in the 
body, and that the body would fail without some combination of the four. In the world of Unthank, 
however, the very disposition of the characters is pathologised. To be a person at all is thus to be 
diseased.   
 
Interestingly, the diseases in Unthank, like Thaw's malady in the realist sections, are all indicative of 
a diseased relation to others. Dragonhide causes its victims to 'combust' after their metallic hide 
encloses them completely, causing the heat of the human body trapped inside to reach such an 
intensity that their outer casing explodes, releasing a huge amount of energy. The disease is 
indicative of a form of madness which wishes to deny humanity, instead reaching for a state of be ing 
similar to that of an inanimate object, particularly a machine. It is thus a metaphoricisation of a self-
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alienating desire for independence and isolation. The human warmth of those who suffer from 
dragonhide is trapped by their metallic exterior, and it is eventually this inability to exchange 
warmth, to make contact, which causes their death. This again echoes Laing, who in The Divided Self 
describes 'a man who imagines he is a machine' as the modern schizophrenic par excellence.18 We 
can see this emphasis on the machine-like throughout the characterisation of dragonhide: the claw 
Lanark has developed as a result of his dragonhide has a metallic quality, and he cannot help but 
admire its 'glossy cold hide' and 'curving steel-blade claws' (p. 41). Like a machine, too, it 'does all he 
wanted with perfect promptness' (p. 40). Most telling of all, it has 'no feeling in it', indicating the 
concern with and hypersensitivity towards rejection and criticism which is a key feature of the 
schizoid personality for Sass (p. 40). 
 
There are other facets to the illness, too. The intensification of Lanark's dragonhide after the night 
he spends with Rima suggests the intense discomfort he feels about issues pertaining to embodied 
existence—a characteristic of schizophrenic experience also commented on by Sass, who argues that 
such forms of madness herald the collapse:  
 not so much of the rational as the appetitive soul, not the mental so much as the physical 
 and emotional aspects of one's being; this results in detachment from the natural rhythms 
 of the body.19 
Lanark's landlady tells him that  all the victims of dragonhide she has known are of a similar 
characterological type to Lanark, 'decent quiet fellows like yourself' who could, before their end, 
only lie quietly in bed and wait for their death (p. 41). The noting of their decency and quietness is 
perhaps a veiled indication of their discomfiture with the physical realm: 'decency' and 'quietness' 
both nod towards a discomfiture about sex. 
 
Sass uses the representations of madness in modernist writing to posit two poles of insanity, 
contrasting the  'blind and passionate intensities' of the id and 'the darkness of the minds' who 
suffer from madness in this form with the madness of 'uncanny vistas', 'gleaming surfaces' and 
'brilliant light' characteristic of the alienation of the 'death-mood' of madness in the modernist 
mode.20 These two poles he links to madness as either a lack or excess of autonomy respectively. For 
him, florid derangement of the kind represented by Goya in 'The Madhouse at Zaragoza' denotes an 
animal loss of control of the instinctual urges: the inability to make rational decisions and to act on 
them. The less well-recognised form of madness, which he focuses on throughout Madness and 
Modernism, is, as I have already mentioned, related to the human as a form of machine. This he 
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characterises through  the visual attributes we associate with machinery: clean lines, brilliant light, 
and gleaming surfaces. In Sass's terms, then, dragonhide is indicative of 'tendencies towards a form-
seeking and contemplative self-control, toward separation of self from world and self from other 
selves, and towards fragmenting hyperawareness and a kind of cerebral self-interrogation'.21 
 
This stands in contrast to the mental state metaphorised by the illnesses 'mouths' and 'softs', both of 
which suggest the possibility of psychic collapse or soul-death through the loss of psychic integrity, a 
lack of self-control, and a subjectivity which allows itself to be defined by, and depends on, the 
opinions of others. This is clearest when Lanark is sickened by the symptoms of the mouth disease 
Gay shows him: miniaturised human lips appear around the body of victim, publicly articulating the 
voice of an imagined other who coldly assesses their actions (pp. 45-46). It is this revelation that 
drives Lanark to despair of Unthank entirely, and to run in disgust to the cemetery where he calls , in 
a moment of suicidal abandon, upon another mysterious great mouth to deliver him from the city 
and into the hands of The Institute (p. 48). 
  
As opposed to the 'fragmenting' nature of dragonhide and its analogous disease, rigour, with their 
emphases on psychic 'from-seeking' and 'self-interrogation', mouths and softs can be typified more 
as a form of rot, in which the failure of the sufferer's individual psychic autonomy is metaphoricised 
by a deeply disquieting 'gloopy' quality to the victim's appearance and personalities (p. 9) . Nomy 
Arpaly, in her article 'Which Autonomy', argues that when we see people as lacking in autonomy, we 
mean that they are ‘weak-willed’, or over-reliant on the opinion of others: ‘those people who seem 
to lack not efficacy, but various kinds of independence of mind: servile and submissive people... and 
people who blindly accept the views of their gurus or their communities’.22 Thus, the essential 
component of mouths is that an awareness of the opinion of others becomes pathological; the 
sufferers cannot form their own views, especially about themselves, because the mouths drown 
them out with the voice of a more authoritative other. As such, the diseases of both too much and 
too little autonomy precipitate a form of madness; the encounter with nothingness, the slide into 
the void, the possibility of complete psychic collapse. 
 
Furthermore, the madness of autonomy and its failure in Lanark do not simply raise questions about 
subjective interiority. The entire political organisation of Unthank and its neighbouring countries is 
predicated on the exploitation of these diseases by the system's more powerful beneficiaries: 
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specifically, members of The Institute, the byzantine total-institution, (half parliament and half 
spacecraft) to which Lanark and Rima withdraw after their attempts at suicide. As I noted in my 
introduction, commentary on the way that the label of madness has been used to promote social 
compliance and good behaviour has a long and illustrious history in both feminist responses to 
madness, and in critical theory.23 What is perhaps rather less well-documented is the suggestion that 
insidious and all encompassing power systems, such as The Institute, induce madness and subjective 
collapse, either directly or indirectly, in order to profit from it. This, however, is precisely the 
implication of much of Lanark. 
 
We see this most clearly in the way that The Institute's electrical power is derived from the 
'combustion' of people, such as Lanark and Rima, who suffer from dragonhide. Here, the hides of the 
dragons completely enclose their bodies, leading to an accumulation of heat that eventually results 
in a controlled explosion which is then used to power The Institute's sinisterly comfortable research 
facilities. Mouths, we learn, are exploited in a different way: as their bodies disintegrate, they are 
sluiced into an enormous drainage system and reconstituted as food for the more fortunate 
members of the community. Lanark witnesses this process in the ominously labelled 'deterioration 
ward', to which 'hopeless' softs are taken. The room is full of a 'slithering multitudinous hiss' and a 
'foul odour' (p. 65). Thus, both mouths and softs clearly delineate the way in which personal and 
political autonomy are imbricated: an over-reliance on the good opinion of one's peers leads, in the 
fantastic world of Unthank, to bodily deterioration which can then be exploited for the benefit of 
those (literally) higher up the food chain. 
 
There is one figure in the Unthank section of the novel, however, who does not suffer from any 
diseases. This is Sludden, a manipulative scenester who, when Lanark returns from his sojourn at The 
Institute, has become the Provost of Unthank. Given his monstrous ability to wound and manipulate 
his friends and supporters (it his voice that is articulated in the mouth from which Gay suffers)  he 
immediately strikes the reader as a prime candidate for a particularly grotesque manifestation of a 
disease. However, he has none. In this, his visible healthiness is related to the way that conceptions 
of mental health and illness are imbricated in normative ethical distinctions about the right way to 
live. As Laing points out, healthiness, too, can be insane: the 'normal' or 'adjusted' state is all too 
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often an adjustment to the 'false realities' of the world in which we live.24 Sludden, then, is a model 
for the sort of person who is adjusted to the nightmarish, dystopian future Glasgow that is Unthank. 
He holds that:  
 moments of vivid excitement are what make life worth living, moments when a man feels 
 exalted and masterful. We can get them from drugs, crime and gambling [...] sports, music 
 or religion [...] and we get them from work and love. 
  (p. 5) 
 It is telling that for Sludden, this ‘vivid excitement’ is synonymous with mastery. In the world of the 
Unthank, the only way to avoid being becoming diseased, and thus likely to fall prey to the 
cannibalistic energies of The Institute, is to be aligned with the desire for power. Gray presents 
Sludden as having internalised this project to the point where he understands power over others not 
only as a means to achieving his own ends, but as a pleasurable sensation in itself.  
 
I would like to end my discussion of Lanark, then, by drawing together the form that insanity and 
power takes throughout the novel. As I have shown, in both sections, Gray explores the troubling 
relationship between the desire for power and an experience of madness. In the Thaw sections of 
the novel, a psychotic break is brought about after his fantasies of 'mastery' and domination in both 
the aesthetic and sexual realm are shown to be untenable (p. 50). In the Lanark section, by contrast, 
fantasies of mastery and domination—Sludden's 'exalted and masterful' moments (p. 5)— are 
precisely what allow him to maintain his sanity, metaphoricised by the absence of disease. Sludden's 
healthiness, however, is shown to be the product of a pathogenic world: he is only free from disease 
because the world in which he exists is so deeply damaged. Both sections of the novel thus point 
towards a central relationship between madness and the desire for power.  
 
The relationship between fantasies of political and artistic control are most fully realised in a fantasy 
Thaw constructs after his rejection by Marjory Laidlaw (but before the onset of full-blown psychosis), 
in which he imagines his election as director at the Glasgow School of Art, and then as Secretary of 
State for Scotland, precipitating the establishment of a separate Scottish parliament and then civil 
war. As head of the 'reconstruction committee', he reimagines and then reforms the  entirety of 
Glasgow (p. 289). The sense of his desire for domination is clearest where he imagines that 'Marjory 
read his name in newspapers, heard his voice on the wireless, saw his face in cinemas; he 
surrounded her, he was shaping her word, yet she could not touch him' (p. 289). The novel thus links 
the desire for aesthetic and political power by suggesting that they derive from the same underlying 
impulse: to create a world is to form a space in which the creator is omniscient, omnipresent, and 
untouchable. It also suggests that the desire to do so is linked to highly dubious motives, motives 
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which have as much to do with vengefulness, disappointed lust and a wounded ego as they do with 
an 'eternal quest' for a utopian Scotland in which artistic expression is freely available to all, pleasure 
boats with small orchestras sail down the canal from Riddrie to the Clyde Islands, and fountains 
splash and trees grow where the 'demolished banks' once stood (p. 290).25 Indeed, the novel 
perhaps suggests that the quest for a utopian Scotland and the desire for artistic control are two 
sides of the same coin, with Lanark's mission, in the fantastic side of the novel, to 'save' Unthank 
from political Armageddon operating as a mirror image of the fantasy of an independent Scotland in 
the realist books. 
 
In the Thaw section of the novel, as we have seen, the overwhelming desire for power and control 
leads to complete subjective breakdown. In the Lanark books, however, he  finally achieves a form of 
psychic and subjective unity. This is not by any means through the achievement of political or 
aesthetic control; rather the moment of psychological peace or wholeness comes about when 
Lanark is visited by the figure of death, who tells him the exact time of his demise. Lanark's response 
is tinged with fear, but is ultimately a kind of quiet acceptance: he is 'a slightly worried, very ordinary 
old man, but glad to see the light in the sky' (p. 560). This is a specific reference to an earlier section 
of the novel, in which Lanark is told by the Oracle who is recounting the story that Thaw 'botched his 
end... he was unacceptable to the infinite bright blankness, the clarity without edge that only 
selfishness fears. It flung him back into a second-class railway carriage, creating you' (p. 219). This 
'brightness', 'blankness' and 'clarity' is indicative of a subjective transcendence, acceptance and lack 
of selfishness which Thaw had yet to achieve. At the moment of Lanark's death, however, it appears 
that he is to be accepted into this transcendent, blank unity. This suggests, ultimatel y, that despite 
the preoccupation with madness throughout the novel, the text actually upholds a commitment to 
the possibility of interior peace and unity. Despite the many responses foregrounding the novel's 
postmodern significance, this, the last sentence of the narrative proper, suggests that through all the 
breaks and incoherences of both Thaw and Lanark's subjectivity, the end of the novel commits to the 
possibility of a transcendent reunion with the natural world, the 'infinite' brightness and clarity  here 
represented by the light in the sky. Notably, this is not achieved through creative mastery, but 
through Lanark's acceptance of his own ordinariness, and a peaceful, reflective relation to the 
natural world. 
 
1982, Janine 
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In 1982, Janine (1984), Jock, the principal character, is brought to the brink of mental breakdown 
when the cocktail of whisky and sexual fantasies he has been using to repress the memories of his 
'meanest and most cowardly actions' fails to work.26 As his shame becomes unbearable, he washes 
down '56 little white blunt torpedoes' with a tumbler of Glenlivet (p. 153); the hallucinations he 
undergoes as a result threaten to develop into full-blown psychosis, but eventually allow him to 
reject his 'vile' fantasies (p. 168). This incident, which is both the crux of the novel and a turning 
point in Jock's life, places the novel in the tradition of responding to madness in which an encounter 
with soul-death or nothingness like that discussed in the introduction precipitates a rebirth in which 
the experience is figured as a form of spiritual cleansing similar to that discussed by Rose in The 
Haunting of Sylvia Plath (1991). Jock's 'rebirth', however, is a purifying moment which provides him 
with the impetus to face and renounce the most disturbing and unpleasant aspects of his past 
actions: the moment of crisis at which subjectivity is threatened with collapse does not so much 
allow the victim access to any privileged knowledge from which artistic expression can be derived, as 
function to enjoin Jock to shoulder the responsibilities of heteronormative social life.27 
 
As we have seen, in Lanark Thaw's madness is brought on by an encounter with deathliness 
precipitated by blows to his artistic and sexual ego. Sex is also at the heart of Jock McLeish's malady 
in 1982, Janine. As Jock says at the beginning of the text: 'My problem is sex. Or if it isn't, sex hides 
the problem so completely that I don't know what it is' (p. 6). As the novel progresses, we discover 
that Jock's pornographic imaginings, which comprise a substantial part of the novel, are indeed a 
screen to prevent him from acknowledging the 'meanest' and 'most cowardly' actions of his own life 
(p. 182). His encounter with madness takes the form of a suicide attempt following a nervous 
breakdown in which he washes a bottle of analgesics down with a bottle of whisky. His life is saved 
when he either hallucinates or is called upon by the voice of ‘God’ to force himself to vomit the 
drugs and alcohol, sleep, and then prepare to tell the story of his ‘meanest and most cowardly 
actions’ in ‘the difficult oldfashioned way’ [sic] (p. 182). This precipitates the close of the novel, in 
which, as Gray later said in interview, Jock is ‘turned into a rather different person and is on the 
verge of a new world’.28 The presence of God in the text, then, suggests a similarly spiritual, 
transcendent closure to Jock's episode of psychosis as we see at the ending of Lanark. 
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In their introduction to One Thousand Plateaus (1972), Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari explain their 
notion of selfhood (or rather, of their theoretical conviction of selfhood's fundamental incoherence), 
outlining the thrust of the text as aiming: 
 to reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but the point where it is no longer of any  
 importance whether one says I. We are no longer ourselves. Each will know his own. We 
 have been aided, inspired, multiplied [....] To attribute the book to a subject is to overlook 
 this working of matters, and the exteriority of their relations. It is to fabricate a beneficent 
 God to explain geological movements. In a book, as in all things, there are lines of 
 articulation or segmentarity, strata and territories; but also lines of flight, movements of 
 deterritorialization and destratification.29 
Similarly, Fredric Jameson outlines two positions on subjectivity, a softer version which accepts that 
in a previous age 'there was such a thing as competitive capitalism, there was such a thing as 
individualism, as individual subjects.'30 He contrast this with a more radical poststructuralist position 
on subjectivity which claims that there have never been 'autonomous subjects of this type' and that 
that the bourgeois subject is a 'myth'.31 For Jameson, the distinction between the modern and 
postmodern period rests on precisely this failure of the faith in 'the experience and ideology of a 
unique self'.32 Both Deleuze and Guattari and Jameson relate this decentred subject to a typically 
postmodern form of schizophrenia which is, in the words of Angela Woods, 'the key to 
understanding postmodern life.'33 As I outline below, although the psychotic episode in 1982, Janine 
might initially invite such readings, the text's presentation of madness and recovery ultimately 
suggests a commitment to transcendent self-identity which speaks to the 'individual subjects' of 
Jameson's discussion.34 
 
As I outlined in my introduction, many of the devolutionary responses to Gray's work depend on 
positioning him as exemplary of the postmodern mode, and indeed, some aspects of the text do 
substantiate a typically postmodern reading of the novel. In the section concerning Jock's psychotic 
break, his conscious fantasies, which are typical of the sadomasochistic concoctions the reader has 
been presented with throughout the text, are positioned at the centre of the page. As in much of the 
rest of the novel, his consciousness flickers and jumps between his memories of past sexual 
encounters, his cruelty towards his first partner and his wife, and his current sexual preoccupations. 
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In the psychotic section the pace of these jumps  quicken, suggesting that Jock is losing a clear sense 
of the temporality of his own thoughts and descending into a psychic state which is unable to clearly 
grasp his own 'biographical experience'. 35  As we have seen, this is characteristic of the postmodern 
schizophrenia as defined by Jameson. To put it in Deleuzean terms, the strata of his consciousness is 
becoming increasingly fragmented, leading almost to the point at which it dissolves into 
incoherence. This atemporality is further underscored, here as elsewhere, by the pastiched images 
of Janine and Big Momma, which are clearly mediated through the tropes of low-grade pornography 
and Hollywood blockbuster films. Jock's fantasies have a sleazy American noirishness to them, 
underlined by Jock's repeated suggestion that Janine resembles Jane Russell and the fact that Big 
Momma speaks with an American accent (and is named using recognisably American nomenclature). 
This places these fantasies firmly in the realm of Jamesonian pastiche, in which an ensemble of 
tropes universally recognised as 'sexual' are mobilised with a flagrant disregard for context and a 
noticeable lack of irony or humour.36 As Jameson says, the move from parody to pastiche is a 
cultural shift which has its root in the same phenomenon as postmodern schizophrenia: namely, that 
we are now existing in a world in which temporality has become meaningless. 
 
Throughout 1982, Janine, however, Gray's representations of madness as subjective non-being 
actually work to suggest that the notion and experience of a unified selfhood still has a great deal of 
currency in his work; indeed that it is often the goal towards which his characters are attempting to 
move. There is a current of his work which does not seek to reach, or even explore, the Deleuzean 
exhilarated schizophrenic point at which 'one no longer says I', but rather to gain a perspective from 
which it makes sense to speak of an I, a selfhood. Furthermore, the movement towards  the return 
to a 'true' selfhood is precipitated by Jock's florid breakdown. Here, in small but insistent text, Gray 
represents the 'voice of God' that has been addressing Jock throughout his breakdown. God calls to 
Jock, saying that he is: 
 not what you were told not an owner true makers never on what they make i have no authority or 
 any kind of master no expert... i  am light air daily bread common human warmth ordinary ground that 
 drinks every stain takes back all  who fall  renews all  who have not poisoned their seed... when you 
 forget yourself i  endure for you endure why always run away tear apart climbing higher by kicking me 
 down o i  bear it you no longer can... 
 (pp. 168-171) 
Jock's bodily responses are also given in the margins, linking the consciousness of his physical being 
with this voice. The voice of God, then, which Jock eventually pays heed to, is here presented as 
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being a creator (a 'true maker'). The passage evokes a kind of theism in which God is constituted as 
'light', 'air' and 'bread', and the other wholesome necessaries of human existence which will be 
eternally 'renewed' if not deadened by Jock's poisonous habits. 
 
This section is particularly important for a reading of Gray's presentation of Jock's madness. In his 
psychotic break, God indicates that Jock has 'forgotten himself', which implies that at the most 
fundamental level, he is made of the same substance as God: light, air, bread and common human 
warmth (p. 170). The text thus suggests that Jock's madness, his pornographic, violent fantasies and 
his suicide attempt are a deviation from this essential divine substance. As such, insanity, which is 
figured as an orientation towards death, non-being and suicide, is revealed as the denial of the 
essence of his selfhood: a movement away from the true 'true being' designated as light, air and 
human warmth (p. 169). As in Alice Thompson's Pandora's Box (1998), The Falconer (2008) and The 
Existential Detective (2012), hallucinatory madness thus reveals a truth about the lifeworld of the 
mad figure. This reading of Jock's psychosis can perhaps shed some light on the fact that, as Luis de 
Juan notes, Gray has repeatedly rejected the postmodern label,  instead characterising himself as an 
inheritor of James Joyce and Laurence Sterne.37 The tension between the author's critical positioning 
and his own attitude towards his work is charmingly underlined by an anecdote related by Rodge 
Glass, Gray’s biographer, in which he explains that on the first occasion they met, Glass, at the time a 
gauche twenty-one year old barman working in a pub Gray frequented, blurted out 'do you think 
Lanark is a postmodern work, or just that it's been called that by critics?' as he was mixing Gray a gin 
and tonic.38 Perhaps understandably, Gray finished his drink in short order, and did not stay for 
another.  
 
As if to further emphasise that the madness Jock undergoes here is not an iteration of the 
postmodern subject's inability to 'actively extend its pro-tensions and re-tensions over the temporal 
manifold', the realisation that Jock comes to after his psychotic episode is that he must face the 
reality of his own life and tell the story of his complicity in his own downfall in the 'difficult 
oldfashioned way' (p. 182).39 To translate this into Jamesonian terms, this section of the book is 
explicit in upholding what he has referred to as the 'the experience and ideology of a unique self'.40 
Jock must adumbrate a straightforward account of his own, unique experiences if he is to move 
away from the poisonous fantasies in which his life has been enmired. This bespeaks a commitment 
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to the notion of objective truth very different to the concern with the 'primary fictiveness of fiction' 
that Luis de Juan and others see as central to Gray's work.41 Madness thus becomes a response to 
the pressure of ignoring the truth: a concept to which Gray, unlike those critics who would place him 
purely in the postmodern mode, is at least partially committed. Furthermore, in maintaining that his 
story must be told in the 'difficult oldfashioned way', Jock is actually prescribing a particular 
narrative form as vital to his sanity: in order to fully regain and reassert his selfhood, the story must 
proceed in a directly linear fashion, recounting 'events in the order that they befell so that I recall 
the purchase of my new suit before, and not after, I seduce Denny in it' (p. 182). 
 
In contrast to a poststructuralist model of selfhood, then, Jock is struggling towards a more humanist 
conception of subjectivity, one which I argue has similarities to that outlined in Charles Taylor’s 
Sources of the Self (1989). Here, Taylor delineates the relationship between subjectivity and the 
subject's attempts to come ‘into contact with the good’ or 'closer to the good'.42 For Taylor, it is this 
recognition of the fundamental values in an individual’s life that form the core of their identity as a 
person. As he puts it, 'selfhood and the good, or in another way selfhood and morality, turn out to 
be inextricably intertwined themes'.43 To compare this to the thinkers mentioned in the 
introduction: if for Sass, subjectivity is defined by a concrete relationship between mind and body, 
for the feminist thinkers under discussion here it necessarily entails recognition in the social sphere, 
then in Taylor's terms, subjectivity is inherently linked with a moral compass. 
 
Taylor's thought is also significant to 1982, Janine, because, like Jock, he sees contemporary selfhood 
as not simply intertwined with one's moral values, but with a sense of seeking out the good: to put it 
another way, in terms of ethical progress. This, he claims, is what differentiates 'modern identity' 
from its predecessors (like Louis Sass and unlike Jameson, Taylor does not draw a clear division 
between modern and postmodern subjectivity). Taylor argues that contemporary culture is 
peculiarly vulnerable to crises of 'meaning' in the way that, for example, the Victorians were not. In 
fact, to demonstrate his point he gestures towards the changes in the conceptualisation of mental 
disorders of the nineteenth century such as hysteria and neurasthenia, which were in the twentieth 
century displaced by complaints such as 'ego-loss, or a sense of emptiness, flatness, futility, lack of 
purpose, or loss of self-esteem': precisely those maladies which are also at the heart of the 
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Jamesonian concept of schizophrenia.44 However, Taylor's account differs from poststructuralist 
notions of subjectivity in that he sees the 'quest' for the good, for an understanding of the right way 
to live, as a central aspect of all moral agents. Significantly, Jock also adheres to the conviction that 
what he needs most is movement towards the good and away from 'shit creek' in as direct and 
straightforward a fashion as possible. The suggestion, then, is that the authentic self which remains 
free from the threat of psychic collapse we have just seen represented is one which is narrativised in 
a truthful, honest and linear way. Clarity of direction and purpose in both an ethical and narrative 
sense are the antidote to Jock's psychological failure. 
 
The redemptive narrative of 1982, Janine is thus predicated on the notion of an authentic selfhood 
which is diverted from its true path and into psychosis by Jock's fantasies of sexual domination. Jock, 
in the passage during which he decides to 'tell his story in the difficult oldfashioned way' emphasises 
both action and a straightforward, conventional narrative structure to his confession (p. 182). 
Furthermore, as in Taylor's metaphoricisation of the 'good' or 'ethical' life, Jock conceptualises this 
change in terms of a straightfoward movement. This section of the novel thus both resists a 
poststructuralist emphasis on the untenability of the unitary enlightened subject, and appears, at 
this point at least, to be advocating a  'difficult, oldfashioned' narrative structure of beginning, 
middle and end which is quite unlike the postmodern foregrounding of indeterminacy, ambiguity 
and resistance to closure (p. 182). In this sense, then, Gray and Jameson are in agreement in that 
they see an inability to fully grasp temporality and the individual 's relation to the historical as a 
constitutive form of schizophrenic or psychotic experience. Where they differ, however, is that 
Jameson sees this as an inescapable aspect of contemporary experience, whereas for Gray it is still 
very obviously a pathology. 
 
This is reflected in the quality of Jock's pornographic imaginings themselves. Unlike the 'difficult 
oldfashioned' structure of the redemptive narrative of his life, these fantasies are characterised by 
an oscillatory impetus which, as he himself comments, circle back and forth without ever reaching 
the 'final bang' of a conclusion or an ending (p. 19). This imbroglio of sexual vacillation is expressed 
in the passage in which McLeish compares himself to a historian writing an account of a nuclear 
apocalypse:  
 To preserve excitement, my Janine must travel toward her climax through a world like a 
 menacing forest, and just before she reaches it I must switch to heroines in other parts of 
 the forest, women travelling toward climaxes which are different, but connected. I will work 
 like a historian describing in turn Germany Britain France Russia America China... the heads 
 of government move to their controls in hidden bunkers, and make certain declarations, and 
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 then the tanks start rolling through the streets with evacuations, concentration camps, 
 explosions, firestorms, frantic last-minute propaganda and the awful togetherness of total 
 calamity before the last, huge, final, bang. That is how a big piece of pornography should go.  
 (p. 19) 
Jock here alludes to 'mutually assured destruction'—MAD—as a way of understanding his own 
imagination. The oscillating, circular quality of Jock's fantasy life (he reimagines the Janine scenario 
in a variety of different ways throughout the text) recalls Freud’s essay ‘Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle’ (1920), in which he postulates that traumatic neuroses stem from a similar source to the 
'greatest cultural achievement' of a young child's life, which is to act out in play a painful memory, 
thus renouncing 'instinctual satisfactions' in order to achieve mastery over the sense of ‘unpleasure’ 
provoked by the incident.45 Jock's repeated return to the period ‘From the Cage to the Trap’ marks a 
compulsion to return to ‘the moment of torture ' which is both a failure of his own ethical 
commitments, and, following Freud, his failure to renounce the 'instinctual satisfactions' that these 
fantasies represent (p. 184). 
  
These neurotic fantasies, then, sadomasochistic representations of relationships of domination, 
power and control in which the sexual encounters are always unwritten by the threat of violence 
and ultimately of death. Like the fantasies of control which underlie Thaw's aesthetic desires in 
Lanark, the text thus links Jock's moment of psychic failure with his need for domination. It is striking 
that the switching of perspectives which imply Lanark's desire for control in both the fantasy of a 
newly independent Scotland, and the mural in the Cowcaddens church, is reiterated here. Jock can 
switch perspectives such that he can view at leisure any number of his heroines, heroines who 
populate other parts of the 'forest' of his desire and who are 'travelling toward climaxes which are 
different, but connected' (p. 19). As in Lanark, then, his deviation from a straightforward narrative 
mode is indicative of his need for the sense of 'absolute mastery that real life has always denied me 
in any way whatsoever' (p. 52). Jock's reading of his own fantasy life, then,  proposes throughout 
that his sexual fantasies are a screen for a more global desire for mastery. If these issues are 
confronted head on, the morbid and neurotic aspects of his psyche will be negated and he will be 
able to achieve the integrated, transcendent unity which the God figure suggests is available to him. 
In this reading, the deathly, violent aspects of his imagination are what leads to his breakdown, and 
will dissipate once his own ethical and narrative equanimity is restored. The fantasies, then, are 
what leads to his madness: 'sex', as he himself says, is 'the problem' (p. 6). 
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That said, this notion of Jock's 'true self', a subjectivity which is in some way divinely authenticated, 
is troubled by other aspects of the text, particularly after the novel's crisis point in Chapter 11. 
According to Jock's own interpretation of his interiority, his fantasies are not strictly pornographic in 
the sense defined by Susan Sontag in 'The Pornographic Imagination' (1967). For Sontag (which is, 
incidentally, the name of one of the ‘real’ women in Jock’s life), true pornography, literary 
pornography, explores a movement towards the dissolution of selfhood and the achievement of a 
full sexual being which is synonymous with death. She contrasts this with the understanding of the 
pornographic current in the 1960s, in which it was seen as a manifestation of an unhealthy, guilt-
ridden conception of sexuality originating in the suspicion of sensuality  propounded by Christian 
dogma. Jock's own view of his sexual fantasies are in accord with the stance on pornography that 
Sontag questions here: he feels that the fantasies are 'a problem'—essentially a neurotic repetition 
of the deviation from the true, healthy selfhood he lost at the same time as he lost Denny, his work 
with a theatrical company from college, and ultimately his self-respect.46 
 
 However, to read the novel simply as Jock himself does, interpreting his fetishistic imagination as 
the product of a betrayed sense of self which ultimately leads to his psychological failure,  belies 
much of the power of the text. The novel problematises his 'problem' by framing his fantasies in the 
context of a highly literary work, thus suggesting affinities with precisely the kind of pornographic 
art, which, Sontag contends, is uniquely positioned to explore 'the mystery which is the loss of self'.47 
Jock's fantasies are not only a screen for his consciousness of his wrongdoing: they are also an 
exploration of the compulsive and destructive aspects of human subjectivity in its own right. Like art 
in Lanark, sexuality in 1982, Janine is consistently associated with death: the club which functions as 
a mise-en-scène for the greater part of Jock's fantasies is dressed up as a kind of military base, and 
the young Jock's gaze idles over Jane Russell's 'soft shoulders and sulky mouth' before moving on to 
consider the 'mushroom cloud in the sky above Bikini Atoll' (p. 9). These moments clearly draw 
attention to the imbrication of sexual fantasy and deathliness, suggesting, as Sontag does, that 
'sexuality remains one of the demonic forces in human consciousness—pushing us closer to taboo 
and dangerous desires, which range from the impulse to commit sudden arbitrary violence upon 
another person to the voluptuous yearning for the extinction of one's own consciousness.'48 Sontag 
goes on to describe the sexual impulse in terms of insanity, exclaiming 'man, the sick animal, bears 
within him an appetite that can drive him mad'.49 Although it resolves the question otherwise, the 
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text certainly raises the possibility that Jock's destructive, violent and sadistic urges are not solely 
the symptom of an abusive political and social environment, but that there is a fundamentally sick, 
'demonic' or 'morbid' aspect to human subjectivity per se. Madness, psychic death, and subjective 
dissolution, in this reading, are threats which may recede or approach, but which are always at the 
edge of consciousness. 
 
The effect of reading 1982, Janine, then, revolves around the central tension between the explicitly 
articulated and optimistic sense that  the death of the soul and collapse of subjectivity represented 
in Jock's breakdown is not an innate quality of human life, but takes place because Jock cannot face 
his responsibility for how he treated Denny and his wife, and the pleasurable yet horrifying 
fascination that these fantasies provoke. This offers a rather different interpretation of Jock's 'true' 
self: one in which the explicitly avowed  part of his psyche which is articulated through Gray's 
representation of a theistic godhead is pitted against the desires which have ruled so much of his 
previous existence. It is notable that even after Jock's moment of epiphany, the appeal of these 
pornographic imagos endures: Jock is consistently forced to remind himself to maintain the direct 
'oldfashioned' narrative of his life, rather than diverting his attention to the various suggestive sexual 
possibilities that the telling of his life-story evokes (p. 182). The structure of the novel, then, diverges 
from Lanark. Rather than ending on a note of unqualified acceptance of reality and transcendence, 
Jock's epiphany takes place midway through the text, thus allowing space for his deviations from his 
own resolutions to become clear.  
 
Despite the fact that these reservations are raised, however, the ending of the text ultimately 
disavows them in a favour of an attenuatedly triumphant ending in which Jock's moment of 
psychological crisis prompts him to leave his job as an inspector of security systems for nuclear 
weapons bases, find love, and release or recognise the 'queer slight bright fluttering sensation' 
which, it is suggested, is another iteration of the transcendent unity with the 'light in the sky' in 
Lanark and the 'human warmth' recommended by the voice of God at the moment of his psychotic 
breakdown (pp. 330-331). Ultimately, then, the text invites us to read Jock's previously incoherent, 
disunified subjectivity as now integrated and whole. Nonetheless, the nagging doubts remain: if we 
follow Sontag's suggestion that explorations of the maddening aspects of human existence explored 
in the pornographic imagination are constitutive of the deepest and most meaningful forms of 
artistic endeavour, we wonder what role the creative will be allowed to have in Jock's future.  
 
Poor Things 
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Poor Things (1992) revisits many of the concerns of the earlier novels in a comic mode.50 Largely set 
in the Victorian period, the first part of the text is an account of an experiment conducted by  the 
scientist Godwin Baxter which revivifies the body of a mysterious pregnant woman who committed 
suicide by launching herself into the Clyde. The resurrected woman, Bella, who has an adult body 
but the mind of her unborn child, takes a 'completely rational pleasure in a life untainted by guilt 
and a fear of death'—a rational pleasure which is both hilarious and deeply threatening to the men 
she encounters throughout her picaresque peregrinations in Scotland and abroad (p. 185). In both 
Bella's encounter with Charcot and her later avatar Victoria Hattersley, Gray draws attention to how 
medical professionals are induced to redefine madness not as a loss of reason but as 'deviance from 
socially acceptable behaviour'.51 The novel, in Elaine Showalter's phrase, represents the role of the 
'psychiatric policemen' who patrol the boundaries between madness and sanity. Thus, the text 
evokes a well-established intellectual lineage which comments on the way that counternormative 
behaviour is delegitimised by an appeal to medical norms outlined at length by Showalter, Chesler 
and others.52 In the second section of the novel, Victoria Hattersley, who the first section of the text 
suggests is Bella, describes the entire gleeful concoction as a mere 'morbid' fiction written by 
Archibald McCandless, her husband, and in the final analysis symptomatic only of his brain fever ( p. 
272). Victoria's characterisation of the text as pathological raises profound questions about her 
modes of valuing and understanding art. Ironically, in Victoria's rejection of the 'morbid', the 
obsessive, the jealous and the irrational, we see, I argue, Gray coming to terms with those aspects of 
human existence which deeply trouble his earlier work.  
 
There are clear congruences between Poor Things and Gray's earlier work in terms of its 
presentation of (in)sanity and ethical development; in particular, in the contrasting chapters entitled 
'Making a Conscience' and 'Making a Maniac' (pp. 75-126). The 'Making of a Maniac' section 
concerns Duncan Wedderburn, the lawyer with whom Bella briefly elopes. Wedderburn becomes a 
maniac, developing a psychosis which is precipitated largely by the mortifying loss of his fortune at 
the gaming table while travelling with Bella, and the emasculating realisation that her sexual 
appetite and energy far outstrip his own. As Harry Astley, the cynical classical liberal Bella befriends 
while abroad puts it, his madness derives from a 'painful recent memory which he refuses to 
discuss'— which is, in fact, a comic but nonetheless accurate way of describing both Thaw and Jock's 
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humiliations in Lanark and 1982, Janine respectively (p. 130). The parallelism is directly alluded to in 
the fact that Duncan Wedderburn shares Thaw's forename. 
 
Wedderburn's madness becomes obvious in the letter he writes to Godwin Baxter, Bella's protector 
and the scientist who revivified her after her attempt at suicide, giving his version of the events 
during the couple's trip abroad. In it, he excessively puns and plays with language. According to Neil 
James Rhind, it is this that demonstrates he is insane:  his madness is the result of 'excessive 
signification' which 'foreground[s] the role of nomenclature as interpretative filter, and the ability of 
both author and reader to make such texts signify’.53 However, both Bella and Wedderburn evince a 
propensity towards echolalia and linguistic play, but, unlike Wedderburn, Bella's is taken by Baxter, 
and implicitly the reader, as indicative of unusual verbal perspicacity. This indicates that we read 
Bella as intelligent and Wedderburn as mad not because of their verbal play, but because, even 
without instruction, or indeed the knowledge that evil exists in the world, Bella is attracted to a 
system of values typified by compassion and conviviality, as we can see in her outright and 
instinctive rejection of Astley's Malthusian-inflected liberalism (p. 153). In contrast to this, 
Wedderburn’s insanity is obvious not because, as Rhind would have it, of his verbal and numerical 
play with meaning, but because he fails to recognise Bella and Baxter's evident and intrinsic 
goodness, instead calling Bella a 'fiend-woman' and 'demon' (p. 170) and Baxter 'Satan himself' (p. 
78). The difference between Wedderburn's madness and Bella's sanity, then, is not linguistic but 
ethical. 
As with Jock in 1982, Janine, Duncan's insanity originates in his attempt to avoid responsibility for his 
own humiliation: his madness is shown to be the avoidance of the truth of his own actions. By 
contrast, when Bella writes to Baxter with details of the same events  in the 'Making a Conscience' 
section of the novel, she gives an account only of how she comes to recognise the presence of 
suffering and injustice in the world, and her resolution to train as a doctor and become active as a 
socialist in order to combat it (p. 197). Structurally, then, 'making a conscience' is opposed to 
'making a maniac': the form of the novel, which places these sections directly opposite one another, 
suggests that Gray's attitude towards sanity and insanity is profoundly involved with questions of 
ethical commitment. Kirsten Stirling has commented that this section of the novel foregrounds the 
constructed and contingent nature of the characters' identities, and, while I acknowledge the point, 
it strikes me that this does not account for the fact that Bella's conscience is in many ways presented 
as already fully-formed: she only has to recognise the truth that there is pain and suffering in the 
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world in order to take the decision to devote her life to combating it.54 In line with Gray's previous 
novels, then, Bella's conscience is a recognition of truth, and Wedderburn's madness is the collapse  
of an inflated self-image which was profoundly false to begin with. 
 
The possibility of madness derived from sexual repression is also consistently raised throughout Poor 
Things: unsurprisingly, perhaps, given the wealth of critical material on the relationship between 
feminine sexuality and madness, particularly hysteria. This is best outlined by the incident in which 
Bella, while in Paris, meets a fictionalised Jean-Martin Charcot, a founding father of modern 
psychiatry, at the Salpêtrière hospital. Charcot diagnoses Bella as showing: 
no signs of mania, hysteria, phobia, dementia, melancholia, neurasthenia, aphasia, 
catatonia, algolagnia, necrophilia, coprophilia, folie de grandeur, nostalgie de la boue, 
lycanthropy, fetishism, Narcissism, Onanism, irrational belligerence, unhealthy reticence and 
is not obsessively Sapphic.  
(p. 222) 
This extensive list of psychological maladies from which Bella does not suffer draws attention to 
madness precisely by foregrounding its absence. The novel thus deploys precisely the opposite 
strategy to Gray's previous work: rather than exploring madness through the representation of 
insane figures, he places the ostentatiously sane figures of both Bella and Victoria in spaces which 
are highly concerned with psychological pathology. 
 
Despite both Bella's evidently tenacious grip on her own sanity, and indeed Charcot's diagnosis, 
however, she nonetheless finds that her sanity is called into question throughout the novel, 
particularly in terms of her sexuality. When General Aubrey Blessington De La Pole, the husband she 
fled, discovers her whereabouts, he comes to Glasgow with the intention of bringing her home. 
While there, he accuses Bella of living with Baxter in order to glut her 'insane appetite for carnal 
intercourse' (p. 213), calls her an 'unstable woman' and apoplectically declares that 'no normal 
healthy woman—no good or sane woman wants or expects to enjoy sexual contact, except as a 
duty' (p. 218). Some weeks after his humiliation at the hands of Bella and Baxter, in which it is 
discovered that he is the man behind the mask of 'Monsieur Spankybot', a regular at the brothel in 
which Bella briefly worked while in Paris, he is found dead at his stately home. Thus, Blessington's 
perverse sexual appetites, his extreme discomfiture with the realm of the physical, and indeed his 
suicide, mirror precisely the vexed relationship to sexuality of the male protagonists of Gray's earlier 
novels, but in comic form. 
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However, this scene also has more serious implications, as it is here that it emerges that Victoria 
committed suicide and absconded from her marriage because her confusion over her sexual desires 
had become so intense that she had arranged to have a clitoridectomy (p. 216). Bella's obvious 
healthiness, then, is the product of living in a sane environment: similarly, Victoria's 'insanity' is 
revealed as the insanity of her social millieu. This is mirrored in Victoria McCandless, Bella's avatar in 
the ostensibly more realist, or at least slightly more plausible, section of the novel. Victoria is a 
doctor who has authored a text on what she terms ‘The Loving Economy’, a medical pamphlet 
(included in the text) which gives advice to parents on how to raise sane, peaceable children. 
Ironically, following its publication, Victoria develops a reputation as mad herself: her rational plans 
for the creation of a just and peaceable nation are described in a letter from Beatrice We bb, the 
well-known Fabian and founder of the London School of Economics, as 'an insane blend of ideas 
culled from Malthus, D. H. Lawrence and Marie Stopes' (p. 308). Webb also calls Victoria 'sex-mad' 
and an 'erotomaniac', ending the letter by commenting that 'the last six years have damaged all but 
the strongest minds' (p. 308). 
 
The presentation of the two central woman in the text, then, clearly draws upon the medicalisation 
of women's sexual desire as hysterical throughout the Victorian period. This is discussed in detail by 
Elaine Showalter in The Female Malady (1987). Showalter argues that:  
 doctors had noticed that hysteria was apt to appear in young women who were especially 
 rebellious. F.C. Skey, for example, observed that his hysterical patients were likely to be 
 more independent and assertive than 'normal women', exhibiting 'more than usual force 
 and decision of character, of strong resolution, fearless of danger'... From these 
 observations, it was a quick jump to conclude that rebelliousness could produce nervous 
 disorder and its attendant pathologies.55 
 The link is made even more explicit by Gray, who has the decidedly resolute and fearless Victoria 
enrol at Edinburgh medical school and, under the tutelage of Sophia Jex-Blake, become one of the 
first women practitioners of medicine in Scotland. Here, then, Gray stages the inevitably social 
construction of madness and sanity. This section of the book recalls Dr Johnson's comments about 
Christopher Smart:  
 Madness frequently discovers itself merely by unnecessary deviation from the usual modes 
 of the world. My poor friend Smart showed the disturbance of his mind, by falling upon his 
 knees, and saying his prayers in the street, or in any other unusual place. Now although, 
 rationally speaking, it is greater madness not to pray at all, than to pray as Smart did, I am 
 afraid there are so many who do not pray, that their understanding is not called in 
 question.56 
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Particularly in his presentation of the fictionalised version of Victoria in the first section of the book, 
Gray thus lends his credence firstly to the notion that madness is determined by social  decree, and 
secondly that the denial of her reason, her sanity, led directly to her own desire for self-destruction. 
Thus, Victoria Hattersley, Bella Baxter and Victoria McCandless are all termed mad due to their own 
decision of character and 'strong resolution'. 
 
However, this constructivist view of madness is not the only one represented in the novel. In the 
second section, Victoria McCandless's understanding of insanity appears to owe a great deal to a 
well-established tradition of scientific and medicalised responses to madness. She takes the view 
that any form of deviation from her own conception of sanity is irremediably linked to physical 
illness; so, for example, when addressing herself to the problem of 'why millions of men who, taken 
singly were neither bloodthirsty or stupid [...] had obeyed governments which ordered them to kill 
and to be killed to such a suicidal extent', she simply concludes, along with Tolstoy, that 'human 
animals are prone to epidemics of insanity' (p. 306). Although 'insanity' is a common metaphor for 
irrational behaviour, the editor here comments that 'being a doctor she knew epidemics can be 
prevented if the causes are discovered', thus underlining her etiological understanding of this 
madness as having a directly identifiable, and curable, pathology (p. 306).  
 
There is a similar operation at work in Victoria's interpretation of Archibald’s retelling of her life-
story in the Bella narrative. Again, this is in her opinion mad: she sees it as symptomatic of the 
mental morbidity of the Victorian age’s diseased imagination. Attributing the narrative largely to the 
'brain-fever' he suffered towards the end of his life, Victoria suggests that: 
 My second husband’s story positively stinks of all that was morbid in that most morbid of 
centuries, the nineteenth[....] Ever since reading this infernal parody of my life-story I have 
been asking WHY DID ARCHIE WRITE IT? I am now able to post this letter to posterity 
because I have at last found the answer.  
 (p. 272) 
Victoria views Archie's narrative in the light of a wish-fulfilment fantasy designed to help him avoid 
facing the reality of his situation, and to which he is able to lend credence only because he is 
suffering from a physical ailment.57 This again indicates that Victoria's view of madness is positivist 
and material: a disease like any other, it is an epidemic that can be cured through the judicious 
application of the correct social remedy. She has little truck with the notion of a soul-death or the 
collapse of subjectivity: madness is simply the product of a diseased brain. As in both Lanark and 
                                                                 
57
 Sigmund Freud’s account of artistic production as wish-fulfilment can be found in ‘Creative Writers and 
Daydreaming’ (1908), in P.F.L 14, Art and Literature, ed. by Angela Richardson and Albert Dickinson, trans. by 
James Strachey (London: Penguin, 1985), pp. 24-28. 
59 
 
1982, Janine, then, this section of the narrative foregrounds artistry, and particularly storytelling, as 
a form of self-assertion and as a way of avoiding the acknowledgement of painful truths about one's 
life. 
 
The dating of the novel suggests that in Victoria's response to McCandless's narrative, Gray is 
evoking a period of the treatment of madness which Elaine Showalter termed 'psychiatric 
Darwinism'.58 The date of Victoria's initial reading of McCandless's narrative is 1896; Elaine 
Showalter roughly traces the era of psychiatric Darwinism from the mid 1870s to the advent of the 
First World War (it was not until then that 'shell shock initiated the era of psychiatric modernism'), 
and indeed, the level of psychiatric detail the text presents us with suggests that Gray has a fair 
degree of familiarity with psychiatric trends in this period.59 Medical practice in this era placed a 
great deal of emphasis on the physiological aetiology of insanity: it was, Showalter says, a climate 
which 'looked for scientific answers to all questions' and in which male doctors treated their 
overwhelmingly female patients with a great deal of suspicion, particularly those who had any 
pretentions to an education or a career outside that of the domestic space.60 Gray's gloss on this 
oppressive history is to gleefully invert it, such that Victoria adopts the position of the authoritative, 
masculine-identified doctor, while her husband plays the part of the neglected housewife whose 
literary efforts are dismissed as a symptom of his hysterical reaction to his social position. It is 
entirely in keeping with the tone of psychiatric thought in that period that Victoria is highly 
dismissive of Archie's literary efforts;  no lesser writers than Virginia Woolf and Charlotte Perkins 
Gilman were advised by their nerve-specialists that their writing was linked to their mental ill-health 
in this period. 
 
There is thus a pleasing (as opposed to morbid) geometrism in this novel: in the Bella section of the 
narrative Bella cheerfully humiliates the roué Duncan Wedderburn's pretensions to masculine 
superiority by adopting the threateningly feminine position of the nymphomaniac, both outstripping 
his sexual appetites by far and working in a brothel to earn money once she realises that he has lost 
all their money. In the Victoria section of the text, however, Bella's position is reversed: rather than 
imagining a (somewhat problematically) empowered version of the most disenfranchised occupants 
of the Salpêtrière, hysterics and erotomaniacs, Victoria occupies a typically masculine role in which 
she operates as the major bread-winner and leaves to McCandless the role of nursemaid, 
housekeeper, and eventually neurotic. Throughout this section of the text, a great deal of the 
                                                                 
58
 Showalter, p. 164. 
59
 Showalter, p. 164. 
60
 Showalter, p. 58. 
60 
 
humour is derived from a delighted sense that the arrogance of Victorian masculinity is being served 
its just desserts. 
 
That said, Victoria's attitude towards mental illness is by no means unproblematic. In taking the 
somewhat mechanistic view of insanity outlined above, she adopts a stance which evokes both the 
Kraeplinian attitude toward madness (it is a form of disease like any other, attributable to lesions in 
the brain) outlined by Richard P. Bentall in Madness Explained (2010) which I discussed in my 
introduction, and the cultural climate of the psychiatric Darwinists. The psychiatric practices of this 
period reflect, Showalter argues, a move away from the paternalistic ideology of 'moral 
management', in which asylum superintendents and psychiatrists alike saw insanity as curable 
through the judicious use of moral guidance, and adopted a kindly, if highly patronising, attitude to 
the patients and inmates under their care. By contrast, psychiatric Darwinism was marked by an 
insistence that 'a disorder of the mind is a disorder of the brain'.61 Concomitant with this 
commitment to positivism and empiricism came a more suspicious attitude towards those patients 
who did not evince any form of physical lesion: neurasthenics and hysterics seeking treatment in this 
period were as likely to be treated as selfish attention seekers who gave way to their illnesses 
because they were too lazy or ill-disciplined to fulfil their roles as dutiful wives or daughters as they 
were to have their complaints taken seriously—an attitude that we can see reiterated, in comic 
form, in Victoria's response to Archie's novella. 
 
This suggests that underlying Gray's rambunctious enjoyment of both Bella and Victoria's 
ostentatiously sane attitude towards complex emotional problems lies an ambivalence about such 
an uncomplicated mode of understanding the darker, less explicable drives of the human psyche. 
The final parts of the text explicitly draw attention to this, particularly in 'The Loving Economy'. Here, 
Victoria argues that family life based around cuddling and ‘wedding’ (the word she uses for sexual 
intercourse) would be the universal solution to ‘All National and Class Warfare’ (p. 307). This is very 
funny, but also patently ludicrous. Equally, before the publication of the 'The Loving Economy' she 
insists that the Great War will not happen (the trade unionists will not allow it), and, after the 
Second World War, writes optimistically to Christopher Grieve (Hugh MacDiarmid) that 'a worker's 
co-operative nation will be established from London without any need for Scotland to disassociate 
itself from England' (p. 316). The implications of the dramatic irony here could not be clearer: we are 
not to take Victoria's convictions altogether seriously. Thus, although she is a sympathetic character, 
the novel suggests that, precisely because she does not appear to understand the allure of the 
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morbid or of the destructive, she will be unable to grasp the appeal of a narrative like Archie's, or to 
accurately predict how history will unfold. 
 
Victoria's attitude to morbidity stands in contrast to Godwin Baxter's. In his view, a purely 
medicalised model of human subjectivity is insufficient to give an account of human life. Speaking of 
his medical practice, Baxter says that most of his fellow doctors see life as 'an agitation of something 
that is essentially dead', claiming that the soothing manner developed by medical practitioners is a 
'cheap anaesthetic designed to make our patients as passive as the corpses we train on' (p. 17). His 
delineation of his compatriots' medical practice is suggestive of precisely the positivistic mode of 
understanding life that Victoria adopts. Baxter, by contrast, compares his own methods to those of 
an artist's, saying that just as 'a portrait painter does not learn his art by scraping layers of varnish 
from a Rembrandt', he does not wish to learn from standard medical training (p. 17). The metaphors 
throughout this passage position the patient as a work of art; the trope of the beautiful corpse is 
invoked in the claim that patients are made as corpse-like as possible, while the comparison of a 
conventional medical education with 'scraping layers of varnish' from a work of art places the 
average doctor as the restorer of the painting. Victoria's lack of sympathy for the morbid aspects of 
art alluded to in her comments about Archie's novel, then, is undoubtedly not shared by Baxter. 
 
This is also underlined in Godwin's name, which links him twice to Mary Shelley through the figures 
of William Godwin and Percy Bysshe Shelley, thus, as many commentators on the text have noted, 
associating the novel with Frankenstein and hence once again to the morbid aspects of creativity, 
particularly the practices of grafting and dissection.62 These metaphors also play out in the Bella 
narrative, in that it very bluntly sutures together elements from Frankenstein, The Private Memoirs 
and Confessions of a Justified Sinner and Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde.63 For Baxter, then, the creative mode 
is comparable to his own practice as a doctor. He attempts to treat human beings as works of art—in 
other words, to behave as if they have a value which is more than the sum of their physical parts. 
However, the violence underlying his own experimentations on human subjectivity, particularly 
Bella's, suggest that the anxieties regarding creativity which are such a major concern of both Lanark 
and 1982, Janine persist into Gray's later work. Despite these anxieties, however, Baxter's 
understanding of the creative mode, of art, stands in direct contrast to Victoria's. Unlike her, he is 
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alive to the morbid aspects of human life and attentive to the existence of selfishness, ambition and 
the desire for dominance; drives which Victoria, by contrast, repeatedly disavows. 
 
It thus appears that Victoria's very subjective stability, her seeming inability to imagine the appeal of 
the destructive which is so central to both Lanark and 1982, Janine, is precisely what prevents her 
from recognising the value of the Bella narrative. Clearly, it is fantastic, but despite Victoria's 
protestations, the text does not leave the reader inclined to abandon this form of story altogether, 
particularly given the links that Baxter makes between the creative process and the process of 
healing the human body. As such, each section of the text problematises and complicates the other. 
In her angry response to Archie's narrative, Victoria, rightly, clarifies the many ways in which the 
Bella narrative is dubiously infantilising and disempowering, furiously declaring that the story 
'deprived me of childhood and schooling by suggesting I was not mentally me when I met him, but 
my baby daughter.' (p. 274). However, her self-confident yet wildly inaccurate pronouncements on 
how the country's future will unfold serve to undermine her protestations about the Bella narrative. 
We are thus alive both to the risks of too positivistic an account of human subjectivity, which is 
strongly associated with the fictional creation, in both Bella and Victoria, of a selfhood which is not 
subject to any internal or inherent contradictions whatsoever. 
 
Unlike both Lanark and 1982, Janine, then, Poor Things does not seek to deny or disavow the 
morbid, secreted and destructive drives of human subjectivity which culminate, in the earlier texts, 
in an experience of madness. In representing two subjectivities— Bella's and Victoria's—which 
appear to operate in an entirely sane fashion, the novel suggests that to live without these divides or 
difficulties is in some way not to be fully human, or at least not to be able to engage in the political 
and social world with any degree of understanding. Thus,  although it is the lightest and most 
optimistic in tone, Poor Things actually celebrates the morbid, the encounter with deathliness and 
non-being, in a way which neither of the other novels do. By presenting us with a character who is 
'the only sane English', Gray paradoxically offers us a text which demonstrates that it is the 
irreconcilable tensions and contradictions of subjectivity that make us truly human (p. 222).  
 
Conclusion: Madness, Postmodernism and Scotland.  
 
Throughout this chapter, I have examined the implications that Gray's presentation of madness has 
for how we should understand the operation of subjectivity in his novels. As I have argued 
throughout, his critical positioning as a postmodernist is somewhat difficult to maintain in the face 
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of the redemptory, transcendent trajectories of his first two major novels, although it is undeniably 
the case that Poor Things's representation of objective truth and personal subjectivity are 
considerably closer to a prototypical postmodern understanding of human personhood. In 
conclusion, I would now like to turn to the question of why his earlier work has so consistently been 
read as postmodern, given the considerable and quite explicit signifiers in the texts which suggest 
otherwise. 
 
These readings, I argue, are inextricably bound up with the practices of devolutionary criticism: in 
particular, they originate in a desire to claim Lanark's literary and theoretical priority as a forerunner 
of the significant wave of postmodern fiction emanating from Bri tain in the 1980s. Situating Gray in 
this way makes it possible to assert his presentiment of the postmodernist concerns that were to 
dominate literary theory and practice in the 1980s and 1990s, and thus to make a claim for 
Scotland's position as a new and exciting crucible for literary talent. This is well recognised 
throughout devolutionary criticism. As Neil James Rhind puts it, 'the identification of postmodernist 
traits within Gray’s fiction represents a fundamental expansion of both Scottish literature and its 
critical apparatus'.64  
 
The postmodern aspects of Gray's work are also seen as speaking specifically to the phenomenology 
of being Scottish. Lanark, as Eleanor Bell claims, is 'pivotal to the discussion of the postmodern 
predicament of the Scottish writer and critic'.65 The argument is thus that Lanark's interrogation of 
static notions of personal and national identity can provide an alternative to the damaging desire for 
a unified, organic and coherent Scottish consciousness that she associates with the critics Muir, 
Nairn and Craig. In this reading, Gray's work 'signifies a condition which pertains to the postmodern 
world, to a postmodern Scotland in particular'.66 Equally, Carole Jones sees Gray's 'hectic 
experimentalism' as specifically addressed to the 'fractured instabilities of Scottish identity, which 
was now seen as positively and fashionably postmodern'.67 Such readings are furthered by the fact 
that Lanark's publication coincided with a string of texts we now recognise as exemplarily 
postmodernist—Angela Carter's The Bloody Chamber (1979), Julian Barnes's first novel, Metroland 
(1980), Martin Amis's Other People (1981), and Graham Swift's Waterland (1983).68 1984, the year of 
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1982, Janine's publication was something of an annus mirablis for postmodernist texts: Barnes's 
Flaubert's Parrot, Amis's Money and Carter's Nights at the Circus were all published in that year.69 
 
That said, there are also some other critics who have tentatively acknowledged that it is in some 
respects difficult to place Gray's work squarely in a postmodernist paradigm: Dietmar Bohnkë in 
Shades of Gray: Science Fiction, History and the Problem of Postmodernity recognises that the term is 
problematic when applied to Gray's work, but frankly acknowledges that he is 'at a loss as to what to 
use instead'.70 Similarly, in Timothy Dubrée's study of the relationship between Gray's work and the 
Bildungsroman there is an intimation of a move away from the postmodern as the dominant 
paradigm of interpretation of Gray's work.71 There is, to my knowledge, only one article which 
outlines the way that reading Gray as a postmodernist might in fact conflict with his construction as 
a nationalist figurehead: David Leishman's 'Half-Nations and Half-People: Rewriting Nationalism in 
Alasdair Gray's Poor Things', in which Leishman asks, 'if the grand narrative of a definable canonic 
Scotland has come to be rejected in favour of one of shifting multiplicity, then should the many 
variant forms and expressions of Scotland and Scottishness not work to undermine the potency of 
Scottish nationalism at a political level?' 72 My suggestion, however, is not that Gray's work should 
not be seen as a foundational aspect of contemporary Scottish writing, but simply that in many 
respects responses to it which evoke postmodernist theoretical paradigms risk missing important 
ethical and political aspects of his work. 
 
What, then, are the implications of a reading of the madnesses in Gray which emphasises precisely 
the opposite impetuses to postmodernist thought and is attentive to the desire and the (apparent) 
possibility of subjective unity and coherence that the novels imply? Firstly, my hope is that I have 
shown how a reading of Gray's work focusing on the nationalist possibilities of the texts can mean 
underplaying what I see as crucial aspects of the texts. As I said in my introduction, this is a key 
aspect of my thesis. Secondly, the readings proffered here have, I hope, situated Gray's work in a 
broader context of literary and theoretical responses to madness. These do not necessarily see 
insane experience as an absolutely central aspect of postmodern existence. Instead, representations 
of psychic collapse are read as a response to specific circumstances; circumstances, which, I argue, 
are only rarely attributed to the problems arising from a specifically Scottish identity.  
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This reading emphasises all the aspects of what Gray's work suggests makes life tenable and worth 
living. As such, I propose that we situate Gray in a mode similar to that proposed by Timotheus 
Vermeulen and Robin Van Den Akker in their influential article 'Notes on Metamodernism'. 
Vermuelen and Van Den Akker argue that 'the postmodern years of plenty, pastiche, and parataxis 
are over. In fact, if we are to believe the many academics, critics, and pundits whose books and 
essays describe the decline and demise of the postmodern, they have been over for quite a while 
now.'73 A similar point is made by Linda Hutcheon, who argues that 'the postmodern moment has 
passed, even if its discursive strategies and its ideological critique continue to live on, as do those of 
modernism, in our contemporary twenty-first-century world.'74  
 
'Notes on Metamodernism' identifies a vein of neoromanticism in contemporary culture which de-
emphasises the sense of dislocation, alienation and decentred subjectivity so central to 
postmodernism, and instead foregrounds affective engagement and a renewed sense of the 
centrality of the human relationship with the natural world. I would like to suggest that, although 
clearly Gray's work is not contemporaneous with this newer form of criticism, it has affinities with it. 
The insistence on the importance of emotional and ethical engagement presented through the 
insanity the protagonists experience when they cannot uphold these desiderata, along with the 
possibility of transcendence brought about by an engagement with the natural world (evinced 
particularly in Lanark and 1982, Janine) both suggest that Gray's work might productively be thought 
of as in certain respects echoing the concerns identified by Vermeulen and Van Den Akker. This 
newer form of reading can, I suggest, be attentive to the impulses towards transcendence 
throughout his oeuvre, while not underplaying those aspects of his writing which are clearly 
informed by postmodern practices such as textual play. The hope, then, is that in disaggregating 
Gray's representations of troubled, divided and split subjectivity from a purely nationalist framework 
we may be better able to recognise the tensions and ambiguities of his work, and to be attentive to 
the move toward the transcendent which is, as I have argued, a key aspect of his work. This will, I 
hope, situate his representation of mad experience as if anything, more relevant to contemporary 
'metamodern' or 'neoromantic' criticism than it has been to the postmodern mode.
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Chapter Two: Playing with Pain—Trauma, History and Aesthetics in Janice Galloway’s The Trick Is 
to Keep Breathing and Foreign Parts 
 
This chapter deals with the representations of trauma in Janice Galloway's first two novels, The Trick 
Is to Keep Breathing (1989) and Foreign Parts (1994). As I note in my introduction, throughout this 
thesis I argue that mad experience is characterised by an encounter with possibility of psychic death: 
of complete subjective collapse. The traumatic experiences under discussion here can thus be read 
as a form of madness because, as I show, the trauma in both novels elicit in the protagonists a form 
of psychic failure; an encounter with, as Lillian Feder expresses it, the 'perpetual amorphous threat' 
of complete subjective dissolution.1 Furthermore, this possibility is experienced as so overwhelming 
that the subject cannot fully comprehend it but must compulsively and distressingly return to it. As 
Dominick LaCapra describes the traumatic mode: 
 in post-traumatic situations in which one relives (or acts out) the past, distinctions tend to 
 collapse, including the crucial distinction between then and now wherein one is able to 
 remember what happened to one in the past but realize one is living in the here and now 
 with future possibilities.2 
As such, for LaCapra, the traumatised subject not only encounters death, but is living in a deathly 
world in which the past encounter with the possibility of the utter failure of subjectivity is endlessly 
relived. The traumatised subject, then, is dominated by the consciousness of death. In this respect, 
trauma is a form of 'death-in-life' or 'waking-death'.  
 
That the lifeworld of the traumatised subject is orientated towards death is clear throughout both 
these texts. In The Trick Is to Keep Breathing, Joy Stone, a secondary school teacher living in 
Glasgow, suffers a mental breakdown following the accidental death by drowning of her married 
lover. Her suffering is so acute that she commits herself to a psychiatric institution, with the novel 
ending at the point of her re-emergence into the social world symbolised by her return to the house 
she shared with Michael. In Foreign Parts, Galloway explores the far-reaching consequences of the 
death of the protagonist's father, and in particular how this affects the protagonist, Cassie's, 
responses to historical narratives of domination and control. The stylistics of both novels continually 
stress the protagonist's focus on the threatening aspects of everyday experience. The very texture of 
everyday life becomes sinister: the challenge represented by basic social functioning such as a trip to 
the supermarket or coping with a health visitor (The Trick Is to Keep Breathing) or driving onto a 
ferry and purchasing a cup of tea (Foreign Parts) are recognised as a genuine threat to subjective 
stability. 
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Trauma theory in its current form has a number of affinities with the postmodern madnesses I 
discussed throughout my last chapter and in the introduction. We can see this in LaCapra's 
comments above: the collapse between past and present described here is redolent of the form of 
schizoid experience delineated by Fredric Jameson, in which the subject is unable to grasp its own 
historicity. There are other affinities too: for the trauma theorists with whom I engage in this 
chapter—Cathy Caruth, Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, and Dominick LaCapra—the encounter 
with the threat of psychic dissolution in trauma exceeds 'conceptual or conscious' limits.3 Their focus 
on the limitations of selfhood and language, their crisis point or collapse, speaks to the 
poststructuralist deconstruction of subjectivity adumbrated in my introduction, and which Louis 
Sass, speaking of Paul de Man's understanding of consciousness, describes as a realisation of the 
'purely fictional nature of all one's knowledge, and... an acute awareness of the inevitability of 
one's... alienation'.4 Indeed, de Man is a important figure for this group of theorists: both Caruth and 
Felman worked with him at Yale, and their conceptions of subjectivity owe a great deal to his sense 
of the unsupportable nature of the unified subject. These writers also tend to emphasise the 
isolation inherent in the traumatic experience: victims of trauma become passive 'bearers of the 
silence': mute, disempowered witnesses to unspeakable truths.5  
 
The proposition underpinning these models emphasises, to use Caruth's term, the 'unclaimed' 
nature of traumatic memory, such that the victim is 'overwhelmed' by her experiences to the extent 
that she is unable to process or narrativise them at the time. Trauma is thus constitutively a 
condition which cannot be dealt with in the social realm. It is this set of affinities to which LaCapra 
addresses himself in the article on loss and absence from which I have already quoted. In it, he 
admonishes us not to confuse the specificities of traumatic loss such as those of the Holocaust or the 
Apartheid regime in South Africa with the constitutive sense of absence or lack of unity which is a 
key aspect of the poststructuralist conception of subjectivity. The danger, for LaCapra, is that in 
eliding the distinction between loss and absence we risk reducing the trauma experience to what 
Michel Foucault describes as madness's 'truth as nothingness': as a condition of being rather than an 
event which took place due to a specific set of political, cultural and (implicitly) preventable forces.6 
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In many respects, Galloway's work is resistant to this poststructuralist mode of understanding 
trauma. Her novels show how the traumatic victims' crises ripple throughout their social worlds, 
disrupting normative social, familial, domestic and sexual arrangements, and engendering a sense of 
solidarity between the traumatised survivor and other disempowered subjects. Speaking of 
madness, Lillian Feder argues that novels taking it as a subject deal with 'the mind in relation to 
itself, to other human beings, and to social and political institutions', and it is in this tradition of 
responding to madness as in relation to the wider world that we should read these novels.7 In their 
exploration of how traumatic experiences are substantially exacerbated by an unsympathetic 
environment which silences the voices of those whose lives fall outside normative expectations, 
particularly of gender performance, Galloway's work should also be read in a feminist lineage of 
thinking about madness such as those constructed by Elaine Showalter, Lisa Appignasi and Phyllis 
Chesler, all of whom see madness as a response to specific social and gendered pressures. That said, 
this emphasis on the social aspects of madness indicates that a primary concern of both The Trick Is 
to Keep Breathing and Foreign Parts is not simply a phenomenological account of the experience of 
trauma—of how it feels to be traumatised—but also with how traumatised subjects cope with the 
threat of subjective collapse with which they have been confronted. One of the most intriguing 
aspects of Galloway's work is how she uses the very stylistic modes which have been privileged in 
discussions of trauma, most notably textual fragmentation, to draw attention to the gendered and 
cultural expectations to which her protagonists are expected to submit. This rhetorical use of 
fragmentation, and her bathetic tactics, mean that Galloway's work complicates and challenges the 
mode of conceptualising trauma as an essentially passive experience speaking to a postmodern 
conception of subjectivity as absence, lack and chaos. 
 
Trauma and Scotland 
 
In much previous criticism of The Trick Is to Keep Breathing, an explicit link has been drawn between 
Joy's wounded selfhood and the traumatised or traumatic quality of Scottish identity. Criticism of 
this nature tends to emphasise Joy's dissolution or disintegration, which is then linked to wider 
concerns regarding the failure or negation of Scottish subjectivity.8 As I discuss in my introduction, 
we can see this in Cairns Craig’s argument that in Trick, the representation of ‘the moment of death 
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and absence’ in the loss of Joy Stone’s partner should be linked to a wider understanding of Scottish 
society as defined by absence and lack, and his reading of the image of Joy’s body as ‘a black hole’ 
with ‘nothing inside’ during a scene in which she undergoes a prenatal scan as a symbol of ‘a society 
living, in the 1980s, in the aftermath of its failure to be reborn’.9 A similar critical move is at work in 
Douglas Gifford's comments on Galloway, which assert that trauma is ‘a predominant theme of 
current Scottish writing', linking this 'emergence from a traumatised personal past' to the trauma of 
'modern Scotland’.10 Similarly, Dominic Head suggests that in Trick, Joy’s dissolution ‘represents an 
uncertainty about national belonging, and the textual materials that might compose it’  and Mary 
McGlynn maintains that Galloway's representation of nationality is 'oblique' yet ‘crucial', arguing 
that her interrogation of conventional family structures operates in much the same way as how 
‘traditional notions of nation and Scottishness are called into question’.11 She also argues that 
Galloway's work challenges ‘the gender roles, origins, and family dynamics of any number of 
nationalist movements’.12  
 
Particularly in the way McGlynn's work links Galloway's novels to a deconstruction of nation and 
national movements and Dominic Head's assertion that Galloway is concerned with the 'textual 
materials' which might compose the nation, we can see a move to link Galloway's work with the 
postmodern dismantling of grand narratives of nationalism, national identity and familial origins, and 
a typical concern with textuality, while simultaneously using precisely these deconstructory efforts 
to construct or reconstruct a Scottish literature which is au fait with contemporary literary concerns. 
Thus, we can see a similar impetus at work in criticism on Galloway to those I discussed in my last 
chapter on Gray. My contention is that what we see in these responses is an operation whereby 
Galloway’s literary interest in representations of traumatic experiences are primarily legitimated by 
their insertion into discussions in which the driving impetus is neither madness or trauma nor 
literature, but a concern with nationality.  
 
This generates a problem: in this mode of criticism, traumatic experiences are consistently 
understood as supplementing a discussion of nationalist politics and national identity, and are often 
instrumentalised as a way of asserting or interrogating nationhood or nationalism, rather than as 
significant in their own right. While, as I outline in my introduction, there have been some trenchant 
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criticisms of the reductiveness such a mode of thinking encourages, these criticisms also tend to take 
issues of nation and nationality as their primary focus, thus reproducing, although in less egregious 
ways, many of the problems they identify.13 More recent work has taken a clearer stance on 
asserting the primacy of issues of individual life and lifeworld over national ones in Galloway's work: 
we can see this, for example, in Jessica Aliaga Lavrijsen's heartening assertion that 'national issues 
should not hide from view gender issues'.14 Similarly, Kirsten Stirling trenchantly critiqued the 
problematic attempt to insert Galloway's novels into a broader nationalist narrative.15 Nonetheless, 
the link between trauma and Scottish criticism has led most critics to focus on the questions of 
temporal displacement, bodily dissolution and psychic fragmentation in Galloway's work, which is 
then framed as symbolic of the fragmented and negatory nature of Scottish identity.  
 
Although features such as temporal displacement and textual fragmentation are clearly present in 
both The Trick Is to Keep Breathing and Foreign Parts, this chapter explores the way that Galloway's 
rhetorical deployment of tropes associated with representations of trauma, particularly 
fragmentation, actually indicate a measure of narrative control and agency in her protagonists 
during and after their experiences of madness which is not usually acknowledged in the criticism of 
her work. This chapter therefore concerns itself principally with the role of narratorial play, humour 
and, particularly in Foreign Parts, self-creation in the aftermath of the traumatic experience which 
continues to haunt its victims with the 'perpetual amorphous threat' of madness.16 It demonstrates 
that in deemphasising the role of the national in Galloway’s fiction, it is possible to offer a more 
positive reading of her work which stresses the playfulness and humour of her novels and the 
contingent strategies she deploys to find fleeting moments of possibility and political engagement. 
These narratives never entirely eliminate or overcome the damage done to individual subjectivity, 
but rather represent ways of living with the aftermath of the encounter with deathliness and psychic 
failure brought about by a traumatic event. 
 
The Trick Is to Keep Breathing 
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The Trick Is to Keep Breathing begins in medias res, and is interspersed with analepses which recall 
the central trauma: the death-by-drowning of Joy Stone's married partner, Michael, while holidaying 
in Spain. The text is structured so that we encounter Joy for the first time not only after her lover’s 
death, but also after the memorial service performed for him by the minister at her school. This is a 
pivotal moment in the narrative of her breakdown because it draws attention to how the negative 
reception of a traumatic event in the social sphere exacerbates the trauma itself. At the service, the 
minister, who Joy terms 'Rev Dogsbody', ignores her relationship with Michael completely. Joy 
describes her thought processes at the time in this way:  
1) The Rev Dogsbody had chosen this service to perform a miracle. 
2) He’d run time backwards, cleansed, absolved, and got rid of the ground-in stain. 
3) And the stain was me.  
I didn’t exist. The miracle had wiped me out. 
The first symptom of non-existence is weightlessness. The second is singing in the ears, a quiet 
acceptance of the unreality of things. Then the third takes over in earnest. The third is shaking. 
(p. 79) 
 
The uncertainty about her status as a living person is indicated by the way that the Rev Dogsbody's 
'miracle had wiped me out' is reiterated throughout the text: she recalls that immediately after the 
service for Michael she could hear screaming, but intuited that the noise was not emanating from 
her, because ‘she didn’t exist’ (p. 80). Post-Michael, her sexual encounters are framed in terms of 
wanting to be ‘made to exist’ (p. 46) and she understands her refusal of food by simply stating that 
unlike an ordinary person, she ‘doesn’t need to eat’, as if she is a ghost existing without human 
bodily needs (p. 38). Her nonexistence is both inwardly felt and outwardly confirmed: after the loss 
of her lover, her position in the social order, and finally a sense of ontological security, she exists in 
what Phyllis Chesler might call the 'half-life' of madness represented in Women and Madness (1973) 
by the figure of Persephone in the underworld, or the 'oblivion' into which the mad were thrust by 
the act of confinement discussed by Foucault.17 
 
This scream, with its simultaneous demand for recognition and acknowledgement of the inarticulacy 
of pain and loss, gestures to a central ambiguity in the text: is the truly traumatic episode Joy’s loss 
of Michael, or the subsequent refusal of her milieu—represented above all by Rev Dogsbody's 
sermon, but also in Joy's interactions with the head teacher at her school, Michael’s wife, Norma, 
and the social security and housing officials she has to deal with—to acknowledge the significance of 
her relationship with him? In other words, how far is Joy's trauma caused by a sense of non-
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existence pertaining to her own loss of a loved one which must be worked through alone, and how 
far is her suffering related to the 'miracle' by which Joy's position as Michael's lover is erased? The 
tension between these conflicting accounts of both traumatic experience and the healing 
therapeutic relationship plays out in Trick through the way that the reader is invited to see both the 
moment of Michael’s death and the funeral scene  as the traumatic incident. Both of these 
tendencies resonate in the scream with which Joy ends the passage. Simultaneously indicating the 
failure of the speaking subject to articulate her pain in language, and a demand for recognition from 
a social milieu that refuses to acknowledge her, the scream stands as a figure for traumatic 
experience as both the dormant, the unspoken and the silenced, and the excessive, the violent, and 
the supplementary.  
 
The aspect of the text that echoes Caruth's work most clearly, which I take to be the iteration of 
trauma theory emphasising the individual experience of it, is the presentation of Joy's memories of 
Michael's death. Broadly, the novel follows a temporal structure in which Joy's memories are 
recorded in the past tense, expectations or hopes in the future, and accounts of how Joy’s life is now 
lived in the present. The memories of the death scene are exceptions: although clearly already lived 
through and therefore belonging to the past, they are articulated in the present tense. These 
memories are differentiated in various other ways, too: recollections of the incident invade the 
wider narrative of the text, interrupting it at unpredictable intervals which imply that their 
appearance is not under Joy’s control. They are also italicised, further heightening their dreamy 
quality and visually distinguishing them from the rest of the text. Appearing without explanation, 
there is no obvious connection between the immediately preceding thoughts and the memories that 
irrupt into them. This is not the case with other insertions, such as the articles which Joy reads (of 
which more later), where metaphoric or contextual similarities prompt the association. The 
traumatic memories, then, are, in Jean Laplanche and Jean Bertrand Pontalis's words in The 
Language of Psychoanalysis (1972), 'isolated from the normal course of thought', which makes them 
difficult to abreact, or to discharge of their emotional cathexis.18 Like Caruth's traumatic memories, 
then, they are 'unclaimed': not placed within the narrative properly, they ‘possess’ Joy’s subjectivity 
and function as a signifier of her distress.19 
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The atemporality of traumatic memory is of particular significance to the second generation of 
trauma theorists, which E. Ann Kaplan argues, was instantiated by the 'flood' of traumatised war 
veterans returning from Vietnam to America throughout the 1970s. 20 'Flooding' is a common 
metaphor in trauma theory: Dominick LaCapra uses the term to characterise how the traumatic or 
non-abreacted memory disrupts the narrative of the traumatised person's life, as does Dori Laub in 
his analysis of the transmission of trauma between the traumatised person and the therapist.21 
Writing of Felman and Laub's Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and 
History, Robert Eaglestone argues that testimony writing constructs a 'dyke' that prohibits a flood of 
identification from the reader: in this instance, the trauma itself is in danger of being overwhelmed 
by the reader's desire to identify with the speaker testifying.22 This conceptualisation of trauma is 
related to the odd temporality of flooding: it evokes immediate urgency and the threat of being 
overwhelmed, and, through its association with the biblical flood and the division between the ante 
and postdiluvian periods, is indicative of a fundamental temporal disruption in which an entire 
dispensation, or lifeworld, is fundamentally changed. This sense of 'flooding', of lack of narrative 
control on Joy's part, is suggested throughout the novel; it is present not only in the unusually 
abrupt way in which Michael's death scenes appear, but is also echoed in the content of the story, as 
Michael died by drowning in a diving accident. The metaphor is extended in the title of the text: in 
order to stay afloat, to survive the flood, the trick, for Joy, is to keep breathing.  What is interesting 
about Kaplan's use of the term is that, if 'flooding' is a suggestive metaphor for the experience of 
trauma, then the 'flood' of traumatised veterans returning to the United States were in some sense 
traumatising themselves. This is perhaps indicative of the scandalous, social nature of the traumatic, 
which I discuss in more detail later in this chapter. 
 
As well as the strange temporality of these memories, Joy's sense that the incident itself is not 
available to narrativisation or meaning also speaks to Caruth's understanding of trauma. This 
indicated in the memories of Michael's death and its immediate aftermath, particularly the two 
dealing with her first glimpse of Michael’s body and a moment when she is in hospital waiting for 
news of his injuries. As the second memory invades her consciousness, the reader is presented with 
a jumble of single words and phrases; in particular, 'say there's nothing' and 'jesus' are repeated 
throughout (p. 69). The absence of capitalisation in 'jesus' indicates an empty expletive rather than a 
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religious invocation; it is a mere noise rather than a word signifying a meaning. Similarly, the phrase 
'say there's nothing', which is presumably meant to be understood as a fragment of  'say there's 
nothing wrong', implies that Joy is unable to either grasp or articulate what has happened to her 
partner. It is also indicative of her encounter with the possibility of death: the phrase 'say there's 
nothing' both speaks to Michael's absence (he is now nothing) and to the sense that following the 
trauma of his death she has somehow become nothing as well. Both emphasise the 'inaccessible' 
nature of the trauma in a way which echoes Caruth's  emphasis on the ungraspable, mysterious 
nature of traumatic experience—the 'enigmatic core' which is 'absolutely opaque' yet at the same 
time 'generates the surprising force of a knowledge'.23 The encounter with death is experienced as a 
collapse in meaning, as an opaque experience of nothingness. 
 
There have been some criticisms of this mode of understanding trauma, however. In one of the 
foundational texts of trauma theory, Sigmund Freud's 'Mourning and Melancholia' (1917), both 
mourning and melancholia are inwardly orientated states of mind in which there is a loss of interest 
in the outside world and a concomitant incapacity to adopt any new love objects.24 Freud sees the 
traumatised subject's ability to abreact pathogenic material as a function of their individual 
psychological make-up, although he does recognise that some people are better able to process the 
excitation of the nerves in a traumatic event than others.25 The model thus interiorises trauma, 
placing the ability to process it in the realm of the individual’s psychic integrity.26 The impetus to 
interiorize the histology of trauma is also encouraged in the Freudian concept of Nachtraglichkeit, 
which, as Ruth Leys observes in her genealogy of theories dealing with the issue, involves a tendency 
to approach the traumatised subject 'as if the external trauma derived its force and efficacy entirely 
from internal psychical processes of elaboration'.27 The problem Leys identifies with this conception 
of trauma is that it places the individual's psychic weakness or strength as the ultimate source of the 
suffering inherent in the experience. This interiorisation is somewhat complicated by Caruth, who 
takes the 'belatedness' of traumatic experience less as indicative of any one individual's 
predisposition toward the malady, and more as a kind of inwardness or inaccessibility at the heart of 
the traumatic experience itself. In Caruth's reading of trauma as an 'inaccessible' state which is 
repeated by its 'unwitting' or 'unknowing' victims, there is a kind of inherent inwardness: a 
mysterious or enigmatic core which is not accessible to human knowledge. The story of the 
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traumatic encounter thus becomes a double-telling: the story of a 'crisis of death' and the life lived 
after trauma as a correlative 'crisis of life'.28 The importance of this sense of belatedness, of living a 
life which is radically different because of this 'crisis of death', is suggestive of those thinkers such as 
Foucault, Rose, Sass, Showalter and Chesler, all of who characterise mad experience as a form of 
death and living in its aftermath as a form of afterlife, as if madness were indeed, as Philo Judaeus of 
Alexandria is said to have commented, a form of 'death, seeing that by it mind dies, the noblest part 
of us.'29  
 
As such, although it is undeniably legitimate to read the memories of Michael's death as arising, 
fragmented and unbidden, into Joy's consciousness, and to recognise the way that the memories 
themselves foreground Joy's inability to conceptualise what has happened, I maintain that this does 
not adequately account for how trauma is presented throughout the book.  Despite the obvious 
similarities between the traumatic memories of Joy's death and Caruth's del ineation of trauma, it is 
certainly the case that it is only after the incident with Rev Dogsbody that Joy has her first intimation 
of non-existence. This suggests that Galloway is concerned to stress that the denial of a person's 
experience in the social realm can lead to a sense of complete psychic collapse. In her emphasis on 
the importance of the social reception of suffering, Galloway's work is closer to the model of trauma 
propounded by Judith Herman in Trauma and Recovery (1992). Herman's work, unlike Caruth's, 
insists on the sociality of traumatic experience. Herman's book opens with the assertion that 'the 
ordinary response to atrocities is to banish them from consciousness. Certain violations of the social 
compact are too terrible to utter aloud: this is the meaning of the word unspeakable'.30 Like Caruth, 
Herman is concerned with negation, with the unspeakable and the silent, but her emphasis differs 
because where Caruth sees the traumatic as unspeakable per se, Herman takes the term as 
indicating a system of social relations in which certain atrocities remain unspeakable not because 
they are inherently so, but because they are a product of actually existing power relationships which 
can be addressed, challenged, and changed. This stands in marked contrast to Caruth, for whom 
trauma is fundamentally incommunicable.  
 
This emphasis on the social and political is obvious in the novel's strategies of fragmentation, 
particularly in the way they draw attention to the self-contradictory content of the magazines that 
Joy reads. Curiously, here narrative fragmentation actually feeds Joy's efforts at recovery. 
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Furthermore, The similarities between the presentation of the two sets of inserts (the excerpts from 
the magazines and Joy's traumatic memories of Michael's death) suggest that the magazine 
fragments are present in the text only because Joy recognises their resonance with her own 
situation. This is particularly the case with the letter from the problem pages Joy reads. The 
typographical analogies between the excerpts here and the traumatic memories of Michael's death 
imply that the trauma to which she has been subject actually increases her sensitivity to the pain of 
others. This, then, indicates a different form of trauma to that proposed by Caruth, as her emphasis 
is on the fundamentally mysterious nature of the trauma, which augers for an attitude towards the 
traumatic in which attempts to understand, empathise or heal are mired in hermeneutic 
inaccessibility. In Trick, however, after the moment of unintelligibilty, the trauma actually 
encourages empathy. This is a form of trauma which encourages empathy; trauma as a heightened 
sensitivity towards misery. 
 
The problem pages of these magazines are linked to articles which are also inserted into the text in a 
list format. This foregrounds their conflicting demands—so, for example, we are given a list of 
recipes for desserts including ‘Baked Alaska’, ‘Our Best Ever Chocolate Cake’, and ‘Making the most 
of Summer’s Late Harvest’ (p. 26) placed directly beside an injunction to ‘Diet for a Firmer New You’ 
(p. 27). Joy's placement of these fragments suggests that she recognises the fatuous lack of self-
awareness evinced by these magazines. The text’s very fragmentation allows for the contradictory 
nature of the demands of womanhood to become clear, illustrating what Naomi Wolf calls the 
'violent backlash to feminism that uses images of female beauty as a political weapon against 
women's advancement'.31 Contra readings such as Carole Jones's, who claims that 'Joy's narrative is 
out of control', I suggest that the rhetorical deployment of fragmentation changes the meaning of 
these inserted texts so that the underlying patriarchal assumptions of these magazines become 
clear.32 In placing different categories of desirable femininity together, Joy draws attention to the 
construction of a form of feminine beauty that, as Wolf characterises it, 'objectively and universally 
exists'; one which 'women must want to embody' and 'men must want to possess'.33 The same 
fragmentation that indicates her trauma underscores how untenable such notions are. It also invites 
ridicule: we are visually reminded of how ludicrous the contradictory demands of femininity are. This 
is not so much an act of witnessing or testifying to the neglected aspects of mundane feminine 
misery as it is critique. 
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Bad Romance: Cruel Optimism and Trauma 
 
Unfortunately for Joy, the strategies of fragmentation she uses to recognise and critique the 
contradictions of her situation are not sufficient to free her from her position. Although she can 
recognise the stupidities of her situation, she cannot entirely abandon them. The passages discussed 
above hold in tension a movement towards a self-awareness or self-assertion in which Joy's 
traumatised consciousness questions conventional expectations of femininity, with the recognition 
that they still hold a great deal of attraction. In this sense, Joy's trauma and its aftermath outline the 
structuring fantasies of what Lauren Berlant would call the 'good life'—that is, the 'sustaining 
inclination to return to the scene of fantasy that enables you to expect that this time, nearness to 
this thing will help you or a world to become different in just the right way'.34 Throughout the novel, 
this fantasy is proposed as the domestic and heteronormative relationship between a man and a 
woman. Joy's traumatic experiences of a social death-in-life, her encounter with nothingness and the 
sense that she 'doesn't exist', come about as a result of the realisation, which takes place after her 
lover's death, that this relationship has retroactively been negated by a social sphere that refuses to 
recognise it as a valid form of 'good-living' (p 79). 
 
After this profoundly disturbing recognition, Joy's desire for a heteronormative relationship takes on 
an affective structure of what Lauren Berlant would call 'cruel optimism': a relation in which the 
subject is bound to fantasies of the good life 'that block the satisfactions they offer' and to the 
promise of 'optimism as such that these fantasies have come to represent'.35 It is 'cruel' because 
despite the fact that her trauma is bound up in her understanding that her relationship with Michael 
did not provide her with immunity to social condemnation—that in fact it further exposed her to it— 
she nonetheless continues to cling to this form of relationship as the only way in which she can exit 
the morass of social negation in which she is enmired. Thus, when she describes her casual sexual 
encounters as being driven by the need to be made to feel 'she exists', she is referring not simply to 
bodily desire, to the sense that she exists in the physical realm, but also to the way that these 
moments allow her an illusory sense that she is engaged in the kind of relationship that will 
legitimise her existence in the social sphere (p. 46). She recognises that the meaning of her life needs 
to change—that its point needs to be more than a dyadic relationship with a lover. However, she 
finds herself unable to reject the promise of fulfilment such romantic couplings offer precisely 
because in so doing she believes she will become unattractive, thus precluding the possibility of 
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further romantic relationships (p. 105). In other words, she cannot move away from her fear of 
failing in standard romantic relationships, even though she recognises that it is precisely her over-
reliance on the fantasy redemption such intimacy offers that is prolonging her unhappiness. 
 
What is intriguing about the relation of cruel optimism revealed in the text is that they also 
undermine the possibilities for escape and redemption offered by feminist awareness. Take, for 
example, Joy's first conversation with the admitting psychiatrist at Foresthouse, the institution to 
which she commits herself in order to 'be made better' (p. 109). Joy wishes to recover, to regain 
some sense of her selfhood outside the traumatic non-existence she has found herself in as the 
result of her unrecognisable relationship and its violent ending. However, the final part of her 
speech runs:  
I see small things about too many small people and it makes me bitter...I’m afraid I’ll go sour 
and no one will love me anymore. Something about me kills people....I’m losing days and 
drinking too much. I’m not a proper woman. I no longer menstruate. Sometimes I think I 
don’t exist. I keep looking for reasons and never finding them, waiting all the time but I don’t 
know what for. I always do the wrong thing. 
(p. 105) 
This passage identifies Joy's problem as an inability to perform legitimate versions of femininity such 
as those propounded by the magazines that she has been reading: she is 'bitter' and 'sour', 
compared to the vision of femininity offered in the women's press associated with 'chocolate cake' 
and the fruit of 'summer's late harvest' (pp. 26-27). The metaphorical connection between women 
and sweetness is in Joy's case also undermined by her intellect; it is her acuity in noticing the 'small 
things' about people that makes her unpalatable. This fear of bitterness is highlighted elsewhere in 
the text, too: her 'functional washes' before school are intended to make her 'sweet' (p. 10); 
preparing for an evening with a younger lover she avoids deodorant because it 'tastes bad', and she 
tints her face with foundation she calls 'peaches and dream' (p. 47). Envisaging a conversation with 
her G.P., she imagines him commenting that 'facetiousness is not an attractive quality in a young 
woman' (p. 52); a comment which is prompted by Joy's observation that she 'doesn't want to get 
bitter because it will ruin my looks' (p. 52). This lack of sweetness is also associated with a physical 
aridity: because of her refusal of her food—the chocolate cake and summer harvest again—she no 
longer menstruates. The physical, metaphorical and intellectual aspects of femininity, then, are 
knotted into a single matrix in which Joy is either unable or unwilling to participate. 
 
There is, of course, a great deal of critical commentary on the ways in which those unable or 
unwilling to participate in the conventional modes of femininity are regarded as mad, and in 
particular that a return to sanity is marked by attentiveness to matters of dress. Jane Kromm draws 
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attention to this history in her article on visual representations of madness in the Victorian period, 
and one of Chesler's interviewees in Women and Madness notes that neatly-combed hair 'shows 
you're advancing'.36 Showalter, too, comments on the significance of carefully arranged hair in the 
recognition of madness: John Connelly, superintendent of the Hanwell asylum in Middlesex, was 
known to commend 'hair more carefully arranged, a neater cap, a new riband' and recommended 
that female patients be presented with 'a neat or even a pretty cap' for Sunday wear to encourage 
seemly attention to their toilette.37 Joy's obsessive attention to her cosmetic regime, and the 
delineation of the bathing ritual she undergoes every Sunday evening, thus take on more sinister 
overtones: as well as indexing her desperate desire to be desirable, they also suggest that she is 
attempting to assert her sanity in the face of psychological collapse. 
 
For all the feminist undertones of the passage in which she discusses her madness with the 
admitting psychiatrist, however, Joy also sees very little hope in the discourses of liberation that this 
section mobilises. She experiences her own voice as she is telling this story as 'chiselled as crystal' 
and 'cold as a razor' (p. 104). Clearly hostile, the voice takes on a life of its own: an instance of 
psychic splitting so threatening that she feels the need to 'let this disembodied glass voice' come out 
and sit aside, 'out of harm's way' (p. 104). This voice 'does not like her', despite the fact it is part of 
her. It thus comes to represent her self-loathing. This is, I think, related to the fact that although, as 
we have seen above, she finds the patriarchal messages in which she is enmeshed oppressive, she 
cannot reject them outright either (p. 105). In interview, Galloway has acknowledged her own 
discomfiture with some of the currents of second-wave feminism, commenting that ‘*My work] is 
about a perennial female problem that I don’t think feminism addresses very much—it’s about what 
you do when you fancy men but you don’t like them'.38 This discomfited desire to be desirable is at 
the heart of the voice's 'dislike' of her. 
 
What is interesting, then, is that by the end of the text we see that neither the sexist equations of 
femininity with sweetness and beauty analysed above, nor her self-castigating anger at her own 
inability to do anything about it, can entirely take hold. Neither external pressure nor internal self-
loathing succeed, finally, in crushing her sense of selfhood entirely. However, by the end of Trick,  
the voice which is initially as 'chiselled as crystal' speaks to her, saying, quite distinctly, 'I forgive you' 
(p. 235). This is another fragment: still not situated in the narrative proper, it nonetheless has a 
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beneficent quality to it; a note of salvation. Rather, then, than being fully able to reject the 
narratives of feminine conformity or emancipation between which she oscillates throughout the 
text, what we see at the end is that Joy achieves a state in which she can organise a loosely 
assembled collection of fragments into something that makes sense to her. It is these fragmented 
moments that allow her the series of realisations that form the novel's ending. Although her 
condition has undoubtedly improved, the final recognition is simply that 'I don't want to live very 
much but I don't want to die' (p. 203), that she is 'still here' (p. 207).The form that trauma takes in 
the novel is thus analogous to the way that Berlant describes the traumatic in Cruel Optimism. For 
her, trauma is a mode of 'describing one or two styles among many to manage being overwhelmed' 
in a way that offers the possibility of conducting 'the work of survival without much of a normative 
plot or guarantee'.39 In The Trick Is to Keep Breathing, this work is done through the contingent and 
accidental felicities that allow Joy to organise the narrative into a loose form of coherence. Although 
there is  a sense of improvement throughout the novel, the rhetorical use of fragmented, traumatic 
narratives and Joy's mordant humour allow for what Berlant would refer to as space to 'tread water': 
to maintain a manageable level of composure in the face of constant threats to Joy's subjectivity and 
stability.40 
 
What I hope I have demonstrated here is that Galloway is offering us a way of understanding 
traumatic experience in which the pathology is not entirely abreacted or discharged, but neither 
does it utterly overwhelm the speaker. Rather, Joy's narrative can be read as a series of contingent 
strategies that keep her narrative and sense of self alive. At the end of the novel, the symbolic 
cleaning of her house and the decision to learn to swim suggest that recovery is not complete, but 
nonetheless one that allows her to become capable of maintaining a 'normal life', one in which she 
will not 'fall through the cracks'.41 After an encounter with the possibility of madness, of soul-death 
or death-in-life, we are offered this contingent, fragmentary form of holding it together, of treading 
water, of keeping breathing. The text is thus not exactly a call to arms in which we are offered the 
possibility of confronting patriarchal value systems and norms, but it does allow space to inwardly 
deconstruct these narratives, deflating their idiocies and exposing the deleterious nature of their 
assumptions. In this sense, The Trick Is to Keep Breathing represents a recovery from madness which 
stresses the importance of functionality over total cohesion: despite the fragmented nature of the 
novel, by its close we see that there is the possibility of moments of relief, moments of tenderness, 
and moments of forgiveness. 
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Piecing Together Foreign Parts 
 
Foreign Parts continues Galloway's engagement with the processes of piecing together a life 
fragmented by trauma. The novel begins with Chapter None, which describes a traumatising incident 
in which a young child discovers that her father has died. Throughout, I argue that this 'piecing 
together' is a specific response to the traumatic encounter with the possibility of madness, of the 
dissolution of selfhood, which takes place in Chapter None. As in Trick, the novel  has a piecemeal 
structure which foregrounds the work the protagonists, Cassie and Rona, do to construct a coherent 
narrative of friendship from the 'parts' of their own lives: even Cassie's name implies fragmentation, 
recalling as it does 'cassé’, the French for 'broken'. Developing the concerns of The Trick Is to Keep 
Breathing, Galloway explores the possibilities of integrating or reintegrating broken 'parts' or 
fragments of narrative; what Berlant might call 'one or two st among many for managing being 
overwhelmed'.42 Galloway draws attention to the contingent structure of the text and to her 
concomitant interest in the act of 'piecing together' a life threatened by the possibility of dissolution 
in Chapter One, when Cassie notices a sign on a hoarding that reads ‘BRICOLAGE’ (p. 13). Often 
associated with postmodernism, particularly in architecture, the term signifies a literary technique in 
which ‘found objects’ are inserted into the text from extraneous waste material, rendering them 
either mysterious or absurd, and putting them to unexpected uses. The French translation of  the 
term is simply 'D-I-Y', which again is apposite: in drawing attention to the practice of doing it oneself, 
Galloway underlines the way in which the two women are arranging the incomplete fragments of 
various conventional aspects of femininity into a meaningful life narrative.  
 
As far as I am aware, there has been no critical commentary on Chapter None in the criticism on 
Galloway. Although the child is nameless, the smooth transition from Chapter None to Chapter One, 
and the way that Cassie's mode of experiencing the world is continually conceptualised in terms of 
loss and instability, both imply that this is an early memory of hers. The memory remains displaced 
within the narrative by dint of two features: the aforementioned anonymity of the child in question, 
and the use of an irregular page numbering scheme throughout the section. The chapter's pages are 
numbered consecutively from '000' to '0': in Chapter None we are in negative territory, approach a 
'degree zero' in the bridge between page 0 and page 1, and then set off into the narrative proper 
with our introduction to the adult Cassie. This clearly signifies a memory that is, to use the phrase 
coined by Pontalis and Laplanche in their description of traumatic recollection, 'not in its proper 
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place', or, to use Caruth's phrase, 'unclaimed'.43 Indeed, the text's suggestion that this incident is a 
degree zero for Cassie's subjectivity foregrounds the centrality of this experience to her, even as it 
disavows it by titling the chapter in which it is titled 'Chapter None'. The section thus functions 
something like a traumatic or pathogenic kernel which we are meant to understand as both not fully 
grasped by Cassie, but yet somehow inescapably present throughout. Furthermore, the fact that this 
incident takes place in Chapter None clearly underlines its relationship to nothingness, to non-
existence, and thus to threat of madness as psychological death. 
 
The chapter begins with the child running homeward, and this desire for 'home' is consistently 
underlined throughout the section. It is entirely focused on returning: the 'big men' eating chips are 
'not needing to be worried about' because the child is 'going home'; she understands the cemetery 
as 'two streets away' from home; and it is her desire to return home that prompts her to run away 
from her mother in the first place (p. 000). Home figures both as a place of warmth and security and 
as the space to which the child's identity is tethered: she makes sense of her environment in relation 
to the home space. However, after receiving traumatic information of the father's death, the child's 
imagination becomes unmoored. Rather than focusing on the warmth and security of a domestic 
setting, her sense of her own psychological stability fails. She senses the 'cold place' left by her 
mother's wetted handkerchief as a gap opening on her cheek: 'it feels like your face is tipping over 
the edge, falling inside it' (p. 00). This, then, is a moment which threatens collapse: the child's face, 
the symbol of her coherent identity, is 'tipping over the edge' into nothingness (p. 00). The sense of 
dissolution and dispersal runs throughout the passage: her mother's voice is 'spiralling upwards and 
further away like wrong snow' (p. 0), and the noise of her own tears merges with that of the waves. 
Throughout, then, the stabilities of home and coherent identity give way to dissolution and a 
threatened sense of subjective cohesion. 
 
As I show later, this traumatised sense of personal fragility and instability informs both Cassie's 
sense of her own physicality, which is constantly under threat, and her responses to the historical 
and aesthetic issues that arise throughout the novel. Galloway thus explores the subjective 
consequences of this early encounter with the collapse of personhood, with deathliness. As in The 
Trick Is to Keep Breathing, the encounter gives rise to unexpected modes of sympathy and 
compassion to arise. In this text, however, the affinities that arise cross historical time and attach to 
those 'poor buggers' who died in the First World War and unnamed workers who suffered for the 
creation of sites of historical interest, such as the Cathedral at Chartres (which Cassie and Rona visit), 
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rather than being contemporary and gender specific (p. 19). There is thus a widening motion at work 
between the two novels, as if Galloway's concerns with the social aspects of traumatic experience 
are now historical as well as interpersonal. 
 
The first thoughts the reader hears in the text proper are Cassie's. As she embarks on the ferry 
taking her and Rona to France, she contemplates ‘how it would be if she hit the accelerator instead 
of the brake how it would be if’ (p. 1). This is an instance of suicidal ideation; either the sentence 
remains unfinished because it ends in death, or because Cassie does not allow herself to finish the 
thought. There is no clear distinction between the impulse here and the revelation of death in 
Chapter None—we are not even given a full stop to indicate that the time-frame has changed. Thus, 
Cassie's childhood trauma still haunts her: she is still living in a world dominated by a sense of fear 
and deathliness. It also implies that the instability and insecurity we see throughout the narrative is 
rooted in Cassie’s childhood experience of loss; concomitantly, her sensitivity to the pain and 
suffering of others, and her inquiring mind and sceptical disposition are also linked to this early 
childhood experience. As we see here, she is prone to sudden, almost whimsical suicidal impulses; 
later, it becomes clear that she is also sensitive to the way that bodies disintegrate and fall apart, to 
the magnitude of historical violence, and to the way that such violence is implied in sites of great 
aesthetic power. The threat of madness thus lurks throughout the novel: my contention is that this 
early childhood trauma, in which the death of a father figure leads to the disintegration of a stable 
sense of home and belonging, should be understood as the originating factor in these aspects of her 
characterisation. The early encounter with the threat of nothingness, of the complete overwhelming 
of subjectivity, which, as I outlined in my introduction, is the key form of madness this thesis 
addresses, thus plays out throughout the novel. 
 
The issue of trauma is also addressed in the text by raising the question of how to respond to 
historical violence. The question is staged most starkly in the visit Rona and Cassie pay to the war 
cemetery in which Rona's grandfather is buried. Cassie is particularly reluctant to engage with this 
expedition, as she feels that there is something fundamentally 'not in order' about the way that such 
sites have become tourist destinations (p. 50). Her sense of propriety is also offended by the jaunty 
tone of Potted France, the inane guidebook they are using to navigate their holiday. When they 
arrive at the cemetery, Cassie leaves Rona to find her grandfather’s grave, which leads to the 
reflection that: 
It was a cemetery, not a fucking amusement arcade. Staring at a photo on a headstone and 
conjecturing about who he might have been was not in order. The place was full of folk who 
belonged to somebody but none of them were hers. She had no right play-acting or making 
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up wee sentimental fictions while her pal was busy. Or manufacturing spurious noble 
sentiments about it either. It was dubious territory indeed, the fantasy you could understand 
a bloody thing by looking at the likes of this. Rows of dead people. Dead men. Dead boys. 
There was nothing to understand but sheer, grinding misery. 
(p. 50) 
Cassie is acutely sensitive to the presence of sheer, grinding misery, but here the passage clearly 
underlines the limitations of identifying with or understanding another's trauma. The reiteration of 
tropes of propriety and ownership indicated by her insistence that the people buried in the 
cemetery are not 'hers', and that she has 'no right' to a sense of emotional involvement in it, suggest 
a disquiet about attempting to understand the pain of others. This, then, is an assertion of decency: 
of a desire not to reappropriate historical anguish through sentimental identification with the 
traumatised subject.  
 
Cassie's mistrust of the memorialisation of the war graves has affinities with Jacques Derrida's 
contention in his essay on Jean-François Lyotard in The Work of Mourning (2001) that it is indecent 
to attempt to reappropriate the life of another into a living subject's narrative. This notion has to do 
with a commitment to avoid mourning which takes the 'form of a personal testimony, which always 
tends towards reappropriation and always risks giving in to an indecent way of saying "we", or 
worse, "me"'.44 Derrida goes on to describe this situation as an unforgiving bind: the question is how 
can we let the one who we are mourning stand alone while simultaneously not abandoning them?45 
Mourning, for him, should not avoid death, or attempt to save the mourned from death, but instead 
attempt to save the dead from that which is 'worse than death': the absolute abandonment of the 
dead, and the deployment of the mourning process in a way that is self-aggrandising and claims the 
relationship with the dead as a monument to the living. This is a fate he associates with Auschwitz.46 
This resonates clearly with Cassie's insistence that none of the war dead 'were hers' (p. 50) . Cassie's 
awareness of the ever-present threat of death thus emanates outwards, encouraging a high degree 
of sensitivity to historical issues of loss. 
 
In contrast to Cassie's response, we might be tempted, in this reading, to suggest that Rona's actions 
verge on the indecent: she cheerfully photographs her grandfather's grave to document this trip for 
her mother, carries a sheaf of her grandfather’s war letters with her so she can look at them over 
dinner, and is unembarrassed by the French sexton’s attempts to  highlight the correct name on the 
Murs de Fusillés so that it can clearly be seen in the photographs. Rona, then, represents a 
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normative, participatory form of subjectivity untroubled by her relation to the historical. Essentially, 
she has no problem doing what it is she supposed to do, or feeling what she is supposed to feel. In 
Berlant's terms, for Rona, normative modes of affective life provide a 'seemingly neutral, reliable 
framework for enduring in the world': she experiences herself, at least from Cassie's point of view, 
as 'literate' in normativity.47 Cassie's early trauma, however, appears to have divorced her from this 
sense of social reliability, such that the modes of life available to her constantly threaten her 
equanimity and sense of well-being. We thus return to the threat of madness represented by the 
inability to participate in normative social rituals discussed in the section on The Trick Is to Keep 
Breathing, and indeed, Cassie's fraught tone throughout the novel recalls Joy's inability to participate 
in the modes of femininity enjoined upon her.  
 
Somewhat surprisingly, Cassie is remarkably tolerant of her friend's reaction to the cemetery, 
despite the fact that elsewhere in the text, she is highly critical of Rona's unthinking acceptance of 
the value-systems propounded by their guidebook. This suggests that Cassie recognises and respects 
Rona's ability to unproblematically take part in collective, normative rituals. Through her early 
trauma, Cassie is constantly conscious of the provisional ity of normality, of the sense that the 
everyday reality is likely to spill into chaos or disorder, and this concomitantly disallows her full 
affective participation in the rituals of holiday-making the two attempt to take part in. The subtlety 
of the representation of the relationship between Cassie and Rona lies in the fact that although 
Cassie is sometimes impatient with Rona's reactions to the monuments they visit, she is nonetheless 
aware that it impossible to valorise her own response over Rona's, or vice versa. The novel thus 
suggests that there are a number of 'decent' ways to respond to historical violence.  
 
Traumatic Tropism 
 
Cassie's traumatised subjectivity also has implications for her aesthetic responses. This plays out 
most clearly in the episode at the cathedral of Chartres. Here, the text does not simply stage an 
engagement with historical narrative, but asks in what ways a traumatised subjectivity affects 
Cassie's engagement with aesthetic production. Before entering the building, Cassie contemplates 
the exterior. Her eye is drawn to ‘thousands’ of ‘different sizes of people’ that populate the front 
wall of the cathedral (p. 94). True to form, Cassie reads these details as suggestive of violence: a 
shepherd is ‘talking to somebody headless’ and the face of the seated Mary is ‘missing' (p. 95). Her 
attention is drawn to the fragmented bodies of many of the figures, describing their ‘chipped noses', 
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'smashed shoulder-blades' and ‘missing hands and hipbones’ (p. 95). Clearly, then, we can see 
Cassie's death-orientated sensibility here. However, there is also a strong sense of the ordinariness 
of the figures. Even the caryatids that make up the main pillars, which Cassie suspects may be 
‘queens, saints or somesuch’ look like ‘women waiting at the bus stop’ (p. 95). Many of the smaller 
figures are engaged in mundane tasks such as watching sheep, caring for children, ringing bells, or 
playing instruments (p. 95). Cassie is taken aback—in fact almost offended—by the figures. They are 
‘too at peace with themselves, too untroubled for comfort’ (p. 95). The intimation that there is 
something suspicious about their sense of easiness in the world, of being too untroubled, stems 
from her own sense of constant dislocation and insecurity deriving from her early consciousness of 
life's fundamental instability. Ironically, her discomfiture stems from the overall impression of 
serenity radiating from the building.  
 
This discomfiture leads Cassie into a spirited reflection on the lives that the people represented in 
stone at Chartres must have lived. She notes ‘the Black Death’, ‘leprosy’, ‘blood dripping from the 
eyes of plaster statues’, ‘leeches and wasps in glass bottles over open wounds’, ‘chastity belts that 
dug raw weals into the skin’, the practice of parents wasting the ‘limbs of their own children to make 
them better beggars’, the burning of animals alive 'to emulate the screams of the damned for the 
purpose of social control’ and the punitive starvation of miscreants in wicker cages until they 
‘wither, die, rot and slither through the slats in public view’ as a few examples of the iniquities of the 
dark ages (p. 96). The focus in this section is not only on violence, but on violence that contravenes 
the limits of the body, upsetting the fundamental division between the inside and the outside. 
Cassie's imagination closely follows the model of abjection proposed by Julia Kristeva in The Powers 
of Horror (1982). Her attention is drawn towards  the collapse of bodily integrity that augers for 
Kristeva's sense of the abject as 'the place where meaning collapses'.48 This bodily instability recalls 
the moment in Chapter None where the child feels that the cold patch on her skin left there by her 
mother’s wet handkerchief is spreading to such a vast size that her whole face will collapse into it (p. 
0), and is reiterated, after she enters the Cathedral, by her vision of the way that the faces of people 
in the crowd surrounding the votive candles are also 'slithering and folding' (p. 100) . The repetition 
of the term 'slithering' here implies a sense of threat similar to the one she imaginatively invokes in 
the list of medieval violences mentioned above. Here, then, Cassie's uneasy way of being in the 
world is related not just to the sense of threat engendered by the trauma of Chapter None, but 
effects her aesthetic responses such that she reads the building in terms of the violence it implies 
both to her own body and to the bodies that helped to build it.  
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The link between the list of medieval iniquities and Cassie's response to the Cathedral's aesthetic 
power therefore indicates a problematised and resistant attitude towards sublime or transcendent 
aesthetic experience, which is insisted upon through imaginative recourse to bodies that collapse, 
sink and fragment. This scepticism regarding the nature of sublime and transcendent experience lies, 
I would argue, at the heart of Galloway's project in Foreign Parts. The bathetic function is evident in 
the episode in the Cathedral. Here, Cassie is just beginning to make sense of the intimation of 
sublimity she rejected outright in her litany of medieval abuses. The final sentences of the passage 
imagine a pilgrimage to Chartres: 
the hopeful journeys over the yellow fields taking days it must have taken days to get here, 
weeks and months. For some, even years. The hazards of travel and how long it took, the 
anticipation of getting nearer. Then reaching a clearing and this thing appearing on the 
horizon, rising up out of the earth like judgement. And closer to, covered in themselves. 
(p. 97) 
The lyricism of this passage is derived from the paratactic sentence structure, and the spirituality of 
the metonymy of the cathedral with ‘judgement’ itself, both of which lend the passage a sense of 
rising to a crescendo. It echoes, too, the account of the pilgrimage given by T.S. Eliot in ‘The Journey 
of the Magi'—another text that evokes the relationship between mundane concerns and historical 
enormity.49  
 
At this precise moment, however, that the reader begins to expect a  transcendent experience which 
allows Cassie access to a sense of historical enlightenment, Rona punctures Cassie’s reflection with a 
simple comment: ‘Big, isn’t it?’ (p. 97). Following John Wilkinson's reading of bathos in the poetry of 
James Schuyler, I argue that we can read this moment as characteristic of Galloway's determination 
to deflate; a determination that derives what Wilkinson terms 'an intense scepticism regarding the 
sublime' which can be traced to the trauma that the infant Cassie has experienced.50 Alexander 
Pope, in 'Peri Bathous', characterises the bathetic as a failure to achieve an elevated poetic tone, and 
hence a comic but unintentional sinking.51 Here, however, bathos does not figure 'as an [accidental] 
fall from a high lyric tone' but, as Wilkinson puts it, 'a principled steadiness and soundness of 
nerve'.52 Wilkinson's foregrounding of the role of 'nerve' in this comment is intriguing: it relates the 
aesthetic practice of bathos to a form of sanity. Nerves, obviously, are exactly Cassie's problem, and 
this steadiness and soundness of nerve is precisely what she so sorely lacks. Her deflationary 
bathetic tactics thus appear to be part of a project to shore them up. 
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In this, then, the bathetic tone functions to resist the possible overwhelming of Cassie's subjectivity 
by an experience of the sublime. Dominick LaCapra underscores the connection between these two 
forms of experience, pointing out that 'trauma is often figured as deeply ambivalent—as both 
shattering or painful, and the occasion for jouissance, ecstatic elation, or the sublime'.53 This 
provides us with a way of reading Cassie's troubled relation to transcendence. Her anxious struggles 
against both the object that moves her and the desire to be moved, is related to an underlying need 
to 'steady her nerve' against the possibility that she may be 'overwhelmed' or 'carried away'. I am 
particularly interested here in Wilkinson's use of the term 'principled', as, for Cassie, scepticism 
towards the desire to be moved seems to be a matter of political commitment as well self-
preservation; a principle which, I suggest, derives from a politicised awareness of the fragility of the 
normative, everyday lifeworld in which she exists.  
 
Conclusion: The Only Stab at Life You’d Got 
 
Both Cassie and Joy's relation to their trauma, then, is suggestive of a kind of struggle for the 
'soundness of nerve' identified by Wilkinson above. In both texts, a form of subjectivity is achieved, 
which, despite its obvious cracks and instabilities, is able to offer a critique of the social world in 
which they have been placed, and to maintain a possibility, however attenuated, of hope and 
change. This stands in stark contrast to those devolutionary critics who have emphasised the victim 
status of the protagonists, especially Joy's, as a way of demonstrating the nationalist concerns of the 
novels: Mary M. McGlynn argues that Galloway’s work expresses the second-class status of both her 
gender and her nation through ‘a parallel focus on the inadequacies of family and on the perils of 
inhabiting threatened spaces, from the female body to remote housing estates’, and Marilyn 
Reizbaum emphasises the ‘double-exclusion' in which 'the struggle to assert a nationalist identity 
obscures or doubly marginalises the assertion of gender’, leading to ‘the historical interaction 
between the marginalization of culture and sexism'.54Alan Riach has it that Joy is 'cripplingly 
sensitive to the dominant masculinity of Scotland's normative society' and Dominic Head asserts that 
her dissolution ‘represents an uncertainty about national belonging, and the textual materials that 
might compose it’.55 This is a phenomenon on which Galloway herself commented, describing her 
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feeling of guilt at 'taking time off the concerns of national politics to get concerned with the sexual 
sort: that creeping fear it’s somehow self-indulgent to be more concerned for one’s womaness 
instead of one’s Scottishness'.56 
 
By way of contrast, I argue that throughout both novels, traumatic rhetoric actually allows the 
protagonists access to modes of being beyond crippled or fractured victimhood. In Trick, this is 
achieved by Joy's rhetorical strategies of fragmentation, which pull together the meaning of the 
narrative and allow the reader access to political truths about gender which would not be clear were 
the text structured in a conventionally coherent way. Similarly, in Foreign Parts, Cassie's desire to 
grasp and to understand historical trauma is represented as intensified by her own traumatic 
experiences, and dependent on an insistence on a historical imagination alive to the ever present 
pain and suffering of ordinary people. In both The Trick Is to Keep Breathing and Foreign Parts, the 
traumatic moment and its aftermath reveal the tensions inherent in problematic, unhappy but 
nonetheless appealing investments in aesthetic and romantic desire—but not, I contend, with 
nationalist desire, with which, frankly, both novels seem largely unconcerned. 
 
 My suggestion is that the representation of fragmented subjectivity and the rhetorical strategies of 
techniques of fragmentation throughout both The Trick Is to Keep Breathing and Foreign Parts 
demonstrate the ways that the traumatised subjects are pulled in opposing directions, towards both 
a critique of and a desire for what Lauren Berlant would call 'modes of life that generate so much 
overwhelming yet sustaining negation'.57 Their trauma has made them aware that the normative 
'modes of life' offered to them are unreliable or at worst actively damaging, yet throughout they 
struggle to articulate what they might replace this with. That said, the moment at the end of Foreign 
Parts in which Cassie suggests to Rona that they might consider sharing their domestic lives together 
is a tentative move towards making the best of the life she has with the material that is available. 
The fact that Rona is asleep as Cassie articulates this suggestion, and that she receives only a snore 
as a response, is illustrative of precisely the bathetic structure of the text I have just been discussing: 
it undercuts, but does not undermine, the suggestion. Despite its attenuation, then, this does 
suggest that Cassie's sense of the instability of conventional domesticity brought about by her early 
encounter with the traumatic recognition of death and instability can have posi tive as well as 
threatening effects. In Foreign Parts, Cassie thus seems to go a little further towards a recognition 
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that the structures of heteronormative domestic life is not the only possible option for a sustaining 
and fulfilling life. 
 
Although there is a less definite movement towards 'alternative modes of lives' proposed in The 
Trick Is to Keep Breathing, the novel nonetheless stages the tensions inherent in normative social life 
which are underscored by a traumatic event which ripples not only through Joy's life, but through 
her social milieu. If both novels stage an encounter with the possibility of absolute subjective 
collapse, with deathliness and complete isolation, we are also presented with possibilities for 
constructing a mode of living which allows for the protagonists to continue functioning in a way 
which allows them access to forms of intimacy, fulfilment and human warmth. Such closeness is 
always on a decidedly everyday plane, but nonetheless its possibility haunts the novels with as much 
power as the equally important emphasis on utter dissolution and psychic failure. Despite the 
grimness of the subject matter, then, they are both in the end optimistic novels, and not cruelly so.
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Chapter  Three: Off the Map—Landscape, Affect, and Madness in Alan Warner's Morvern Callar 
and These Demented Lands 
 
Morvern Callar (1994) and These Demented Lands (1998) follow the narrative of the eponymous 
Morvern, a twenty-one year old supermarket worker living in The Port, a small town based on Oban 
on the west coast of Scotland.1 On the day before Christmas Eve, she returns to her home to 
discover that her novelist boyfriend has sliced his wrists with a meat cleaver. The novels trace the 
aftermath of his suicide and Morvern’s response, which is so amoral that it forces the reader to 
seriously question Morvern's sanity. The effect of the entire novel thus turns on the question of 
madness. Warner is the author of six other novels: The Sopranos (1998), The Man Who Walks 
(2002), The Worms Can Carry Me To Heaven (2006), The Stars in the Bright Sky (2010), The 
Deadman's Pedal (2012) and Their Lips Talk of Mischief (2014).2 In his representation of Morvern's 
partner's suicide, Warner also explores and reiterates the trope of the madness derived from the 
condition of being, as Martyn Evans, speaking of Hans Castorp in Thomas Mann's The Magic 
Mountain puts it, 'half in love with death'.3 In common with many of the thinkers responding to 
images of insanity, Evans associates madness with a dissolution of selfhood orientated towards 
deathliness and non-being. Unlike in Louis Sass, Phyllis Chesler or Elaine Showalter, however, this 
Dionysian form of madness involves a substantial degree of wilfulness: the creative artist, as both 
Evans and Patricia Waugh in the same volume show, is in this tradition represented as seeking out a 
transformative self-destruction: in Waugh's words, the 'Dionysian dissolution of the self' is 
reincorporated into a 'harmonious whole...through the Apollonian discipline of form'.4 In Morvern's 
partner's suicide, and her untroubled cooptation of his novel to fund her lifestyle, we thus see two 
different forms of madness deployed to explore questions about different ways of making books, 
and the proper and improper uses of them. 
 
I have already highlighted Morvern's lack of emotion at the death of her partner. This speaks to an 
entirely different tradition of thinking about insanity, one which Waugh describes as the 
'contemporary pathology' of borderline personality disorder.5 Speaking of postmodern art, she 
identifies the key feature of this form of pathology as affectlessness, arguing that this is 
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'symptomatic of the postmodern condition of "hyperreality", a condition where art and self have 
ceased to exist, not only because their critical transcendence has gone, but because in a culture of 
the simulacrum, of endless self-invention and technological reproduction, reality itself is entirely 
impregnated with an aesthetic which is inseparable from its own structure, has been confused with 
its own image'.6 Morvern Callar plays with and troubles both these deathly forms of madness, 
showing how madness as a kind of transcendent, spiritualised desire for death and the affectless 
condition in which selfhood has in some sense ceased to exist simultaneously undercut one another, 
and are unsustainable on their own terms. 
 
In These Demented Lands Morvern returns to Scotland, penniless and pregnant, seeking work in a 
hotel on a Scottish island owned by the demonic John Brotherhood. In the opening pages, she 
passes from the realm of the living into a strange, hallucinatory  environment which is consistently 
marked as the land of the dead, and yet in which the possibility of return is always maintained. I 
argue that this ambiguous crossing is best understood as a form of mad experience, an encounter 
with death such that the reader is unable to decide if Morvern herself is mad, if the madness lies 
with the other characters she encounters throughout the text, or if the experience of the text is 
intended to force the reader to share this pervasive sense of insanity. These Demented Lands can 
thus be read as a contemporary pilgrimage, a form of what Rachel Falconer would describe as a 
katabatic descent into hallucinatory madness, 'a story about a living person who visits the land of the 
dead'.7 She is thus, in a very literal way, existing in the form of 'death-in-life' which I take to be a 
centrally defining feature of madness throughout this thesis. For Falconer, the katabatic journey is 
stabilised by the return of the narrator to the land of the living, after which point the traveller can 
narrate their experiences and fix a meaning to the narrative. The most intriguing aspect of These 
Demented Lands, however, is that neither Morvern nor the other characters in the novel recognise 
that they are existing in this ambiguous netherworld. As such, the descent is not narrated from the 
safe ground of the return, but navigated in all its disorientating illegibility by both the protagonist 
and the reader of the text. These Demented Lands thus resists the definition usually accorded to 
katabatic narratives: like Morvern Callar, it is peculiarly resistant to interpretation. In the first novel, 
this ambiguity is effected by the question of Morvern's sanity; in the second, it comes about because 
she, and by extension we, are travellers through an insane landscape. 
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The last point regarding madness in These Demented Lands concerns the text’s stylistic and 
rhetorical thickness, in which the reader consistently struggles to make sense of what is happening 
because of the intensely stylised descriptions of events and landscapes. This, along with the 
profound incongruity of the presence of many of the island's inhabitants and occupations, also 
disorientates the reader’s ability to make sense of the narrative. There is a fairly typically 
postmodern 'overloading' of sensory experience, such that it is difficult to make out precisely what is 
happening. Notably, however, this does not seem to affect Morvern: rather, the reader themselves 
feels demented. In this respect, the text is mimetic: like the novels of Alice Thompson discussed in 
Chapter Five, it elicits in the reader an experience of disorientation and dislocation comparable to 
the 'blankness' identified by Annesley as typical of texts which engage with the question of the 
relationship between the 'individual and consumer culture'.8 What is most disorientating, though, is 
that these issues are raised in the context of the paradigmatically romantic, unspoiled environment 
of the Western Isles (or rather, an insane version of them). Questions of sanity and affective 
response are thus also intimately involved with issues pertaining to how the human subject interacts 
with the wider environment. 
 
There is a clear development between the two texts in terms of Morvern's affective responses: in 
the second, she is less alienated and more politically aware; an awareness that leads, in the final 
pages of the novel, to an act of arson in which she torches Brotherhood's hotel, the Drome, to the 
ground. I contend that although both the dismemberment of her ex-partner's remains in the first 
novel, and the violent attack on property in the second can be understood as mad in the affectless, 
disengaged way discussed both by Patricia Waugh, James Annesley and others,  and which ultimately 
derives from the postmodern collapse of individual identity and resultant schizophrenia theorised by 
Jameson, both incidents also point towards a violent refusal of the modes of understanding the 
world offered by both Brotherhood and Morvern's partner. There is thus an attenuated sense that at 
some level Movern's actions here can be understood as expressing (if not articulating), a political (if 
not politicised), sensibility alive to asymmetries and injustices of her situation. 
 
Morvern and Affectless: 'Vast Internal Emptiness' 
 
The inside jacket of the 1995 edition of Morvern Callar describes Morvern as representative of the 
'vast internal emptiness of a generation'.9 Many of the critical comments on the text emphasise 
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Warner's affinities with Irvine Welsh, and as such often focus on the frank depictions of recreational 
drug use and casual sex, or the unusual level of detail in Morvern's self-care routines, seeing her 
flatness either as the product of the consumer culture in which she is enmeshed, or her materialism 
as providing her with an antidote to it.10 In this reading, Morvern's affectless is related to her 
consumption of consumer goods, and in particular film and pop-music (the text is peppered with 
track listings from the compilation tapes she listens to on her walkman). As mentioned above, 
Morvern thus becomes an avatar of what Fredric Jameson would call 'the inner truth of that newly 
emergent social order of late capitalism' which is characterised by the waning of affect he associates 
with schizophrenia.11 This, in Annesley's words, leads to the 'blank, atonal perspectives and fragile, 
glassy visions' which he typically associates with the fictions responding to this decentring of 
individual personhood.12 
 
Critics who have commented extensively on Morvern's emotional flatness, the feature that I take to 
be at the heart of the novel, fall into two camps: those who understand her affective responses to 
be pathologically lacking—as if she is genuinely psychotic—and those who interpret her emotional 
life to be relatively legible but withheld from the narration for stylistic reasons. In the first camp is 
Rod Mengham, who describes Morvern Callar as 'morally opaque' and 'stylistically delirious' and 
Cristie March, who sees Morvern as moving 'through life as if shell-shocked’, ultimately 'unable to 
register the lasting implications’ of her situation.13 Critical discussions of Morvern's sanity in the first 
novel have largely centred around her lack of emotional and political engagement; in the second 
text, the issue is, for the most part, ignored altogether. For Berthold Schoene, Morvern is a 'feral' 
who 'barely seems to think at all'; for Carole Jones, she is 'slightly psychotic'.14 Sophie Dale, on the 
other hand, holds that Warner’s characters ‘withhold’ their emotional power, indicating that she 
reads Morvern’s affect as suppressed rather than absent.15 Carole Jones, too, sees Morvern Callar as 
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representing Morvern's mourning period for her partner.16 Similarly, the narrative of Lynne Ramsey's 
2002 film follows Morvern's withdrawn emotional capacities as they are extended and drawn out 
through the momentary transcendence available in dance music and her appreciation of the natural 
landscape.17 All these responses, then, read Morvern's emotional state as perhaps damaged but 
ultimately normative.  
 
Whether we read Morvern’s affectlessness as indicative of a pathological lack of feeling or as 
withheld for aesthetic reasons, it is undoubtedly the case that the text, in Sianne Ngai’s words, 
foregrounds ‘the absence of strong emotions where we are led to expect them’.18 One of Ngai’s 
concerns in Ugly Feelings (2005) is to trace the ways in which inhibited or absent affect plays out in 
the formal qualities of the texts with which she engages. Describing Melville's The Confidence Man, 
as ‘a novel which readers will have trouble caring about’, Ngai argues that the absence of caring is in 
itself the most significant feature of the text, provoking a ‘negative secondary emotion’ in which the 
reader is troubled precisely by the fact that they do not care about the text.19 As she puts it, ‘the 
very absence of care subsequently becomes disturbing’.20 Morvern Callar explores the intriguing 
implications of precisely the opposite operation: we are presented with two events, the fraudulent 
publication of a book and the end of a man's life, which the reader cares about and is interested in, 
but the protagonist does not and is not.  
 
Affectlessness and Narrative 
 
The 'absence of care' in Morvern Callar is strikingly evident in Morvern's lack of interest in her 
boyfriend's work. She has no desire to read the novel for clues about her partner's death or even 
curiosity as to whether she appears in it. Immediately after reading his suicide note, Morvern makes 
this comment: 
 After a good while I started paging forward through the disc. This novel thing was 
 page after page of words then a number then more pages of words and another 
 number. You had to read to get to the end; you couldn't see the point in reading 
 through all that just to get to an end. Without reading a word of it...my fingers touched the 
 keys and typed letters over His name. 
 (pp. 82-83) 
                                                                 
16
 Jones, p. 176. 
17
 Lynne Ramsey (dir), Morvern Callar, Sheffield, Warp Films, 2002. 
18
 Ngai is here speaking of Melville's 'Bartleby'. Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings (New Haven: Harvard, 2005), p. 10. 
19
 Ngai, p. 83.  
20
 Ngai, pp. 83-84. 
96 
 
The phrases 'page after page', followed by 'more pages' indicate her supreme lack of interest, 
contributing to our impression of Morvern's sense of the interminability of the reading process. The 
passage also draws together Morvern’s lack of interest in her own emotions, and in the business of 
reading and writing novels. Her comment that 'you couldn't see the point in reading through all that 
just to get to the end' indicates Morvern's rejection of narrative structure: she has no expectation 
that the ending will be able to illuminate the beginning, hence its pointlessness. Morvern's affectless 
response to the appearance of the novel thus suggests that an important aspect of the novel is its 
representation of the failure of narrative coherence, and a concomitant desire to create narrative 
meaning. It can thus be linked to the inability to grasp biographical temporality which is for Jameson 
a key feature of postmodern schizophrenia. 
 
This sense of atemporality is also present in Morvern’s conception of her own life, particularly later 
in the novel, when she comments to the representatives of the publishing company to which she has 
sent her partner's manuscript that writing is ‘better than working in a supermarket; waking up on 
cold mornings knowing it’s thirty-nine year to go till pension’ ['year' in original] (p. 161). This 
suggests that Morvern’s affective flatness is entangled with the fact that the present, past and future 
are equally blank, thus provoking a supreme lack of concern with the whys and wherefores of her 
partner's death, and her place in his life. This formlessness also offers us a way of understanding the 
curiously uneven narrative of the text, in which Morvern spends six months in the Port, journeys to 
Spain, returns first to London and then to the Port, finds that she has been gifted her boyfriend’s 
father’s inheritance in his will, and then immediately goes back to Spain, only returning five years 
later. Both the (lack of) narrative structure and the mimetic representation of it when paging 
through the boyfriend's novel speak to Jameson's characterisation of the postmodern condition as 
'living in a perpetual present of perpetual change'.21 Her figurative lack of direction in life is thus 
metaphoricised by the literal lack of direction in the plot. 
 
The sense that the novel form has been superseded—that the reader can't 'see the point in reading 
through all that just to get to the end'—is a central point of Ngai's argument about art, in which she 
identifies a pervasive modern intuition of the increasing disempowerment and irrelevance of 
‘bourgeois artworks’ theorised by Theodor Adorno in Aesthetic Theory (1970) and notes that all the 
ugly feelings attendant on this recognition stem from a sense of ‘suspended agency’.22 She links this 
with the oft-noted 'affective gaps and illegibilities' common to postmodern texts.23 This is an 
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iteration of the well-established critical connection between affectlessness, loss of subjectivity and 
the failure of conventional works of art: an instance, then, of the cultural schizophrenia identified by 
Jameson as  characteristic of the postmodern era. Her lack of a sense of narrative time, too, speaks 
to Jameson's notion that this schizophrenia is linked to an inability to grasp the historicity of the 
present moment: Morvern's comments about her boyfriend's novel function very much within this 
critical tradition.  
 
However, this stands in contrast to the understanding of narrative evinced by Movern's partner. 
Unlike Morvern, he has an intense sense of the narrative of his own life. He is 'always telling her that 
he doesn't have much time' (p. 40), he is happy to direct her to the publisher he wants to take his 
novel, and he ends his own life in the grand guignol of his suicide. The contrast between Morvern 
and her boyfriend's forms of madness thus gesture towards different ways of thinking about 
narrative, rather than an outright rejection of it based on the postmodern subject's lost 'capacity to 
retain [their] own past'.24 This relationship is delineated in Morvern's partner's suicide note (p. 81):  
 I have decided to play this trick on myself. Keep me on my toes. I was happy with you 
 Morvern but things became too cushy for this oldest of chancers. I was always looking for 
 peace, but here, you take it instead. 
 ...  
 I love you Morvern; feel my love in the evenings in the corners of all the rooms you will be 
 in. Keep your conscience immaculate and live the life people like me have denied you. You 
 are better than us. I do not want to leave this world I love so much. I love this world so much 
 I have to hold onto this chair with both hands.  Now send off this novel and have no 
 remorse. Be brave! 
 Right now, to work!  
  x x x x x 
 (p. 82) 
The emotionality of his words here—the intimation that he loves the world so much that he 'has to 
hold on' with both hands, his characterisation of himself as a 'chancer', his rejection of the 'cushy' 
domesticity and 'peace' of life with Morvern, and his heroic exhortation that she 'be brave' and 'have 
no remorse' all play on the myth of the creative artist as an audacious adventurer— what Al Alvarez 
might call an 'extremist' figure whose 'work' heavily involves 'mental disturbance' and is intimately 
involved with his own self-destruction.25 He has provided a list of publishers for her novel, asking her 
to send his novel to the first one on the list: if it is rejected, she is to go through them all. He is, he 
writes with magnificent complacency, prepared to 'settle for posthumous fame as long as I'm not 
lost in silence' (p. 82). 
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Warner here explicitly draws attention to the dubious assumptions of the 'creative artist' myth. 
Morvern's partner's desire to keep himself 'on his toes', to disrupt his own peaceful complacency, 
dismisses his relationship with Morvern as simply 'cushy', and thus unable to provide him with the 
artistic stimulation he needs (p. 82). In a similar vein, his intimation of her 'immaculate' conscience 
indicates that he sees her as the passive victim of 'people like me'. What we see in the suicide note, 
then, is Morvern's boyfriend's typically humanist expectation that the artist figure is redeemed firstly 
by a form of love that transcends even the barriers of death, and secondly by what Waugh describes 
as the 'critical transcendence' of his art.26 In short, he expects to be redeemed by his love for 
Morvern and his literary efforts speaking for him from beyond the grave. He thus evinces a typically 
humanist attitude towards both selfhood and artistic endeavour. He courts his own self-destruction 
precisely because it is only by transcending the self that both his art and his love can be vindicated. 
This section therefore draws on a tradition of madness which, although similarly deathly and 
orientated towards self-destruction, functions in a very different way to the schizoid affectlessness 
on which the characterisation of Morvern plays. 
 
My argument is that the novel does not simply represent but dramatises the anxiety that the novel 
form is no longer a valid way of representing experience. The two modes of madness presented in 
the book complicate and deepen both a Romantic and postmodern vision of artistic practice, 
augering for the novel form as a particularly appropriate way of thinking through the effects of 
disempowerment and social domination. The power relations implied in the boyfriend's attitude 
towards art is underscored in numerous ways. Warner draws attention to various material 
imbalances between them throughout the text, including age, financial security and cultural capital. 
The comment about 'people like me' indicates his awareness of his domination, hence implying a 
sense of inauthenticity, of out-of-placeness, even in his home environment. In representing both 
humanist, Romantic notions of the artist, and Morvern's affectless response to it, the novel bears 
out Sianne Ngai's point that it is precisely this sense of ‘powerlessness and superfluity’ in bourgeois 
artworks that make them capable of theorising social powerlessness.27 
 
In this respect, the novel can be understood as in the lineage of thinking about postmodern madness 
as amnesia and a waning of affect established by Fredric Jameson. My suggestion, however, is that 
placing Morvern's flatness squarely in this tradition does not fully do justice to the text. Rather than 
simply seeing the text as mobilising both traditions of thinking about madness simultaneously, 
Morvern's form of 'emptiness' and 'flatness' is set against the deliberately self-destructive model of 
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artistic creation which Morvern's boyfriend appears to be drawing on in his sense of the urgency of 
his artistic projects and finally in his suicide. Certainly, Morvern's affective blankness can be 
understood as a madness of emotional unintelligibility, but it also draws attention to the selfishness 
and self-aggrandisement feeding the myth of the suicidal artist who consciously manipulates the 
madness of his despair into the service of his art.28 
 
Affectlessness, Belonging and Authenticity 
 
In the section above, I noted that Morvern's affectlessness is set up in direct contrast to the anxious, 
conflicted relationship to authentic experience represented by her boyfriend. Morvern's affectless 
response to her partner's death problematises her partner's attitude towards notions of belonging. 
The anxiety about this issue is denoted by his odd choice of pastime: according to Morvern, he is 
obsessed with building an accurately reproduced scale-model of the countryside surrounding the 
Port. His reconstruction of the landscape of his childhood thus suggests an attempt to reclaim a 
sense of belonging to that environment, and his decision to end his own life so soon after the end of 
his father's again betokens this concern with his relationship to his environment. Morvern says of 
him that: 
 Queerest of all is the model railway-set of his childhood village he's built up in the loft [....]
 He's spent hundreds till it seems exactly like the real thing, so he sits up there just doing 
 these big stares at it; from the railway line to the top of the stairs and the hotel.   
 (p. 39) 
This implies that in order to create a fictional world in the novel, he is obliged to take control and 
ownership of a miniaturised physical world in his attic. There is a suggestion, then, that Morvern's 
relationship with him operates in an analogous manner, in which his relationship with a local woman 
somehow allows him temporary access to a sense of ownership and belonging to The Port. In  the 
boyfriend's understanding of their relationship, then, it is suggested that Morvern becomes the 
bearer of an authenticity unavailable to the educated artist.  
 
His sensibility is well-articulated by Seamus Heaney, who in his essay ‘The Sense of Place’, argues 
that: 
I think there are two ways in which place is known and cherished, two ways which may be 
complementary but which are just as likely to be antipathetic. One is lived, illiterate and 
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unconscious, the other learned, literate and conscious. In the literary sensibility, both are 
likely to co-exist in a conscious and unconscious tension.29 
In Morvern’s boyfriend we see precisely the operation in which he places her in the position of the 
bearer or recipient of some kind of ‘lived’, ‘illiterate’ and ‘unconscious’ authenticity which, as a 
middle-class writer, he denies to himself. Morvern's affectless (non)reaction to her boyfriend's 
attempt to insert himself into this lineage through his suicide thus problematises both his desire for 
a sense of belonging, and creative potency. As well as the central act of dismembering her partner's 
body, Morvern's plagiarising of his work, her lack of attachment to her home, and her rejection of 
her relationship both with her best friend and her foster father, are exemplary of the postmodern 
affective blankness which for Waugh 'overwhelming presents the humanist self as vanishing'.30 If the 
boyfriend's relationship with Morvern involves an attempt to shore up his own humanist sense of 
authentic connection with his environment, he has clearly vastly misinterpreted the nature  of their 
relationship. 
  
This reading offers a possible interpretation of Morvern treatment of  his remains. She not only 
handles the body with profound disrespect, but actually destroys the railway while doing so, 
winching his dead body up to it and then dropping it so that it smashes the model. It is this central 
act which causes us to question Morvern's sanity. However, rather than reading Morvern's gleeful 
dismantling of her boyfriend's remains as simply the symptom of her postmodern anomie, we are in 
fact witnessing the destruction of the figure of the Romantic artist. The suicidal artist is, as Alvarez 
points out, a paradigmatically Romantic figure: the most obvious example is Thomas Chatterton, 
who, Alvarez claims, became a 'great Romantic symbol' precisely because he committed suicide.31 
The image is striking: the woman who, in the imagination of the writer, plays the ‘immaculate’ 
innocent, uses the corpse of said writer to destroy the model through which he claims a similar pure 
and authentic relationship to his home environment to the one he believes she has to hers, and then 
coolly destroys his chance of 'posthumous fame' by passing his work off as her own. It is a singularly 
piquant revenge on behalf of all those whose subjectivity is instrumentalised for the purposes of 
helping the powerful achieve their own inner aspirations. 
 
Morvern and the Romantic Tradition 
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Above, I argued that Morvern Callar draws attention to narrative disorientation and places 
Morvern's partner firmly in the tradition of the Romantic artist. The narrative disorientation 
discussed above is furthered by the way in which both texts invite the reader to project certain 
narratives onto them, or to place them within certain traditions, but then withdraw the possibility of 
making sense of them in this way. The narrative that Morvern Callar most obviously engages with 
and problematises is that referred to by Greg Garrard as the Romantic or Pastoral 'escape and 
return', in which the protagonist encounters ‘redemptive nature', leaving her refreshed and better 
able to cope with the strains of civilisation.32 The text invites such an interpretation: we expect that 
after Morvern has left the Port, experienced the consumerist hell of the Spanish Resort and 
journeyed up the coast to quieter areas of great natural beauty, she will effect a return to civilisation 
happily tempered by the lessons drawn from the experience.  
 
The narrative we are lead to expect, then, is one in which the encounter with nature 'cures' 
Movern's affectless insanity. This faith in the redemptive power of an encounter with the natural 
world has been a feature of treatment of madness since at least the Victorian era, and is still 
noticeable today. Elaine Showalter notes how asylums influenced by John Connelly in the period of 
Psychiatric Victorianism emphasised the restorative power of outdoor work, fresh air and pleasant 
views, and it was considered desirable for asylums, especially private ones catering to a wealthy 
clientele, to be situated in a picturesque, Romantic locale. In fact, an attenuated form of this attitude 
is still alive today, with many contemporary mental health practitioners advocating forms of 
occupational therapy that involve an engagement with nature, such as tending to a vegetable garden 
or walks in the countryside. The notion of the redemption offered by the natural world, then, runs 
deep in Western cultural consciousness. 
 
Lynne Ramsey's 2002 celluloid rendering of Morvern Callar follows this paradigm. The film recasts 
the novel's narrative thrust by representing a journey of trauma and recovery in which Morvern's 
sojourn to Spain gives her access to the redemptive ‘lost, unalienated state’ of unity with nature, 
thus healing the traumatic wounds of her boyfriend's death.33 The film reinterprets the text as a 
trauma narrative in which the audience journeys with Morvern through the process of grieving for 
her boyfriend’s death. Scenes of Morvern's encounters with the natural world—as when she sits on 
a Spanish beach alone, admiring the movement of an ant as it jumps from the ground to her hand, 
or when she suggests to her friend Lanna that they turn off the road to explore the surrounding 
countryside—indicate that her encounter with a simpler, more primitive way of life attuned to the 
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natural environment, and the money she receives from her boyfriend's publication, ultimately give 
her the strength and self-confidence to overcome her traumatic loss and explore the wider world. 
Although some critics have responded to the film's ‘candy coloured anomie’ it is, to use Liza 
Johnson’s phrase, ‘absolutely flooded with—and traumatically overwhelmed precisely by—affect’.34 
In this reading, then, Morvern is a sympathetic young woman 'overwhelmed' by feelings she is 
unable to process. Note again that, as in responses to The Trick Is to Keep Breathing, the traumatised 
Morvern is 'flooded' and 'overwhelmed'; a passive victim of emotional forces she can neither 
comprehend nor control. Ramsay's film is some respects more of a piece with Galloway's The Trick Is 
to Keep Breathing than it is with the novel of Morvern Callar, in that it addresses itself to a very 
different form of madness brought about by mental suffering.  
 
This, I suggest, is very much not the effect of the novel. Unlike the film, where Morvern buries her 
partner's remains in a gale, thus reflecting her inner turmoil, in the novel the scene of the 
boyfriend's dismemberment is set as a beautiful day. Morvern describes the beginning of her 
expedition in minute detail, noting the 'fresh, bright-coloured bracken', the 'jittering leaves' of the 
birches and the 'soft pinkish mounds of moss' (p. 88). The loving detail here is intended to indicate 
Morvern’s elation in her encounter with nature: she walks from her campsite to the summit of Beinn 
Meadhonach listening 'to the happy sound of Salif Keita' through her walkman (p. 87), and at one 
point is so ecstatic that she 'started spinning round slowly, squinting up at the sun it looked to be so 
darting' (p. 87). The sense of freedom indicated in her ability to divest herself of her social inhibitions 
and express her joyfulness at the combination of the music and the surrounding countryside clearly 
invokes the notion of a Romantic subject who can, via the poetry of the soul, find 'a means of 
emotional communication between man and the natural world'.35 We can almost imagine the 
moment as comparable to the opening scene of  The Sound of Music, in which we first hear Julie 
Andrews sing 'The Hills Are Alive'.36 This, then, is very clearly meant to be read as a moment of 
subjective unity, in which Morvern is at peace both with herself and with the natural world.  It is 
decidedly resistant to a Jamesonian reading which would stresses a schizophrenic affective 
blankness. 
 
However, throughout this section, Morvern’s elation is undercut by the reader’s horrified knowledge 
of the trip's purpose. Her blasé reference to the ‘chopped off head’ bumping against her back acts as 
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a very physical reminder of the body’s presence in her rucksack, as if she and, by extension, we, are 
being tapped on the shoulder by his presence (p. 88).The reader is thus unable to participate in her 
salutary moment of communion with nature. We are left uncomfortably hesitant between the 
undeniably affective quality of the writing, which is particularly obvious in Morvern's description of 
the 'creamy' shade of the trees with the sunshine 'trilling' through their leaves, and the fact that this 
mood is only possible due to her disturbingly blasé attitude to the decomposing corpse she has just 
buried. Furthermore, a good part of Morvern's enjoyment is derived from the transgressive 
desecration of her boyfriend's remains, which is clearly shown in the way she laughs while imagining 
herself in hot pursuit of her boyfriend's severed head as it rolls from her hands and 'bounces' down 
the mountainside (p. 89). The scene, then, could be read as a violent reiteration of Jerome McGann's 
problematising of the Romantic movement in The Romantic Ideology (1985), in which he critiques 
the reactionary nature of much Romantic writing and contends that the Romantic privileging of 
'imagination at the expense of history' is regressive because it 'covers up social conditions in its 
quest for transcendence'.37 
 
It is impossible to read this scene without asking oneself whether or not Morvern is mad.  Indeed, it 
is precisely this question from which the scene derives its intriguing power. The issue of madness is 
thus absolutely central to the effect of the text, and yet somehow eludes the reader's grasp. This 
section forces us to ask ourselves major questions about how we define sanity and subjectivity. 
Whether we read this an instance of psychosis— in other words, a deviation from a reasonably 
coherent sense of subjectivity in the humanist mould—or of a kind of generalised and culturally 
imbued schizophrenic affectlessness, it is safe to say that the presentation of Morvern augers for a 
kind of subjectivity radically different to the humanist model suggested in the figure of Morvern's 
boyfriend. It is precisely this ambiguity, expressed through Morvern's absence of grief, which allows 
her in the novel's version of the burial scene to neatly dispose of the notion of a salutary relationship 
with nature in general at the same moment as she disposes of the figure of the Romantic artist 
represented by her boyfriend's remains. Thus, through the figure of Morvern's partner, the text 
addresses itself to the damaging ideological effects of the 'creed of the all-powerful, redeeming 
poetic imagination' identified by Jonathan Bate in Romantic Ecology (1991).38 
 
Bate sees his work as a corrective to previous movements of criticism that positioned the Romantic 
writers either as paradigmatic 'poets of the imagination' (Geoffrey Hartman's Wordsworth's Poetry 
(1967) and Harold Bloom's The Visionary Company (1971) are the central texts here). His project is to 
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reassert the primary importance of the environment in the Romantic tradition by tracing the ways in 
which the Romantic poets constructed themselves as having a mysterious yet healing relation to the 
natural world. Morvern's blankness, however, both refuses the notion of a 'healing' environment 
and challenges the concept of a 'redeeming' imagination. The effect of the whole text is predicated 
on the troubling fact that she has, it seems, no wounds to heal and nothing to redeem. 
 
Morvern's ambiguous subjectivity calls the Romantic association of the redemptive encounter with 
nature into question. It thus problematises the Romantic understanding of nature as a place in which 
the human soul is refreshed (the 'ensoulment' thesis proposed by Patricia Waugh), and, more 
generally, addresses the notion of the unified artistic subject. This 'conception of the self as free to 
choose, free to imagine alternative possibilities, or to achieve existential command over its life and 
destiny' is disrupted by the freedom lent to Morvern by her absolute disengagement from ethical 
concerns.39 She is, it seems, somewhat too free. By placing Morvern in an environment which 
should, we feel, restore her sense of 'alternative possibilities' and 'existential command', we expect 
her to regain some degree of normative ethical functioning: in other words, we are expecting a 
narrative in which she 'comes round' from her affective stupor and resumes normal life— to regain 
her sanity. Speaking of contemporary Gothic and in particular Patrick Bateman in American Psycho, 
Kate Ferguson Ellis argues that the text 'gleefully rejects the culture of therapy and social work'.40 It 
is, in other words, an attack on some of the institutions and techniques that have attempted to 
'make sense of, and intervene in' pathology and pathogenic behaviour.41 There is a similar impetus 
at work here: by placing Morvern in a position in which we expect her to regain normal functioning, 
and then representing her refusal to do so, Warner sends up both the Romantic notion of a 'healing' 
encounter with nature, and its instrumentalisation as a restorative to psychological malaise. 
 
Carole Jones reads this section as Morvern’s attempt to escape an oppressive gender paradigm that 
'places her in the traditional female relationship with nature, as earth/landscape/passive fertile 
ground. The man is now at one with the land, inverting that traditional relation of passive woman 
and active man'.42 My suggestion, however, is that there is a more fundamental movement at work. 
Morvern's transgressive enjoyment of the violence she commits on her boyfriend's remains 
problematises the Romantic notion that such an environment is good for her—and for us—and thus, 
I would suggest that this section is not so much a reversal of the nature/culture dichotomy, as a 
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challenge to the Romantic intuition of the beneficial effects of an encounter with salutary nature 
mediated by an 'ensouled', artistic temperament that can transmute such experiences into human 
comprehension. The possibility of transcendence implied in Morvern's ecstatic experience of the 
natural world is raised specifically in order to be denied to the readers through the burial of the 
figure of the Romantic artist. Morvern's sadistic burial challenges the 'freedom' of both her partner's 
insane prioritising of his quest for transcendence over his life with her, and denies that such 
transcendence is possible even in the highlands, which form a paradigmatically Romantic 
environment. Nonetheless, it is precisely the political charge of this reading which means that it is 
difficult to precisely place in it the postmodern tradition of schizophrenic apathy and affectlessness 
delineated by Jameson: Morvern's response to her boyfriend's problematic appropriative gestures 
seems to belie the notion that she has no grasp of historicity and no ability to conceptualise her life 
in a political way. Although the question of madness is thus situated at the very heart of the novel, 
we are left unable to determine precisely which form it takes. 
 
These Demented Lands—The Madness of Gothic Katabasis 
 
These Demented Lands complicates the visions of madness presented in Morvern Callar. The 
opening of the novel suggests that Morvern has drowned. As the boat on which she is crossing to 
the Island sinks, Morvern can see the inscription on its stern: 'In God We Trust' (p. 13). The 
impression that we are in a netherworld of some kind is echoed through references to  mythologies 
of death and rebirth: Morvern's journey on 'the ferry' is redolent of the passage across the river Styx, 
and the man captaining the ship is simply known as 'Ferryman' (p. 1), while the name of the large 
car-ferry in whose wake the smaller vessel capsizes is Psalm 23, referring to the pilgrim who walks 
'through the valley of the shadow of death' (p. 4).43 The opening thus evokes a landscape which can 
be read through its references to scripture and pre-Christian texts, particularly the Virgillian epics, 
clearly indicating that the reader should understand this crossing as a form of living, conscious 
death. Taking my definition of madness as an encounter with death from which there is the 
possibility of a return, then, we can read the entire novel as an exploration of mad experience: a 
sojourn in the land of the dead. This metaphor has a long history: we might think of Sylvia Plath, 
who, as Jacqueline Rose argued, saw her time in a mental institution as a 'deadly sleep' from which 
she was 'born again, and not of woman'.44 Rachel Falconer outlines a tradition of thinking about 
madness in this way as a form of katabatic narrative throughout Hell in Contemporary Literature 
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(2004).45 This reading is further suggested by Warner's title, which clearly hints at some kind of 
psychotic journey through a 'demented' landscape.  
 
The moment at which Morvern appears to enter this nether region is the point at which the Ferry 
transporting her to the environment capsizes, and she is immersed in an environment in which fires 
burn underwater and a 'coral reef' has 'gone insane in these killing seas' (p. 6).The hellish 
phosphorus and the phrase 'killing sea' all evoke a form of underworld, while the inversion of fire 
that burns underwater is indicative of an insane world in which up is down and black is white. The 
disorientation is apparent in her description of the sea into which she leaps as 'moonless nightwater' 
(p. 4), yet when she sinks beneath the surface she sees 'a landscape of colours glissanding on the 
lunar seabeds' and a 'constellation of pinkish bubbles' that collapse, by dint of me tonymic 
association, into a 'universe' of 'rising planets' and 'blue stars' emanating from below (pp. 5-6). The 
double insistence on the darkness of the water (it is both 'moonless' and 'night') and the way that 
this contrasts with the images of light as she sinks into the water—the 'constellation' of bubbles that 
come to seem like stars, and the 'novae' that form at the end of the bubbles as she watches them— 
is contradictory: the water is simultaneously pitch dark and illuminated. The denseness of the 
metaphoric associations is immediately disorientating, either suggesting that Morvern's descriptions 
of the seascape are unreliable, or that the seabed itself is. In the earlier novel, it is Morvern's 
subjective stability which is called into question; however, in These Demented Lands this instability 
written into the very landscape, and it seems that it is this that leads to the strange writing style. 
Both violent and beautiful, we find ourselves in a profoundly disorientating text the meaning  of 
which constantly eludes our grasp. The madness here, then, appears to point both to a deathly 
sojourn in the netherworld, and an atmosphere of profound hermeneutic disorientation. 
 
The hallucinatory, dream-like sense of much of the novel, and the hint that Morvern might now be 
existing in some kind of bizarre afterlife, indicate that a productive way to situate the second text 
might be in the tradition of contemporary Gothic. The bleak setting and her purported desire to 
disinter her mother's body also suggest such an association, as does her encounter with the demonic 
John Brotherhood, which I analyse in more detail later in the chapter. Gothic literature has famously 
been characterised as 'the writing of excess', and, as Scott Brewster has argued in his discussion of  
madness and the Gothic genre, there is also a noted tradition of responding to madness as excessive 
or 'exaggerated passions' understood as an 'uncontrollable surplus of natural feelings and 
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appetites'.46 As such, he argues, 'madness is a thoroughly Gothic concern'.47 The notion of madness 
as 'uncontrollable surplus of natural feelings and appetites' is certainly present throughout The 
Demented Lands, particularly in certain aspects of the devilish Brotherhood's characterisation, which 
certainly suggest that this is one genealogy of insanity on which Warner is drawing throughout. 
 
Brewster's main contention throughout the article, however, is that Gothic madness causes the 
reader to question their own sanity. Drawing on Shoshana Felman's well-known analysis of the 
madness of interpretation in The Turn of the Screw and David Punter's discussion of 'the dreadful 
pleasure' of Gothic fiction, he argues that Gothic representations of madness are characterised by a 
denial of a secure standpoint from which the reader can assess whether the madness lies with the 
protagonist, the people that s/he judges to be mad, or, indeed, in the reader themselves. This is 
certainly the case in These Demented Lands, in which it is never clear if Morvern is insane or if it is 
simply the people she encounters who are mad, and where the very quality of the writing is such 
that the reader feels, in line with Punter's characterisation of Gothic fiction, that 'we may be losing 
our minds, that the madness exemplified in the text may end up... leaving us adrift'.48 
 
There is a strong tradition of reading Gothic writing in Scotland as a dark mirror that troubles 
typically Romantic concerns, as evinced by the November 2011 special issue of the journal Gothic 
Studies, which was devoted specifically to contemporary Scottish Gothic. Kirsty A. Macdonald, 
analysing Iain Banks's The Wasp Factory (1984), argues that in adopting the Gothic mode, 
contemporary Scottish writers problematise 'the backdrop of a sublime landscape' by drawing 
attention to the ways in which such Romantic environments contribute to damagingly homogenised 
versions of what it is to be Scottish.49 For most of these critics, the most important aspect of Scottish 
Gothic is the relation between the landscape and the historical. For Macdonald, the sublimity of the 
Scottish landscape masks historical violence, with the Gothic being deployed precisely because it 
troubles this landscape by peopling it with ghosts and horrors. Devolutionary criticism often 
therefore tends to stress historical aspects of contemporary Scottish Gothic, and is concerned with 
'ultimately portraying how these [historical] distortions prove destructive in the present'.50 It is 
precisely this association of the Scottish highlands with a bygone past that McDonald believes to be 
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contested in the contemporary Gothic mode. Similarly, Timothy Barker argues that the novel is 
primarily concerned with the historical.51 
 
Cairns Craig, too, suggests in The Modern Scottish Novel that These Demented Lands ultimately 
refers to the problem of history in Scotland, suggesting that Morvern's Rudder Feeling 'occurs when 
the direction of history is undone by the limitless space in which its journey takes place '.52 Morvern 
tells us that The Rudder Feeling is the sense of desolate dislocation she feels when imagining the 
rudders of the boats in the harbour she visited with her father as a child. For Craig, this dislocation is 
an iteration of Morvern's sense that the 'direction of history' is indissociable from the fate of the 
nation, and These Demented Lands thus becomes a commentary on Scotland's ambiguous, 
ahistorical position—a position which is casually referred to by Jacques Derrida in his reference to 
the Scottish landscape in the film Ghost Dance (1982), in which he claims that ghosts are not tied to 
antiquated places 'like the landscape of Scottish manors, etc., but on the contrary, is accentuated, 
accelerated by modern technologies like film, television, the telephone'.53 
 
In contradistinction to these readings, interpreting the novel as a Gothic katabatic narrative in which 
both the protagonists and the readers feel that they may be losing their minds emphasises  the 
impression that the novel deals with a crisis of meaning-making. Such an argument has been made 
by David Leishman: like myself, he is somewhat sceptical of reading These Demented Lands in the 
nationalist tradition as commenting on Scotland's ahistorical position. Leishman, analysing the 
impossible road signs that pepper the texts, leading to such spaces as 'inaccessible point', suggests 
that they gesture towards an interest 'in the break-up of language rather than the break-up of 
Britain'.54 This, then, indicates an understanding of madness identified by Louis Sass as one of the 
most characteristic responses to it in the twentieth century: that it is a 'failure of language and 
symbolic thought'.55 This, then, is a form of psychic death: the failure of a subjective position that 
can make sense in language. We are being offered a map of the island which fails to offer us 
accessibility—readability—precisely when we are attempting to make sense of it. This is also 
indicative of a wider resistance to accessibility within the text: These Demented Lands foregrounds 
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the notion that Morvern is passing through a nonsensical environment which does not follow normal 
geographic or psychological rules.  
 
This resistance to the attempts to make sense of the environment in These Demented Lands is, I 
would argue, symbolised by Morvern's characterisation of 'The Rudder Feeling': 
 The Rudder Feeling is when I was wee my foster-dad would hold my hand and take me to 
 see the fishing boats. I'd no interest in boats, only in the textures and sizes of their rudders 
 and propellers that I could see hung in the bluey-green world below the curves of the 
 hulls. It gave me scaredness lying in my bed thinking about those rudders, held there 
 forever, punished above the cold Atlantic seabeds that were always rolling out below them. 
 (p. 50)  
The rudder, as the piece of equipment that allows the crew to navigate the craft, stands as a figure 
for the human ability to navigate in both its literal and figurative senses. It denotes the desire and 
ability to make one's way in the world; of being able to progress in a linear fashion. The notion of 
navigation further implies the ability to make sense of the world, referring back to the attempt to 
map or plot, a concern which is also problematised through the road signs These Demented Lands 
offers the reader. This section of the novel indicates that the plot is not only difficult to map on its 
own terms, but is about the difficulty of mapping in general: Morvern's 'scaredness' is the result of a 
recognition that in order for human endeavours, here represented by the boats, to continue to 
function in the world, it is necessary at some point to deal with aspects of the world that are simply 
unavailable to human forms of knowledge. The Rudder Feeling thus becomes a metaphor for the 
inability to read or navigate the text with any degree of certainty on the part of both Morvern and 
the reader: it is a figure for madness as the inability to form coherent narratives and to make sense 
of the world, linking Morvern in this text to the lack of plotting and a structured narrative of her own 
life present in Morvern Callar. 
  
This sense that Morvern is passing through an insane world is furthered by the contrasts between 
the two texts. Much of the disquieting power of the first novel is derived from the richness of the 
landscape contrasted with the flatness of Morvern's interiority. However, in the second, it is largely 
the landscape and its inhabitants that lend the text its power to unsettle and disorientate the 
reader. It is the landscape itself which has completely lost its bearings. Thus, the text performs the 
destabilising operation identified by Felman and Brewster, in that it does not provide the reader 
with a firm position from which to make sense of it— a fact which is perhaps alluded to when 
Morvern says to the Devil's Advocate that 'this island's crazy. It's all like a dream' (p. 52) . In 
contradistinction to the traditional katabatic narratives of mental illness discussed by Rachel 
Falconer (she uses Girl, Interrupted as an example) in Hell in Contemporary Literature, in which the 
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moment of return marks the point at which the protagonist can make sense of the narrative, in 
These Demented Lands neither the reader nor Morvern emerges back into ontological stability: we 
never, as it were, regain the 'main land' from which to reliably interpret the significance of the text. 
  
In my discussion of Morvern Callar, I argued that Warner's presentation of the clash between 
Morvern's affectless postmodern madness and the more established forms of self -destructive, 
creative madness mobilised in the figure of her boyfriend allow Warner to critique the modes of 
responding to the natural environment made available through a Romantic intuition of the 
possibility of redemption and healing through an encounter between human and natural world. 
Similarly, if we read, as I have suggested we should, These Demented Lands as speaking to a 
conception of madness as a katabatic narrative figured as a journey through a kind of netherworld, a 
land of the dead, then I contend that we can also read The Rudder Feeling as addressing itself to a 
different aspect of the way that the human is figured in relation to its environment in more 
contemporary forms of ecological criticism. As I have noted, in this novel we are confronted with a 
world in which Morvern is unable to construct narratives that make sense to her (rather than in 
Morvern Callar, in which she seems to have no desire to construct a comprehensible narrative). I 
thus read The Rudder Feeling as speaking to a tradition of understanding madness as the pure 
inability to make sense of the world.  
 
The inscrutability of the natural world is offset by the insanity of humanity's intrusions onto it. This is 
most strikingly presented in the bizarre presence of the Kongo Express, a child's fairground ride 
which is absurdly situated in the barren interior of an unnamed Scottish island. The incongruity is in 
itself strikingly funny, as is the sheer enjoyment derived from its strangeness by its somewhat 
demented driver, who takes great satisfaction in drawing Morvern's attention to the sheer 
'weirdiness' of the island's inhabitants (p. 18). The humour is important. Firstly, it gestures towards 
the laughableness of capitalist opportunism, with its breath-taking insensitivity in discerning 
appropriate business ventures for a remote Scottish location. Secondly, the structure of the  Kongo 
Express, with its admirable disregard for world geography and its obsessively reiterated journey 
from the Makarikari Salt pans (in Botswana) to the Niagara Falls (on the American/Canadian border) 
and Mount Kilimanjaro (in Tanzania) is itself a grotesque parody of the attempt to map, make sense 
of, and, in the way that all of these natural phenomena are placed in ex-colonial situations, take 
ownership of these natural environments. The merry-go-round is an excellent symbol for the 
mysterious flow of capital and sign identified by Jameson in 'Postmodernism and Consumer Society' 
as contributing to the postmodern subject's profound sense of psychic disorientation, speaking as it 
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does to the flow of commodities and capital, the exploitation of the natural world, and the bizarre 
encroachment of profit-driven enterprises into spaces, such as the Scottish Hebrides, that were 
previously understood in the popular imagination as somehow beyond or unavailable to such 
capitalist endeavours. If, then, The Rudder Feeling is a reminder that the non-human world remains 
fundamentally mysterious and unknowable, the Kongo Express stands as a figure for the absurdity of 
mankind's attempt to use it for the purposes of deriving profit.  
 
The Gothic Villain or the Crude Thatcherite: Brotherhood's Madness 
 
Focusing on the Gothic forms of madness in the text also demonstrates that the novel mobilises a 
set of concerns particularly germane to the ethical questions significant throughout the thesis. I have 
already suggested that we can productively read Morvern Callar as a confrontation between two 
different forms of madness: Morvern's postmodern affectlessness confronting the paradoxically self -
affirming destructiveness of her boyfriend's creative impulses and suicide. In keeping with my 
contention that These Demented Lands offers a Gothic intensification of many of the themes of the 
earlier novel, I now want to turn to the conflicting models of insanity through which we can read 
John Brotherhood, Movern's antagonist throughout These Demented Lands. 
 
On the one hand, he is read by the inhabitants of the island as being ‘worse than devils’ (p. 25); 
equally, The Aircrash Investigator, attempting to persuade Morvern to leave the hotel, tells her that 
'the man's the Devil' (p. 111).56 Morvern initially thinks of him in similar terms: when she is 
ambushed by one of the cows belonging to a group of students researching medieval farming 
methods she encounters, she is alarmed by the thought that she has ‘looked into the face of the 
Devil’ before breathing the name ‘Brotherhood’ (p. 29). This is borne out by the story of his 
involvement with a pair of conjoined twins, in which he deliberately excites their romantic jealousy 
to a level of such intensity that the stronger one murders the weaker. The text provides no hint as to 
Brotherhood's motivation: he does it simply because he can.  
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This aspect of his characterisation has a mystical intensity to it, in which Brotherhood takes on the 
symbolic weight of a transcendental evil, linking him to the forms of radical ethical insanity evinced 
by Caz in Special and Adam Verver in Alice Thompson's The Existential Detective, which I discuss in 
subsequent chapters. Through the figure of the Dionysian Wildman, he is linked to the cast of 
'aberrant characters' that, later in 'Seeing Things', Scott Brewster identifies as typical of the Gothic 
mode.57 This is a kind of theatrical ethical insanity, then: Brewster's aberrant characters evince their 
insane evil purely for the sake of it. Here, this is suggested by the link between Brotherhood and the 
devil: he has no explicable reason for behaving as he does other than pure destructiveness. It is also 
hinted in the text that this devilment, or evil in this pure, unmotivated form is linked with 
environmental degradation: discussing the Rudder Feeling with Morvern, the Devil’s Advocate 
compares the seabed to the ‘underworld’ (p. 50), an association made markedly more hellish by the 
‘seabed burnings’ caused by the Phosphorous Beds (p. 8). Brotherhood is twice associated with this 
underworld, as he is both consistently described as devilish, and also had a previous career as an 
arms dealer, thus metonymically linking him with the weapons-grade phosphorous dumped in the 
sound. It is also in these phosphorous beds, in the final pages of the novel, that he finds his end.  
 
However, when Morvern finally encounters Brotherhood, his characterisation is quite different—a 
fact that is perhaps hinted at in the way that Morvern mistakes a cow's face for his.  Altogether, he 
presents himself as a crude but savvy Thatcherite: a small-business owner with pretensions to 
philosophical insight, he is in the last analysis a misogynist that enjoys making crudely sexualised 
comments about Morvern’s looks (he says that 'she could shove my toothbrush as far up her arse as 
it would go and I'd still brush after breakfast and last thing at night' (p. 66))  and patronising ones 
about her accent and vocabulary: 'she used the word "Mister" the way a child would' (p. 71) and 
'Telly, that's what she calls it' (p. 72). The intensity or mysticism that marks the stories of his 
depravity are undercut by comments drawing attention to the unabashedly monetaristic value 
system to which he subscribes: so, when telling Morvern about Brotherhood's arms dealing exploits, 
The Devil's Advocate characterises Brotherhood's business ethics as ‘unrepentantly from that school 
that if he didn’t sell the goodies to them then the next man would' (p. 57). 
 
This version of Brotherhood's narrative is the polar opposite of the Gothic depravity discussed 
above. Here, he represents and articulates the reductive neo-liberal position that the only aspects of 
life that have any power are forms of capital. This can be economic, as in his business interests, 
sexual, as in his attraction to Morvern, or social, as in the way he consistently draws attention to the 
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failure of the honeymooners staying at his hotel to differentiate themselves from one another. So, 
when Morvern first arrives at the hotel, Brotherhood sneeringly points out that although others pay 
dearly to see the island ('especially', he sneers 'in my hotel'), he will allow Morvern to see them for 
'free' (p. 105), because although she does not have the economic capital to enjoy these 'lovely 
sights', she does have the sexual capital, which he redeploys by buying provocatively short skirts for 
her. This is in the service of furthering the dispiriting lack of commitment the honeymooners e vince 
to their own marriages, as is clear when The Aircrash Investigator notes that the newlywed men had 
been trying to pay their wives the same level of attention as Morvern, but 'they hadn't succeeded' 
(p. 116).  
 
This, then, is not the ethical insanity suggested by Brotherhood's association with the embodiment 
of evil, but rather a bleakly reductive insistence on the maxim that everything is for sale. In this 
sense, Brotherhood functions as the voice of 'sanity', except that the voice of sanity in this instance 
refuses any form of value other than the purely mercantile—a characteristic again linking him with 
Caz in Special, and perhaps, too, with the classical liberal, Harry Astley, in Poor Things. This profit-
driven orientation towards the world also has its insane moments, which are highlighted throughout 
the text: the 'Kongo Express', which purports to be able to drop its passengers at 'Niagara Falls, 
Mount Kilimanjaro or the Makarikari Salt Pans', the phosphorous which has been dumped in the 
Sound because it is no longer profitable, and the sheer incongruity of the Drome itself are all  
indicative of the insane disorientations of time and space associated with advanced consumer 
capitalism theorised by both Fredric Jameson and Jean-François Lyotard (p. 18). The logic 
Brotherhood insists on, then, is similar to Jameson's vision, which is described by James Annesley in 
Blank Fictions as one in which 'commercialisation has touched every kind of experiential sphere with 
the implication being that this world is both totally fetishised and totally integrated'.58 Like the 
confrontation between Romantic and postmodern conceptions of selfhood and subjectivity in 
Morvern Callar, then, in These Demented Lands Brotherhood's characterisation mobilises a very 
humanist conception of insane, radical evil, and a form of ethical blankness associated with the 
schizophrenia and psychopathy delineated by Fredric Jameson and James Annesley respectively.  This 
is married with another form of insanity, which is associated with the inability to proceed through 
conventionally centred modes of mapping or orientation. The lands through which Morvern travels 
are thus twice demented, causing the reader to question whether it is Morvern herself who is 
insane, or if the radically incommensurate modes of understanding the ethical world of the novel 
means that they too are in an insane position. 
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Conclusion 
 
How, then, are we to read Morvern's act of arson at the end of the novel? By the standards of the 
normative bourgeois social world evoked by the faceless 'husbands and wives' who frequent the 
Drome, it is an act of a psychopath. However, as the hallucinatory landscape, the narratives of 
essential devilment and corruption, and the insane displacements of accelerated capitalism make 
clear, the rules of the text are not those of the ensouled bourgeois novel. This means that as readers 
we are in a position similar to that described by Shoshana Felman while reading The Turn of the 
Screw: we are unable to clearly define whether Morvern's actions are insane on their own terms, or 
make sense in the context of a landscape which is itself demented. The text thus not only 
destabilises our reaction to Morvern, but forces us into a position in which we are unable to clearly 
make a judgement about what is sane or insane. We thus find ourselves in a kind of reverse Catch-22 
position, in which we are unable to reliably make a decision as to whether Morvern, her antagonists, 
the world of the novel or we ourselves are mad: in Felman's words, madness thus becomes 'the 
rhetorical condition of our reading' of the texts.59 
 
By way of conclusion, I would like now to turn to how madness in Morvern Callar and These 
Demented Lands troubles our understanding of the ethics of the texts. As I have suggested in my 
previous chapters, madness is clearly linked to an appeal to a sense of right and wrong that 
functions both in terms of the reader's ethical intuitions and the commitments of the protagonists. 
In both Alasdair Gray and Janice Galloway's representations of insanity, we are offered texts in 
which, even if the characters themselves sometimes do wrong or lose their sense of ethical 
orientation, there appears to be a clearly defined ethical framework by which to navigate the texts. 
Although they sometimes do wrong, or the reader may not accept their intuition as to what right 
and wrong is, there is never a sense that there is no distinction between 'the right' and 'the wrong'.  
 
Madness in Warner's work functions rather differently. In both texts, it troubles the moribund 
political and aesthetic narratives offered to Morvern by her male antagonists. In Morvern Callar, 
Morvern's disquieting coolness offers a way of commenting on the failure of the narrative of the 
'ensouled' creative artist to create narratives that can bring the aspects of her life together in a way 
that makes sense. Similarly, in These Demented Lands, her act of arson both does and does not make 
sense within the terms of the text. It is this instability which means that madness infects the entire 
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novel, and not simply the actions of any one character within it. The actions she takes that seem 
most insane, specifically the desecration of her boyfriend's remains and the destruction of the 
Drome motel, are rejections of the narratives of what I have identified as the madness of the 
creative artist, the madman as the 'hero of desire', and a form of ugly soul in which the only 
recognisable value is monetary. In other words, madness figures as a rejection of the paradigms of 
sense-making proffered by the texts themselves. 
 
Perhaps, then, we can use Felman's insight about The Turn of the Screw to think through Morvern's 
madness. Although her characterisation has many features in common with the postmodern 
iterations of schizophrenia outlined above, Morvern's madness is not entirely characterised either by 
a disengagement from political issues, or with a complete disregard for aesthetic forms. She is highly 
invested in some serious forms of art, particularly music and film, and, despite those critics who 
have claimed that this is indicative of her disaffected, indiscriminate consumption of pop-culture, 
the music she listens to is often at the most cutting edge of avant-garde Jazz and neo-classical (the 
tracklistings include Miles Davis, Luciano Davis, and Ronald Shannon Jackson). Similarly, she is 
politically aware enough both to recognise the detrimental effect that working in the supermarket 
has had on her to express her resentment through concerted acts of resistance such as refusing to 
use the supermarket's plastic bags to give them advertising, or to buy anything from the shop in 
which she sells her labour.  
 
Commenting on Morvern Callar, Colin Hutchinson argues that the focus on the necessities of life, 
Morvern's avoidance of work and the choice to 'knock off' and 'make a cup of coffee'—in other 
words, to refuse work—indicates that:  
 In Morvern Callar it is the older generation that tries in vain to bequeath to an apathetic 
 younger generation a legacy of social engagement and political awareness—a legacy that 
 contrasts with the individualist-liberationist discourse thrust upon Morvern by her 
 boyfriend.60 
In this reading, Morvern's materialism is a signifier of her apathy: a dubious equation of taking an 
interest in the ephemera of conventional femininity with being politically apathetic.  Such readings, I 
think, attempt to place the Morvern novels in the group of postmodern novels that James Annesley 
refers to as constituting the 'blank fictions' of 'atonal perspectives and fragile, glassy visions'.61 
However, reading the novels through the lens of madness can thus offer us a way of thinking 
through this desire to problematise meaning in both Morvern Callar and These Demented Lands.  
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Morvern's affectless subjectivity is, upon close analysis, not the monetarised disregard for others 
that, as we shall see, is evinced by Caz in Special. It is also markedly different to the traumatised 
response to the loss of a loved one such as Joy's in The Trick Is to Keep Breathing. Rather, the 
absence of emotional engagement and the absence of the desire to create narrative structure from 
her life is a marker of the resistance to the creation of narrative, political and cultural capital, 
especially when such value is created through preordained expectations about the proper way to 
respond to those aspects of life which are usually understood to be salutary, particularly 'beautiful 
nature' and literary art. As with the other novels I have analysed throughout this thesis, then, both 
Morvern Callar and These Demented Lands cannot be read simply as an iteration of the postmodern 
schizophrenic affectless of absolute political disengagement and apathy. Rather, they insist on 
indeterminacy, neither falling entirely into the category of postmodern blankness and political 
apathy, nor returning to an ensouled vision of subjective coherence and affective engagement. 
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Chapter 4: 'The Fields of Sighing'—Humour, Style and Madness in Contemporary Scottish Gothic 
 
A sixteen-year-old girl is dead, barefoot but dressed in her mother's evening gown and stockings. 
She lies halfway down a grand staircase, illuminated by light streaming through a stained-glass 
image of a dying cockatoo. So opens Elspeth Barker's 1991 novel, O Caledonia. The sanity of Janet, a 
bookish teenager sequestered at the remote Auchnasaugh, a castle called 'the field of sighing' for 
the mournful winds that haunt it, is consistently called into question because of her desire to live at 
a level of poetic intensity equal to the opening scene described above. The novel illustrates how 
Janet's branding as mad is consistently linked to her reading habits, the way she uses language, and 
how her intellectual and romantic expectations are mediated through literature. As such, madness 
figures in the novel as a device which polices what Elaine Showalter describes as women's 
'intellectual ambition, sexual autonomy and domestic defiance'.1 This suppression brutally plays out 
in the fate of Janet's cousin Lila, who is confined in a psychiatric institution after an altercation with 
Janet's mother. Janet herself is fatally stabbed as she flings herself upon Jim, the family gardener, 
mistakenly believing that he is the apparition of a 'demon lover'  she has invoked using a love charm 
from Theocritus (p. 1).2 Jim, alarmed by this overtly sexual display, stabs her with his rabbit skinning 
knife. The incident makes explicit the link between madness and the literary imagination: Janet half 
expects the love charm to work and when it seems that it has, her response is not to question the 
apparition but to throw herself into his arms. The novel's conclusion thus turns upon Janet's desire 
for the figures of imagination to become flesh, a desire so strong that she deludes herself into 
believing that a figment of her imagination has become reality. It is at this moment of madness that 
she is murdered. If, then, These Demented Lands offers a world in which the reader cannot correctly 
distinguish if Morvern herself is mad or whether she is a sane protagonist in a mad world, in O 
Caledonia the protagonist has difficulty distinguishing between the reality of the outside world and 
her own imaginative projections. 
 
In contrast to the dramatic setting and crystalline prose of Barker's novel, Bella Bathurst's Special 
(2002), another Gothically-inflected text, explores madness as a product of the drab 
commodification of everyday life.3 The Gothic has long been associated with madness—as Scott 
Brewster points out: 
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 From the outset, it [the Gothic] has assembled a cast of aberrant individuals who may be 
 classed  to some degree as mad: paranoiacs, schizophrenics, manic obsessives, exorbitant 
 tyrants, overreaching scientists, and serial killers.4 
It is primarily through this that the novel's affinity with the genre is revealed: trapped in a former 
lunatic asylum, Dean Manor, for an excruciatingly intimate week of outdoor pursuits, the group of 
schoolgirl protagonists present an array of disorders which reflect what Avril Horner and Sue Zlosnik 
call the Gothic tradition of 'a textual engagement with profound social collective neurosis'.5 In the 
wounded subjectivity of the group, indicated most obviously by Hen's anorexia and Caz's 'aberrant' 
relationship to the others, the novel mobilises a long tradition of feminine madness identified by 
Elaine Showalter as one in which schizophrenic symptoms such as 'passivity, depersonalisation, 
disembodiment and fragmentation' parallel the social situation of women. Such symptoms, for 
Showalter, are ultimately 'expressive of women's lack of confidence, dependency on external, often 
masculine definitions of the self' and the 'split between the body as sexual object and the mind as 
subject'.6 As in O Caledonia and indeed in The Trick Is to Keep Breathing, then, the madnesses 
represented in Special are very clearly presented as an aspect of gendered experience. 
 
The novel's exploration of insanity also speaks to madness in a more radical form. The 'collective 
neuroses' of the girls finds its ultimate expression in moments of betrayal that horrify the group: 
Caz, its most beautiful, enigmatic and dangerous member, hides a classmate's medication so that 
she almost dies from anaphylactic shock, leaves a close friend in the company of a man she thinks is 
likely to rape her, and at the novel's close allows the same friend to fall to her death. From her 
privileged position as the most attractive member of the group, she encourages the other girls to 
view maturity as a form of competition in which the only matter of any import is, in Caz's own 
words, having her peers 'look at her and think "Bitch"' (p. 112). Through her relentless focus on both 
the commodities that contribute so much to her power, and her own position at the top of the 
hierarchy which has developed between the girls, she encourages them to understand themselves as 
a form of commodity: in Mark Seltzer's terms, anticipating 'the notion of the female body as a sort of 
leading economic indicator of consumer culture'.7 In Blank Fictions (1998), James Annesley draws 
attention to the processes of bodily commodification common to many contemporary American 
fictions, using Rachel Bowlby to argue that 'the commodity makes the person and that person is, if 
not for sale, then an object whose value and status can be read off with accuracy in terms of the 
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things he has and the behavioural codes he adopts'.8 This, then, is Caz's madness: she cannot 
conceptualise herself outside the terms of a commodity. The deathliness of this insanity lies in its 
desire to completely objectify human subjectivity. Thus, as well as signalling its position in 
contemporary Gothic through the mobilisation of a series of well -recognised motifs such as anorexia 
and the asylum space, Special's Gothicism ultimately addresses itself to a highly contemporary 
anxiety about the penetration of capitalist modes of conceptualising selfhood that is particularly 
brought to bear on the young women in the novel. 
 
Scotland, Gothic and Madness 
 
As I noted in my previous chapter, the association between Gothic writing and Scotland has long 
been acknowledged. Nicholas Royle, in his monumental study The Uncanny (2003), draws attention 
to Scotland's privileged position qua the genre: 
 The 'uncanny' comes from Scotland, from that 'auld country' that has so often been 
 represented as 'beyond the borders', liminal, an English foreign body. The 'uncanny' 
 comes out of a language which is neither purely English (as if there could be such a 
 thing) nor foreign.9 
Devolutionary commentators on the Gothic tradition within Scotland tend to draw together 
Scotland's association with the uncanny with historical concerns. Ian Duncan, for example, argues 
that 'if gothic [in general] can be understood as the aesthetic sign of the political defeat of 
opposition to the British state, in Scotland it comes to represent—with greater historical and 
anthropological specificity than in England—the uncanny recursion of a native or ancestral power 
alienated from modern life'.10 For David Punter, the significance of Gothic writing to Scotland is the 
'remaking of the past': it reflects either the attempt to escape or to attend to the violence of Scottish 
history. 11 'The bitterest rub' of the Scottish condition, he writes, is not the threat of relegation to 
third-world status, 'but rather the continuing threat, emblematised in the asylum, of indistinction; of 
not being known for what one is'.12 The asylum is a symbol of madness figured as the dissolution of 
the self, ‘indistinction’ implying disappearance. There is a similar emphasis on the historical nature 
of the Gothic in Scotland in Timothy Barker's Contemporary Scottish Gothic (2014), in which he 
argues that Scotland is consistently understood as 'a place of self-generating myths' that is 
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simultaneously 'locked in the past' yet 'removed from larger historical narratives'.13 Once again, 
history, or the relationship of the past to the present, looms large. Equally, for Monica Germaná, 
'Scottish writing is peculiarly haunted by the 'otherness' of its lost past', thus associating it with 
antisyzygy through the splitting or multiplication of selves and selfhood. 
   
Clearly, then, the devolutionary mode has established a tradition of thinking through Scottish Gothic 
texts in which madness functions as a metaphor for the historical loss of national identity. 
Throughout this chapter, I demonstrate that reading these texts through the lens of madness as a 
facet of the Gothic tradition gives rise to a different set of emphases, in particular to do with the 
relationship between madness and gender. In both my chapter on Janice Galloway and my 
introduction, I outlined how some critics have suggested that the devolutionary tradition privileges 
national concerns at the expense of gender. The same point applies here: the chapter thus outlines 
the ways that the authors explore other facets of insanity, in particular, how the gendered 
expectations placed on the teenagers in the novels bring about different forms of madness. It is a 
critical commonplace that Gothic deals with liminal spaces, with hybridity, and with people or things 
which are hauntingly, uncannily, neither one thing nor the other. In Scottish Gothic, the 'borderland' 
par excellence has always been Scottish identity itself. In these novels, however, the most important 
borderland the protagonists have to negotiate is the uncomfortable ground between childhood and 
adult femininity; in doing so, they often lose their way and find themselves in the topsy-turvy world 
of insanity. Both novels thus speak to Elaine Showalter's suggestion that one of the major problems 
causing mental health issues for twentieth-century women was 'conflicting messages about 
femininity and maturity', indicating that adolescence is not only a particularly challenging time in 
terms of psychological pressure, but is also germane to many of the major concerns of the Gothic 
tradition.14 
 
Madness and Hardness: Sexuality and Abjection in Special and O Caledonia 
 
Special presents hostile terrain for the girls to negotiate. Bathurst’s writing suggests withdrawal and 
horror, the sense that both inner and outer worlds are sterile and inhospitable. This is  signalled upon 
the arrival of the group at Dean Manor. By setting the narrative in an ex-asylum, Bathurst invites the 
reader to understand the text as operating within the Gothic tradition. In Literary Women (1976), 
Ellen Moers argues that the insane asylum is the contemporary locale of the female Gothic novel; in 
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her reading, the asylum itself 'becomes... an elaborated, enclosed, and peculiarly feminine testing 
ground for survival'.15 In linking the experience of boarding school to life in an asylum, Bathurst 
draws attention to the way in which such institutions mirror one another, and secondly suggests that 
boarding school, like the asylum, becomes such a testing ground. 
  
This is borne out by the way that Hen, anorexic and the child of a recent divorce, is attentive to the 
building's history as a psychiatric institution and as a place of incarceration. She notes both the 'bars 
on the window' and the colour of their dormitory, which is 'the same hungover green as a hospital 
wall' (p. 23). The hostel's decrepitude betokens bodily rather than merely decorative decay: the 
description of the walls as 'hungover' is redolent of physical nausea, and the 'blistered' paint recalls 
violence enacted on resistant bodies. Indeed, the building at times takes on an almost human 
presence: Hen can hear it 'muttering to itself', suggesting the insanity of its former inmates, and the 
lights 'come on and go off' as if at the will of some erratic and unpredictable presence (p. 24). They 
also lend the room 'an eerie tinge', ultimately giving Hen the feeling: 
 that people with more turbulent histories had been here before [....] Were there ghosts? 
 Sinister things still locked in cupboards? Had its  previous occupants been happy here, or had 
 they been kept against their will? Were the bars on the windows left from the time 
 when this had been an asylum?  
 (p. 24) 
The passage underlines an affinity with the tradition of the haunted house or manor, which is 
evident in the way that the house 'murmurs' to itself and made explicit in Hen's speculation about 
the presence of ghosts. It is also metonymic: Hen's interpretation of the house as unstable, as if it is 
about to fall apart, mirrors her own preoccupation with her bodily integrity, which is crumbling 
under the depredations of her anorexia. In his discussion of madness and the Gothic, Scott Brewster 
discusses how, in Poe's 'The Fall of the House of Usher', the House itself reflects the physical and 
mental deterioration of the protagonist and the narrator. We can see a similar point at work here: 
Dean Manor's dilapidation operates as a signifier of Hen's own physical suffering and psychic 
instability.16 
 
As the novel progresses, we realise that many of the girls staying here have affinities with the 
'turbulent histories' of the asylum's previous inhabitants. In a memorable scene in the hostel's 
cafeteria, Hen is forced to eat against her will by the tyrannical Miss Naylor, consequently purging 
herself of the margarine's 'yellow sewage' by imagining a rabbit she had seen being consumed by 
fleas 'from the inside out' merging with Miss Naylor's 'lifeless, immobile' hair (pp. 79-80). The 
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relationship between anorexia and madness is well documented: Elaine Showalter describes 
practices of fasting among Victorian adolescents as addressing a situation in which 'only the body 
was important', arguing that such 'anorexic girls paraded physical starvation as a way of drawing 
attention to the starvation of their mental and moral faculties'.17 The episode in which Hen vomits 
after being forced to eat is also evocative of Maud Ellmann's discussion of the practice of force-
feeding in The Hunger Artists (1993). Exploring Sylvia Pankhurst's account of this experience while 
incarcerated, Ellmann contends that the practice 'demolishes the ego' in a way that violates 'the 
essence of the self'.18 Ellmann sees Pankhurst's decision to reject the sustenance forced into her as 
restoring 'her sense of self-identity': she is only able to 'pull herself together' by purging the 
unwanted food.19 Hen's revulsion, her sense that the margarine is 'sewage', a waste product that her 
body must reject, is intensified by her visualisation of the spread's lurid 'yellow' colour, linking it 
both to urine and thus back to sewage, and also, more subtly, to the images of contamination and 
contagion associated with toxic waste (p. 77). Anorexia, then, is a form of deathliness: the food Hen 
refuses is metaphorically linked not with sustenance or the nurturing of the body, but with 
poisonous waste-products. In the deathly association of food with poison, Hen's self-negation 
paradoxically becomes a bulwark against it: her desire to rid herself of the 'yellow sewage' is an 
attempt to keep some part of herself together, in spite of the pressures that assail her on all sides.  
Hen's anorexia, then, speaks to the 'fragmentation' of selfhood theorised by Showalter as the 'bitter 
metaphor' of a generalised female condition.20 
 
One facet of Hen's anorexia has to do with her incipient adult body and feminine sexuality. She hates 
her body, hates it for 'being itself, for being the same body she met with every night when she took 
her clothes off [...] for needing things' (p. 97). Again, the link between anorexia and the rejection of 
female sexuality is well documented: Showalter notes that a keen appetite, particularly for meat, 
was in the Victorian period associated with a voracious feminine sexuality, 'especially with an 
abundant menstrual flow, and even with nymphomania... Thus, in the rigid control of her eating, the 
anorexic both expressed her fear of adult sexual desire and enacted an exaggerated form of the 
deadening life of the dutiful daughter'.21 The sense that Hen's developing body bespeaks a betrayal 
of her relationship with her father is indicated in the way that she hates her body for 'embarrassing 
her father', who she has to ask for money when she needs to purchase a brassière (p. 98). In this 
respect, her eating disorder deviates markedly from the anorexia suffered by Joy in The Trick Is to 
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Keep Breathing: where Joy's illness is precipitated by the fear that she may be losing her looks, Hen's 
is partially an attempt keep at bay the world of adult sexuality in which she knows she will soon be 
obliged to participate. 
 
In Literary Women, Ellen Moers famously argues that the 'Female Gothic' is overwhelmingly 
concerned with the fear of being trapped; trapped by the female body and ultimately by childbirth.22 
This is particularly noticeable in her reaction to the hyper-sexualised femininity that she abruptly 
adopts after her separation from Hen's father. Hen remembers illicitly entering her mother's 
bedroom in the 'smug, stuccoed flat' (p. 162) she is now renting in London: 
 clothes covered every available surface, oozing out of drawers, over the chairs, round the 
 bedstead. They weren't like the kind of clothes her mother used to wear... These were 
 bright as billboards: buttery yellow, shocking pink, scarlet. The empty cups of a red satin bra 
 gaped at her from an open drawer. 
 (p. 164) 
The troubling aspect of this encounter is not the recognition that she is becoming like her mother so 
much as the fact that her mother is becoming more like her. The brashness of the brightly coloured 
clothes remind Hen of precisely the kind of clothes that she or her compatriots choose: later, she 
explicitly compares her mother's 'cute cardigans' to something that Caz might wear (p. 164). The 
comparison of the clothes' brashness to billboards bespeaks Hen's painful perception of the 
desperation underlying her mother's recently reasserted sexuality and is perhaps indicative of a 
similar uneasiness about the desperation with which her classmates pursue any form of male 
attention. That this disquietude about her mother's behaviour is related to Hen's anorexia is 
suggested by the way that Hen metonymically associates her mother's clothes with precisely the 
kinds of foodstuffs she is hoping to avoid. Her disgust expresses itself in the sense that the yellow 
clothes are 'buttery', and the mess is an insidious 'ooze', thus linking them to the margarine of which 
she later purges herself. The 'empty cup' of the bra suggests the inordinate quantities of alcohol that 
her mother drinks, indicating that she is both insatiable in her consumption and, in the comment 
about the billboard, perhaps too eager to be consumed in turn. 
 
Hen associates the abjected leavings which have been in close contact with her mother's body not 
just with physical fluidity and 'ooze', but, metonymically, with her mother's emotional incontinence. 
This is clearest in her comment about the bra cups which 'gape' at her from an open drawer:  the 
adult women's body is associated both with stupidity and greed, its 'gaping' indicative of a gormless 
and vociferously greedy mouth. This is reiterated throughout the novel: her mother persistently 
demands that Hen performs the role of the close, dutiful daughter, weeps when she does not do so 
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adequately, and embarrasses her by smelling of alcohol and flirting inappropriately with waiters. Her 
anorexia, then, is not simply an expression of an ambivalence about sexuality, but also speaks to her 
perception of femininity as a state of permanent neediness and vulnerability. This ambivalence is 
only resolvable through the deathly refusal of food, which both hardens her body and gives her a 
sense of discipline and autonomy.  
 
The characterisation of Hen's mother stands in stark contrast to the character Lila in O Caledonia. 
Lila, Janet's second cousin by marriage, is a Russian émigré who lived at Auchnasaugh for years with 
her husband before his death, when the castle fell into the hands of Hector and his relatives, 
including Janet. Lila's distant relationship with the central family, her sinister bearing (the children in 
the village believe she is a witch) and her emotional unavailability all make her vulnerable to 
accusations of insanity. Her eccentricity takes the form of an overwhelming desire for whisky, an 
interest in unfeminine past-times such as botany, and a hardness and resistance to emotional 
engagement which is indicated on both the emotional and physical plane. She evinces an obdurate 
resistance to emotional engagement or human contact. She is opaque—'silent' and 'black-eyed' at 
the beginning of the text, by the time she has been banished from Auchnasaugh for attacking Vera 
after she interferes in her liaison with Jim, she is as still  and unblinking as 'a basilisk' (p. 117). This 
characteristic is even born out at the level of syntax: her taciturnity and short sentences all bespeak 
the very opposite of the excessive expressiveness and emotional ooze evinced by Hen's mother.   
 
However, it is only after Lila is actually incarcerated in a mental institution following an altercation 
about her relationship with Jim, that she becomes mad. Thus, although I would agree with Monica 
Germanà's assertion that Lila can be read as an iteration of  the madwoman in the attic figure 
delineated by Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar in The Madwoman in the Attic (1979), it should be 
noted that, before her unseating by Vera, there is nothing pathological about Lila: in fact, Vera gives 
the sum of Lila's perceived psychological problems in fine when she says to her husband 'you must 
admit that she's very peculiar. And she drinks too much whisky' (p. 29). Like Special, then, the novel 
ostensibly directs the reader's attention to the problematic relationship between feminine sexuality 
and madness. Rather than the asylum acting as a 'testing-ground' for her survival it is the end-point 
at which her desires—the 'small reserve of appetite for life' she keeps intact through her interest in 
the flora and fauna of Auchnasaugh, her cat and her whisky—ultimately drain away. (p. 113)23 
 
                                                                 
23
 Moers, p. 123. 
125 
 
Lila's hardness is a result of her complete lack of regard for conventional forms of femininity. She is 
magnificent in her absolute refusal to feign an interest in anything about which she is unconcerned. 
In this sense O Caledonia and Special can productively be read as addressing themselves to precisely 
opposite ends of the psychological spectrum: in the presentation of Hen, Hen's mother, and, as we 
shall see later, Caz, Special analyses the psychological risks attendant upon learning the rules of 
normative femininity in a world completely interpenetrated by capital. O Caledonia, by contrast, 
explores how madness is invoked as a punishment if these rules are not followed. In Lila's case, her 
eccentricities (and, not inconsequentially, the financial burden she places on the family) antagonises 
Vera to the extent that she feels nothing except vindication when she arranges for her to be taken to 
the Sunny Days lunatic asylum. Her self-justification is expressed in the magnificently officious 
accusation, not that Lila is mad, but that she 'flouts protocol' (p. 113). Germanà notes that Vera is 
the figure tasked with policing the boundaries of gender in the novel: if so, then Lila's confinement 
at Sunny Days is essentially a custodial sentence at the hands of the heteronormativity police. Thus, 
the figure of Lila is one in a long line of literary women who have been 'taken away' because they are 
unable to convincingly perform feminine norms. 
 
The catatonic state induced by Lila's stay at Sunny Days is underlined when Janet goes to visit her. 
Rather than the malevolence of her final days at Auchnasaugh, the incarceration reduces Lila to 
almost nothing: she is only 'strange and small [...] as though all her existence had contracted to this 
point and would proceed no further' (p. 117). Even here, though, this reduction is not one of 
indistinction, but hardness and impenetrability. Despite her reduced state, Lila remains inaccessible. 
The reduction in the magnitude of Lila's figure is underscored by the change in tone from the poetic, 
Gothic redolences of Auchnasaugh, 'The Field of Sighing' in Gaelic, to the otiose Sunny Days 
(Showalter notes the 'ironically named' asylums in which schizophrenic women were often placed).24 
As well as the obvious inanity of such an optimistic name for a lunatic asylum, there is perhaps an 
echo here of Beckett's Happy Days, another text in which blankness and indeterminacy take the 
place of terrible pain.25  
 
As we shall see later, beautiful language in O Caledonia speaks to moments of subjective possibility 
and excitement, whereas drab and mundane expression gestures towards a concomitant restriction 
of hope and possibility. Lila's madness, then, takes the form of a restriction of selfhood so intense as 
to be almost catatonic: the appetite for life indicated by her sexuality and her intellectual 
engagement with the world around her is reduced to nothing—she tells Janet, tiredly, when she 
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comes to visit her: 'I'd like to go to sleep now' (p. 120). As mentioned in the introduction, madness in 
this thesis figures as a loss of selfhood from which there is a possibility, however slim, of return. Of 
all the characters under discussion here, Lila is the one who seems least likely to return. She is the 
figure who is most clearly a member of the (barely) waking dead. Lila, then, is an excellent example 
of madness as what Elaine Showalter defines as the 'bitter metaphor' by which mid-20th-century 
British women writers express their discontent with their conditions of life.26 
 
This anxiety about sexual maturity is further underscored after Vera takes Janet to Edinburgh to fit 
her out with 'those badges of Scottish womanhood', a tweed suit and an adult haircut, having 
peremptorily decided that it is time for her to 'become a woman' (p. 128). Janet is immediately 
reminded of Sunny Days upon entering the hairdressing salon, underscoring the relationship 
between adult sexuality and madness, and further suggesting that Janet's adolescent borderland—
her passage into womanhood—is in some way a punishment (p. 130). Linking the space of the 
asylum to the space of the salon, which also figures as a kind of liminal space which 'Scottish 
womanhood' must pass through to gain entry to maturity, suggests that the threat of the asylum is 
not confined to the floridly insane, but somehow threatens all femininity (or at least, the middle-
class Scottish versions of it) (p. 128). Like Dean Manor acting as a hostel for the girls in Special, the 
comparison of the salon as the space in which normative adult femininity is achieved (or enforced)  
with the space in which counternormative femininity is incarcerated, indicates that the insane 
asylum is not merely the threatening end-point for those who fail to perform their gender correctly, 
but is in some way an inherent part of becoming a woman. 
 
Style and Subjectivity in Special and O Caledonia 
 
In  their discussion of Comic Gothic, Avril Horner and Sue Zlosnick note that there has been relatively 
little discussion of style in Gothic criticism. Despite the 'pioneering work' done by Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick, they argue that 'most orthodox accounts of what Gothic is' do not capture the 'hybridity' 
of many Gothic novels, particularly in their juxtaposition of 'incongruous textual effects'.27 This 
incongruity, they argue, makes possible what they call a 'mixed response to the loss of 
transcendence that characterises the modern condition'.28 This sense that the commentary on the 
stylistics of Gothic is largely absent has been borne out by my own research: Punter does not discuss 
Gothic style in his The Literature of Terror (1980), and neither Victor Sage in Modern Gothic (1996), 
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nor Jerrold Hogle in The Cambridge Companion to Gothic (2002) offer a section on Gothic stylistics or 
poetics.29 The same applies to Fred Botting in his Gothic (2013).30  
 
My contention in this section is that the stylistics of the two novels under discussion here are 
indicative of a very different conception of subjectivity, and perhaps even to different iterations of 
the Gothic mode. Bathurst's prose style speaks very much to the movement towards nothingness 
and negation:  a form of self-restriction bent on becoming ultimately, empty, inhuman and 
flawless—a desire to become unsouled rather than ensouled, to retread Patricia Waugh’s term . The 
forms of madness in Special ultimately deal with the girls' struggle to abandon a liberal humanist 
conception of subjectivity which has a coherent history and identity. In this sense, the novel 's 
stylistics directly bear out the 'loss of transcendence' which Horner and Zlosnick identify as the 
modern condition of the loss of any sense of their own value which is autonomous in relation to the 
way that they are valued in the commodified sexual marketplace.31 By contrast, O Caledonia’s 
madnesses—both Janet’s and Lila’s—come about due to the external denial of a greater appetite for 
life than their lives will give them space for. Again, this is reflected in the use of language, which is 
consistently pitched at a level of intensity which often far outstrips the affective weight of what is 
being described. The emphasis throughout is on a seeking out of transcendence, of romance, which 
does seem predicated on the possibility of a genuine subjective autonomy, even if, for women 
anyway, such subjective coherence is constantly assailed by external forces.  
 
Stylistically, Special bears out the concern with the straightening and restrictive effect the girls' 
world has on their subjectivity. The girls' attempts to 'deself' or 'unsoul'  themselves are firstly 
indicated in their speech patterns, which are truncated, reductionist and peppered with obscenities. 
It is an absolutely typical feature of the text that Jules, Hen and Ali studiously avoid using the first 
person pronoun: thus, in the episode involving the injured woman at the beginning of the text, Hen 
responds to Jules asking if she is alright by saying 'no. Going to be sick' rather than 'I'm going to be 
sick' (p. 8). When Jules offhandedly tells Hen that she has found her a bed she says 'Beds. Got you 
one' rather than 'I got you one' (p. 14), and later, when attempting to explain to Caz why she and 
Hen have quarrelled, she says 'don't know' rather than 'I don't know' (p. 106). The only character 
who does not use this mode of expression is Caz—a linguistic characteristic that gestures towards 
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the mirage of completeness and maturity she projects and which is unavailable to the othe rs. Even 
she, however, shortens her name, as do all the other girls in the novel.  
 
The relationship of this reductionism to an openly Gothic sensibility is visible through the figure of 
Hen. We can see this in her nightmarish vision of the woman in the car-crash at the beginning of the 
text. In particular, the 'shrieking noises' that reach the point of 'hysteria' when the brakes are 
slammed in the minibus in which they are travelling, the 'tight, flat summer day', the sun that 'beats 
down' into the back of her skull, and the sweat that 'creeps' over the face of Miss Naylor, all reflect 
the restrictive nature of the girl's world (p. 2). The impression is reinforced by the reference to the 
hysterical character of the noise made by the breaks, as hysteria is surely the paradigmatic neurosis 
of those living in confined, straightened conditions (p. 2). These oppressive, airless stylistics intensify 
later in the incident. The injured passenger's eyes are 'high and hectic' and her face looks like a 'huge 
sick purple moon', covered with 'pits and lines like the marks of something diseased' (p. 5). As the 
policeman approaches the injured motorist his face shifts 'from hurried concern to incomprehension 
to a kind of blank-eyed terror' (pp. 5-6). There are numerous Gothic elements here: the comparison 
of the woman's face to a bloated moon, the monstrosity of her appearance as something 'diseased', 
and the slippage from 'incomprehension to blank-eyed terror' is haunting imagery of the kind we 
would expect from a conventional Gothic text. The phrase 'something diseased' is meant, I think, to 
sound overtly literary and somewhat archaic, as in the formulation 'something wicked this way 
comes'.32 It bespeaks the sense of 'terror and horror' which is the hallmark of so many Gothic texts.  
 
Thus, typically Gothic concerns—the excessive sense of disease and decay—are married with a sense 
of shabby mundanity that locates these fears in the everyday world: it is inherent in the motorways 
and central reservations, papier-mâché hearts and large plastic roses, which constitute the girls' 
milieu (pp. 4-5). There is no indication that this fear gestures towards any transcendent mystery: 
rather, the reader is left with the sense that the malevolence generated by the violence of the car-
crash is indissociable from everyday matters such as dress and highway regulations. The sense of 
threat is derived not so much from the presence of a malevolent higher power, but simply that this 
is all there is: violence and nausea seems indissociable from everyday life. This, then, is indicative of 
the subjective 'loss of transcendence' discussed by Horner and Slosnick.33 The universal malaise 
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afflicting the text appears to be not derived so much from the 'terror and horror' of any supernatural 
forces, so much as it is the fear that Hen and her compatriots are of a piece with this world of 
absolute banality. It is very much a representation of an enivronment in which all hope of an 
encounter with the transcendent, with 'ensoulment', is nullified. The final end point of this denuding 
of the possibility of subjective transcendence, of the valuation of anything in terms other than 
commodified ones, has its final expression in the insanity revealed by Caz at the end of the text. 
 
The damage done by too great an emphasis on appearance is a major theme of Special. It is also an 
issue often discussed in the literature on madness. This is, I think, because the novel delineates a 
world in which beauty is drained of any critical power or transcendence. There is a long crit ical 
tradition associating beauty with some kind of transcendence, the paradigmatic expression of which 
is the Keats's assertion, in 'Ode on a Grecian Urn', that 'Beauty is truth, truth beauty'.34 In Blank 
Fictions, James Annesley analyses Brian D'Amato's novel Beauty, in which the central character 
works as a plastic surgeon who improves his clients' appearances so that they can increase their 
earning power by working as models. The novel thus underlines the way that the 'penetration of the 
body', both physically in terms of the surgical scalpel, and figuratively in terms of the penetration of 
capital into the very fabric of the body, speak to an all-pervasive diminishment of human experience. 
There is a similar operation at work in Special. In this context, the pressure to be visually appealing 
at all times denotes an intense commodification and reduction of the girl's selfhood. Thus, the 
obsession with beauty becomes a hallmark not of transcendence, but of profound mundanity. 
 
 In Ways of Seeing (1972), the art historian John Berger links the visual field with feminine psychic 
splitting. Women, he argues, are divided in two by their constructed awareness of themselves as a 
visual object, and their resulting double role as actor and spectator. "A woman must continually 
watch herself," Berger says: 
 She is almost continually accompanied by her own image of herself. Whist she is walking 
 across a room or whist she is weeping at the death of her father, she can scarcely avoid 
 watching herself walking or weeping. From earliest childhood she has been taught and 
 persuaded to survey herself continually. And so she comes to consider the surveyor and the 
 surveyed within her as the two constituent yet always distinct elements of her identity as a 
 woman.35 
There is a similar emphasis on the role of the visual in Showalter's work, too, in which she argues 
that 'the abyss that opens between the schizophrenic's body and mind... can be seen as an 
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exaggeration of women's "normal" state'.36 The sense of constantly being watched, and constant 
watchfulness, is highly relevant to the characterisation of Caz. Not only is she always aware of her 
own image, but the other girls both watch her and watch her being watched: the beauty of the 
image she projects is so incorruptible that she seems to Hen to live in a 'holy fucking golden place' to 
which none of her peers will ever have access (p. 297).  
 
The readers are never allowed access to Caz's interiority, and the other girls consistently draw 
attention to Caz's mysterious background and the lack of information about her family. Both these 
aspects of her character are linked to the impossible glamour of her image. The only information 
that we have about her background—that her mother works in 'interactive advertising'— similarly 
directs us to understand her as in some way imbricated in the flow of capital (p. 74). The link 
between her mother and the world of advertising also suggests that Caz is a creature of publicity, 
hinting at the notion that advertising may become interactive in some way, almost as if Caz herself is 
a holographic projection of an advertisement for clothes or shoes. Later in Ways of Seeing, Berger 
also discusses the publicity still, speaking of the way that the glamour model's gaze has an 'absent, 
unfocused' quality which appears to look out over the envious gaze of the consumers that sustain 
her.37 At one point in the text Jules wistfully notes that Caz's gaze is similar: she seems to be looking 
away, Jules says, as if her mind were already on 'higher things' (p. 106). This impression is intensified 
in the way that the girls continually think of her in terms of impossibility— her hair, stomach, 
shoulders and clothes are all continually described as such. In a similar vein, the other girls in the 
novel find that their haircuts blunt, their clothes fade and their weights fluctuate, but Caz's 
appearance has a timeless and 'delightful uniformity' (p. 145). The image she projects to the other 
girls, then, is comparable to an advertisement or publicity still. 
 
The similarities between Caz's presentation and a publicity still are striking in other ways too. In 
Berger's analysis, the primary affective charge of the publicity still is that it produces envy; envy 
which in turn encourages consumers to purchase the product on offer. Caz's role in the novel also 
functions through envy. This is shockingly evident in the passage in which the girls are discussing the 
significance of their own consumerism and the concomitant fragility of their feminine solidarity and 
friendship. Jules, in response to the second-wave feminist book they have been perusing, hesitantly 
asks Caz if she believes the 'stuff about people sticking together', asserting, somewhat shakily that 
'we stick together, don't we?' (p. 111). Caz's response is this:  
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 Ye-es... but what people—us, girls—really actually want is to make themselves up, put on 
 their blindingest clothes, do the stuff with the heels and the hair and the lipstick. And then 
 they want to walk into a room, looking as dead fuck-off gorgeous as they can ever look, and 
 for every other girl in the room to look at them and think, "Bitch". 
 (pp. 111-12) 
Jules defeatedly attempts to disavow this assertion: 'you... me... I mean, we do sort of matter, don't 
we?' (p. 115). However, it is finally this—this sense that the unique individual identity of Jules, Hen 
and Ali does not actually matter—that forms the shattering realisation at the heart of the novel.  
 
If Caz's appearance is suggestive of the publicity still, then the way that she articulates her sense of 
ethical and moral value can be interpreted through Marx's delineation of the commodity form.  
Speaking of commodity fetishism, Marx says: 
 As against this, the commodity-form, and the value-relation of the products of labour within 
 which it appears, have absolutely no connection with the physical nature of the commodity 
 and the material relations arising out of this. It is nothing but the definite social relation 
 between men themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation 
 between things.... I call  this the fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour as 
 soon as they are produced as commodities, and is therefore inseparable from the 
 production of commodities.38 
In the section above, in which Caz discusses her sense that women's worth is defined by the 
commodities they have or can wear (the hair, the heels, the makeup), she delineates a view which 
bespeaks a relation between people which is defined by the things or commodities they own. More 
significantly, however, her intimation at the end of the section that she wishes her peers to look at 
her and think 'Bitch', involves a further degree of commodification. The moment at which she is 
termed a 'bitch' is one of triumph—Caz actively seeks it out—because it indicates that the women 
who call her that have perceived that her value is higher than their own. Thus, the moment of a 
supreme lack of feminine solidarity is also the moment at which it becomes clear that Caz values 
herself and her peers in the same way as commodities are valued. Their value is always determined 
in relation to one another. It has no relation to the subjective analogy of the 'use-value' of the 
person (for example, how clever or kind they are, or the sort of music they like—the things that Jules 
tremulously appeals to as the things that 'matter' about people), and, most importantly, in any given 
set of commodities, there is always one that is the most valuable.  
 
The difference between the classic Marxist understanding of commodity exchange and the system 
that Caz implicitly proposes, however, is that the girls' value is not determined by their economic 
worth, but by their sexual exchange value. This is based on the extent to which they conform to 
normative beauty standards, and, as we have just seen, Caz is continually presented as looking like 
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an advertising still. In this sense, she does not simply conform to normative standards of beauty: she 
is a normative standard of beauty, and thus, is always the most valuable—the most powerful—of the 
girls in the group. As a figure, then, she functions to encourage the paradigmatic iteration of the 
commodity relation: her presence forces the other girls to evaluate themselves as commodities 
whose worth is only perceivable in relation to other commodified people . She is a representative 
figure of the ethical 'blankness' which pervades postmodern culture, a figure whose absence of 
history speaks to the Jamesonian schizophrenia of an eternal present, and to the commodity form 
which occludes its past—its production—through the exchange value it takes on in the market. The 
form of madness dominating Caz's subjectivity, then, is derived from the sense of the failure of the 
belief in the possibility of a transcendent human subject described by Avril Horner and Sue Zlosnick: 
if we truly accept that there is no sphere into which a solely economic valuation of life has not 
penetrated, then Caz's understanding of selfhood is the only available logic of subjectivity. She 
wants, in other words, not to be human, but to be a commodity. The logic of Caz's presentation 
throughout the first half of the novel thus implicitly undercuts the central contention of the liberal -
humanist thesis of subjectivity: that it has a value autonomous of its relation to economic worth. 
 
However, for all that Caz's presentation in the first section of the novel is redolent of an image in an 
advertisement, and indeed a commodity per se, she is not simply a photograph in a magazine but 
(within the terms of the text, anyway) a real human being. The denouement of the text presents us 
with the gradual unravelling of Caz's carefully crafted facade as inhuman, as pure commodity. It 
begins to fray after her visit to the youth hostel in which the group of boys that the girls arranged to 
meet in the pub are staying. While there, Hen sees Caz fleeing the hostel in a state of 
uncharacteristic disarray: she later telephones one of the schoolboys to ask what happened. The 
conversation is a revelation of a humiliating sexual assault: the boy she went to meet persuaded Caz 
to let him tie her naked to his bedpost, and then, as punishment for her perceived sexual precocity, 
invites his classmates to come into the bedroom to gawp at her. According to Adey's narrative, 'they 
didn't do anything: they just laughed' (p. 269). This is fitting, because Caz's power is derived from 
being looked at with desire and envy: the particularly visual element of her humiliation therefore 
undermines her self-image and her power in a way stunningly direct both for her and Hen (p. 270). 
 
It is at this moment that Caz loses what Berger terms the 'envy which sustains her'.39 Her image as 
an avatar of the postmodern subject as historyless, affectless, and concerned only with image and 
style—the Jamesonian schizophrenic subject—falls away, revealing, beneath it, an equally insane 
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desire to dominate the hierarchy of teenagers in the novel. After this moment, she hides the 
medication of an unpopular asthmatic, leading to her hospitalisation, encourages a man pursuing 
her to rape Jules, and finally allows Jules to fall to her death from the roof where the three girls have 
their final confrontation. Ultimately, the novel strongly indicates that she is a psychopath. It is also 
after this point that Caz angrily confronts Hen about her anorexia. At this point, the  'glassy' façade of 
her unconcern, which seems to bespeak the 'blank fictions' theorised by James Annesley, falls away, 
and the reader has an intimation of the 'frozen ice-white rage' beneath (p. 297).40 Tellingly, Hen sees 
this anger emerge as 'something rough' in Caz's face; her implacable smoothness is gone and 'all that 
remained of her was the perfect body' (p. 301). The striking ugliness of Hen's anorexic body appears 
at the same moment that Caz, too,  is revealed as ugly. This links Hen's 'disgusting body' with the 
discovery of something ugly in Caz, suggesting that such ugliness is in some way linked to the way of 
thinking about selfhood which Caz proposes.  
 
The notion of ugliness returns us to Hen's ravaged and 'disgusting' physique. At the end of the novel, 
Caz accuses Hen of being 'just a fucked up. Boring. Anorexic.' (p. 297). Tellingly, the word 'boring' is 
casually deployed throughout the novel to denote anything that smacks of political engagement—
for example, Caz also uses it when dismissing the feminist text that they have been leafing through 
to find the 'filthy' sections from books in the 'frigid' school library (p. 108). A similar claim is being 
made when Jules boldly tells Caz that she is a 'bit bored of sex at the moment' (p. 134). Caz's 
response is first incredulous and then outraged. This is because Jules's gesture here, despite its 
amusingly inept attempt at a worldly tone, is reaching for a mode of seeing oneself in which Caz 
does not have the ultimate advantage. The tag 'bored' again implies political engagement: Jules is 
groping towards a recognition that the endless sexual competition she has to undergo is indeed 
boring; that she hopes to find a more fulfilling way of understanding her own desire. 
 
 The moment  of this confrontation, then, is one of hope for Hen, because to be boring, for Caz, is to 
be politically engaged, to stake a claim, however self-destructive, for a form of living other than that 
which Caz offers. Essentially, she is angered by the way that the anorexic body undermines the myth 
of feminine perfection on which her own power rests. This is the source of Caz's discomfiture with 
Hen's illness: her emaciated body competes with and undermines Caz's perfection. Although, as 
Kerstin Shands points out, it is dangerous to understand anorexia solely as a form of deliberate 
rebellion against patriarchy, it is worth noting, as both Ellman and Showalter do, that the anorexic's 
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body, unlike the female form in its modelesque perfection, can be read as a form of protest.41 Caz is 
disturbed by Hen's disgusting body because it makes explicit the insane end-point of the 'single 
proposal' to which she too has committed, and which in a different but equally perturbing way she 
embodies.  
 
Hen's body confronts her with a grotesque form of her own commitment, evoking both the desire to 
reduce one's selfhood to nothing, and to be valued purely by how far one conforms to normative 
standards of beauty. Caz's mode of viewing the world is undercut by the anorexia which follows this 
logic to its inevitable conclusion by attempting to reduce the living, non-commodified body to 
nothing. Her vituperative revelation to Hen and Jules at the end of the text that 'we weren't friends. 
We were never friends’ is the degree zero of such a system (p. 301). Caz has no friends, no human 
engagement with her peers: she lives simply to increase her stock. In a complicated and self-
destructive way, then, both Jules and Hen are able to assert some form of selfhood through an 
encoded (Hen) or explicit (Jules) rejection of the sexual. Thus, if Sedgwick sees the function of the 
Gothic as being 'to open horizons beyond social patterns, rational decisions, and institutionally 
approved emotions [...] to enlarge the sense of reality and its impact on the human being', then 
Special is diametrically opposed to this project.42 The text is not so much an exploration of how far 
reality can be expanded, but of how, through constant surveillance by authority, family, pee rs and 
oneself, it can retract. 
 
The girls' obsession with how they appear to others throughout Special stands in complete contrast 
to O Caledonia, in that throughout the text, Janet evinces a disregard for her appearance which 
frequently causes other characters to question her sanity. While the madness of the girls in Special is 
intimately related to their painful awareness of how others perceive them, in O Caledonia Janet is 
consistently seen as mad because of her complete inability to envisage how she appears to others. 
Take, for example,  her first and last social engagement, a hunt ball. Vera despairingly describes the  
dress she has chosen as making her look rather like a 'mad old person who had her brains scrambled 
by too many hunting accidents and is indulgently regarded as "game"' (p. 128). There are similar 
operations elsewhere in the text, too: when reading, Janet reminds her mother of 'a girl she had 
known once, who was said to be a pathological eating maniac' (p. 129) and when she is moved up a 
year at school, she stops being 'mad, as in mentally disabled' and becomes 'mad, as in mad 
professor' (p. 75). Although, clearly, this is not 'true madness', it does speak to the way that the term 
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is used to police or punish unacceptable social behaviour and dress—behaviour that Janet never 
learns to disguise. Although Janet is never incarcerated, the fact that Lila's eccentricity and lack of 
femininity leads directly to her confinement at Sunny Days suggests that even such casual usages of 
the term do have an effect on the institutionalisation of inconvenient women.  
 
Interestingly, some critics have attempted to read Janet in the Gothic tradition of young women who 
are uncomfortable with their sexuality and body; Monica Germanà, for example, interprets Janet as 
having 'a schizoid view of her [own] physicality'.43 This reading evokes Moers's delineation of the 
Female Gothic as intensely wary of physical entrapment in sexuality and childbirth, but, as Germanà 
also interprets the text through a devolutionary lens, she links this ambivalence to a preoccupation 
with ghosts, doubled selfhoods (and thus antisyzygy) and hauntings characteristic of devolutionary 
readings of Scottish gothic. There is some evidence for this—there are numerous moments later in 
the text at which Janet is upset by the sexual advances of men she dislikes, and she attributes her 
exclusion from but 'obscure longing' for the feminine world to her lack of an 'essential quality of 
girlishness' (p. 128). However, Janet's use of language—her very material, almost physical pleasure 
in a well expressed turn of phrase—as well as her longing to meet a 'demon lover' and her attraction 
to the young man she meets at a reading competition—indicate to me that this is not so much a 
disdain for the physical as it is simply a healthy insistence on her own bodily autonomy (p. 128).  
 
This suggests that both Janet and Lila be read in a different tradition of thinking about madness: one 
in which being defined as mad is interpreted as 'symbolic punishment for intellectual ambition, 
domestic defiance and sexual autonomy'.44 Rather than seeing Janet's physicality and her 
imaginativeness as schizoid, then, both the physical pleasure that she takes in beautiful words, and 
the punishment that she finally receives at the hands of Jim for her insistence on her own sexual  
desire, can perhaps be linked to the mistrust of sensuous pleasure displayed by certain characters, 
particularly the more obviously Calvinist ones such as Nanny, and the gossips who take a 'grim' 
satisfaction in Janet's death (p. 11). In Lila's incarceration at Sunny Days, and the note of sexuality in 
Janet's encounter with its inmates, there is a similar suggestion of the Scottish Calvinist mistrust of 
sexual and physical pleasure, leading to madness. This suspicion, however, is firmly placed in the 
social sphere: there is none of the anxiety regarding physical pleasure in the narration suggested by, 
for example, the work of Alasdair Gray. Nonetheless, it is the desire for pleasure, for a keener, more 
varied existence, that sends Lila to the asylum and Janet sprawling to death down the great stairs at 
Auchnasaugh. 
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These textual features suggest that there is a relationship between Janet's sexuality, her 
preoccupation with literature, and her madness. Many of the commentators on O Caledonia have 
discussed the significance of Janet's facility with language and imaginative faculties. As Timothy C. 
Barker notes, the novel remains 'remarkably close' to Janet's imaginative world.45 I would like to 
extend, or perhaps reverse, that insight, and claim instead that Janet's imagination is  remarkably 
close to the real world. By this I mean that she is strikingly able to make her flights of fantasy present 
in her own life: throughout the novel, she finds herself in trouble due to her habit of interweaving 
her own imaginative confections with the quotidian reality of the everyday. In this sense, the 
proximity of her imaginative projections to the real world take on a far darker hue  than in the 
humorous incident at the hunt ball analysed above. 
 
This strongly indicates that Janet's imagination is in some way related to madness: in his article on 
the Gothic and madness, Scott Brewster argues that the Gothic is peculiarly interested in the points 
at which readers begin to treat fictional characters as real. The example he gives is of Freud, who in 
‘Jensen’s Gravida’, is momentarily troubled that by examining the figures in the story as if they had 
an unconscious mind, he is treating characters described in fiction as if they were real.46 This, 
Brewster says, is an example of what Peter Brookes describes as a ‘willingness, a desire, to enter into 
the delusional systems of the texts’ he reads, ‘to espouse their hallucinated vision, in an attempt to 
master and be mastered by their power of conviction'.47 We see a similar movement in Janet's 
characterisation. She is consistently presented as struggling to fully make the distinction between 
the real world and her own imagination, again and again succumbing to the temptation to read the 
world in terms of the fantasies she projects onto it. 
 
As I mentioned in the introduction, the culmination of Janet's imaginative faculties ends in a 
moment of madness: she misreads Jim's appearance in the castle to turn off the lights as the 
apparition of the 'demon lover' she has invoked using a love charm (p. 128).  The novel also 
foregrounds this tendency in an attenuated form throughout. From earliest childhood, Janet half -
convinces herself of the reality of her imaginative projection in a way that draws together both her 
sexual and literary desires in a quest for transcendence. We can see this in the section in which she 
persuades herself that her tame jackdaw, Claws, is in love with her: 
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 The gentlest of winds stirred the wild cherry blossom against a soft blue sky. Daffodils and 
 snowdrops bloomed together. Janet's jackdaw was behaving strangely: he would climb into 
 her pocket and peer up at her, twisting his head in a beckoning manner, his eyes bright with 
 meaning [....] In Konrad Lorenz's wonderful King Solomon's Ring she found the explanation. 
 He wished to lure her into her pocket, and there they would build a nest together. He had 
 chosen her as his mate, his true and everlasting love, for jackdaws are monogamous. How 
 strange that the creature who offered her all this should be a bird. How strange that she 
 should be a human. What a merry little joke for the gods.  
 (p. 145) 
Here, the softness of the sky and the gentleness of the wind work to provide a rich setting for Janet's 
reading of her jackdaw's infatuation with her as cruel pathos. The softness of the surroundings 
heighten Janet's sensitivity to the world's cruelty: the passage delineates the way that moments of 
tenderness, particularly those provoked by a heightened sensitivity towards the natural world, 
actually heighten the possibility of emotional pain.  
 
We can see here that very much in contrast to Special, Janet is more than capable of imagining a 
world of transcendence, of limitless possibility in both intellectual, aesthetic and Romantic terms. 
However, this inevitably leads to crushing disappointment—gestured towards, here, perhaps, by 
Barker's intimation of the 'merry joke' of the jackdaw falling in love with her.  Janet's madness, then, 
is not, as in Special, the neurosis brought about by a recognition that the world in which she lives has 
lost all possibility of transcendence, but a painful half-belief in its possibility. Barker thus spins a 
complex web of how different forms of madness in the novel interact with one another. Janet’s 
possession by the seductive imagos of beautiful language, romantic love and unnatural power—the 
cause of so many of her troubles— becomes  true madness at the moment in which she believes 
herself to have evoked her 'demon lover', when it is in fact Jim having arrived unexpectedly at the 
castle to turn off the lights. This is also, significantly, the moment of her murder: imaginative power 
is thus linked with madness and death.  
 
Janet's punishment for the criticism of her milieu implied by her imaginative desire to be elsewhere  
is her demise. The purity of her imaginative faculties are thus at their strongest at the very moment 
which is marked by both madness and death. It is this that gives Janet's moment of madness, in 
which she genuinely believes that the figment of her imagination that she calls her 'demon lover' has 
in fact been summoned from the underworld, its cruel pathos. The irony of the humour here is 
underlined by the ultimate (or perhaps the foundational) irony of the text: having been denied all 
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along the role of the Gothic heroine that she so desperately wishes to assume, her murder allows 
her the belated opportunity to become the tragic heroine she has so often fantasised herself to be.48 
 
Ways of Being: Madness and Subjectivity in Special and O Caledonia 
 
I now want to turn to how the representations of madness in both these novels link with the wider 
concerns of the thesis. As I have pointed out, many of the texts under discussion here deal with a 
central ambivalence regarding creativity, linking it with the possibility of subjective collapse, suicide, 
and the desire for dominance. O Caledonia is no exception. However, unlike in Alasdair Gray's 
novels, Barker is particularly attentive to the way that Janet's moment of madness is punished 
externally. This stands in contrast to both Gray and Warner: where Gray underscores the 
relationship between creativity and the desire for dominance throughout his writing and Warner 
highlights the way that a Romantic notion of artistic creativity is linked with a privileged gender and 
class position, Barker is primarily concerned with the punitive attitude that Janet's social world takes 
towards her unruly imagination. 
 
In this sense, her madness is brought about by the desire to conjure and live within other poss ible 
worlds. Her insistence on imbuing her everyday existence with romance, adventure and beauty is 
both elicited and punished by the environment in which she finds herself, and it is when she finally 
finds herself in the position to believe that her imagination has come to fruition—which is also the 
moment of madness—that she is punished most severely. Unlike Gray's novels, though, which seem 
to evince a profound suspicion of creative endeavour even as the protagonists seek it out at all costs, 
O Caledonia never implies that there is something inherently wicked about her imaginative 
inventions (despite the fact that, as I discussed earlier, she is repeatedly made to feel that they are 
somewhat freakish). Instead, the text presents us with both a form of madness related to an 
exuberant  desire for experience and life which elicits a disgusted and violent response. Jim's 
involvement in Janet's death and Lila's incarceration also suggests that Barker is highlighting an 
affinity between the two women's demises. In staging Lila's state of catatonic withdrawal from the 
world as one in which she loses all of her 'small reserve of appetite for life', the text thus represents 
a pole of madness brought about by the social suppression of desire  as the mirror image of female 
sexuality ruthlessly suppressed (p. 113).  
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This effect is quite different to Special's. In its representation of the penetration of neo-liberal 
modes of valuation into human subjectivity, it is perhaps the bleakest of all the novels under 
discussion here. Although it has affinities with Morvern Callar in its representation of the kind of 
'glassy' subjectivity described by James Annesley in Blank Fictions, Special appears to offer very little 
by way of relief.49 Where the affectlessness represented in both Morvern Callar and These Demented 
Lands at least gestures towards modes of being oppositional to a blankly capitalistic mode of being, 
in Special  the ghostly sense of other possibilities is evinced only through self -destructive madnesses, 
particularly Hen's anorexia. Although the novel's representations of madness thus offers a powerful 
critique of late capitalist social relations, it does nothing to provide an alternative: there is little to be 
salvaged from its airless mundanity apart from the desire to escape. Although there are moments of 
desolation in O Caledonia —Lila's predicament is a good example—hopelessness permeates every 
aspect of Special, from the truncated misery of its tone, to the way that the four girls interact with 
one another. A concomitant textual feature of its representations of mental distress is its emphasis 
on self-effacement, on reducing one's existence as far as possible, and on how these strategies of 
self-effacement at times function as a destructive form of self-assertion. Although many of its tropes 
are Gothic, in this respect it represents a move away from the Gothic text as a form which opens 
'new horizons' and enlarges the human 'sense of reality', and instead addresses itself to the question 
of what the genre can offer to those for whom any hint of 'depth' is prohibited.50 
 
What this finally suggests, then, is that the madnesses in Special and O Caledonia are products of 
very different conceptions of selfhood. In O Caledonia, Janet is consistently defined as mad because 
she does not or cannot affirm the evaluation of femininity and selfhood proposed by her social 
milieu, instead choosing to valorise the realm of literature and the intellect above all. The moment 
of madness at the end of the novel thus affirms this: she becomes mad precisely because her 
imagination runs away with her. A reading of madness in the novel thus indicates that the text 
considers, even if it does not entirely accept, the existence, indeed the desirability, of a semi -
autonomous aesthetic realm in which worth is not defined in monetary terms. Madness in the novel 
reflects this: it comes about when the people who are attempting to live according to terms which 
do not reflect the consensus values of their social world are punished for attempting to do so.  
 
The madness in Special, on the other hand, reflects the way that the girls in the novel understand 
their value as entirely dependent on their worth as commodities: the relentless focus on hair, 
clothes and make-up reflects the belief that they their worth is only comprehensible in the terms of 
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a hierarchy in which the person who is most desirable (Caz) is most valuable. Rather, then, than 
pursuing their own desires, the girls' forms of madness reflect what it is to live to be desired rather 
than to have desires. This is why the madnessess in Special are ones in which either desire (Hen's 
anorexia) or the notion of interiority per se (Caz's psychopathy) are denied. Although there is an 
intense cruelty to the madnessess in O Caledonia, then, it is not an unremittingly bleak novel, as it 
affirms both the centrality and the possibility of desire to its central characters, even if these desires 
are ultimately denied to them. By contrast, although Special presents the desire for escape in Hen's 
anorexia and Jules's rejection of sexual competition, we are not given any explicitly articulated 
alternatives to Caz's system of evaluation. We are thus presented with a world in which the only 
possible way of understanding desire is as the impetus to improve their position in the girls' complex 
internal hierarchy.  
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Chapter 5: The Fragile Rationality of Alice Thompson 
 
The history of madness as that which is excluded from rational discourse has a long history. 
Throughout the seventeenth-century, the accepted opinion was that 'madness was the loss of 
rational truth'.1 In this view, folly is 'the personification of irrationality'.2 As I discussed in my 
introduction, this stance was developed by Michel Foucault in Madness and Civilisation (1964), who 
argues not only that the rational and the mad are opposed, but that the rational i s constituted by 
the exclusion of madness. As he says, Madness and Civilisation is 'the archaeology' of the silencing of 
insanity, the story of that 'form of madness, by which men, in an act of sovereign reason, confine 
their neighbours, and communicate and recognise each other through the merciless language of 
non-madness'.3 Madness, in his influential view, is thus that which makes reason possible. Foucault's 
excavation of this relationship was an early iteration of one of the key intellectual concerns of the 
postmodern moment, which Charley Barker, in Madness in Post-1945 British and American Fiction 
(2010), has described as 'the insistent questioning of evidence and of the foundations of 
knowledge'.4 It was this restiveness with regard to notions of absolute truth which, she argues, led 
to the pervasive 'epistemological uncertainty' of postmodern narratives.5 
 
As I have drawn attention to throughout this thesis, both Fredric Jameson and Jean-François Lyotard 
theorise such uncertainties. Lyotard in particular is deeply sceptical about that which can be 
rationally explicated, arguing in The Postmodern Condition (1979) that such radical doubt is the 
postmodern mode par excellence. Jameson's scepticism towards the logic of grand narratives is 
clearest in his characterisation of postmodern subjectivity as schizoid. As I outlined in my 
introduction, here the logic of temporality, history and linear time is displaced by a spatial 
experiential mode comprised of 'pure material signifiers, or, in other words, a series of pure and 
unrelated presents in time'.6 This feature of postmodern life, he argues, means that postmodern 
subjects (or non-subjects) are characteristically unable to make historical sense of their own present. 
As such, his position is not so much one of scepticism towards empirical, objective truth as it is the 
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somewhat defeated recognition that the logic of late capitalist modes of production have rendered it 
impossible to achieve.7 
  
As we have seen, poststructuralist theoreticians have often married their epistemological concerns 
with metaphors of madness, particularly schizophrenia. There are also more general redolences 
between the two sets of concerns: madness, obviously, is a paradigmatic instance in which the mad 
person is unable to fully grasp the distinction between empirical truth, external reality, and their 
own thoughts. Alice Thompson's first novel, Justine (a reimagining of the Marquis De Sade's novels 
Justine, Or the Misfortunes of Virtue and Juliette), was published in 1996, six years after a novella, 
Killing Time (1990). She continues to publish today. As a writer publishing during and (arguably) in 
the immediate aftermath of the postmodern period, then, it is perhaps unsurprising that her work 
reflects many of the concerns of the theorists mentioned above. Like Foucault, she is deeply 
invested in the relationship between madness, irrationality and rationality. Like Lyotard and 
Jameson, she is concerned with the failure of grand narratives: of romance and desire, of the 
relations between men and woman, and of the historical record. Her postmodern tendencies are 
nowhere clearer than in her treatment of rationality: in the figures of Noah in Pandora's Box (1998) 
Edward, Lord Melfort and Iris in The Falconer (2008), and William Blake and Adam Verver in The 
Existential Detective (2012), each of the novels under discussion here show that the rational itself, if 
it is insisted on at the expense of all other considerations, becomes mad. In these texts, the reader 
encounters characters whose impetus to rationalise, to order and to explain spills into a form of 
insanity which is unable to cope with the irrational and inexplicable. Throughout the novels, it is the 
latter modes of experience which are consistently linked with life, with the body, and wi th the desire 
for justice. Thus, the most pressing form of madness for Thompson is not irrationality so much as the 
insistence on too great a degree of rationality, a rationality, which, by its exclusion of the modes of 
life mentioned above, becomes deathly both in the modes of being it offers, and in the violence 
which it allows.  
 
This indicates that there are some respects in which Thompson's work does not adhere nearly so 
easily to the postmodernist paradigms I have outlined above. Again and again, characters within her 
novels do gain some form of insight or understanding which extends beyond both the alienation, 
dislocation and confusion so characteristic of postmodern fiction, yet also beyond the emphasis on 
the empirical evidence of the senses against which fiction in this form was reacting. The body, the 
irrational and the mystic are significant concerns of her work, and insights into these subjective 
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modes almost exclusively come about through that paradigmatically mad phenomenon, 
hallucinations: Venus Dodge in Pandora's Box, Iris in The Falconer, and William Blake in The 
Existential Detective are all subject to visions of this type. Although they are mad in the sense that 
they represent objects that are not actually there, they nonetheless act as a form of insight, allowing 
the characters an affective understanding of their predicaments that they could not access through 
purely rational means. These moments suggest that Thompson is intrigued by the possibility of a 
transcendent core of selfhood, of secret or unknown knowledge, to which our conscious minds do 
not have access but to which we have recourse through dreams, imagination and fiction.  
 
Drawing attention to the role of madness in her work can, I hope, destabilise the dichotomy 
between the unified, coherent subject of liberal doctrine and its decentred postmodern antithesis. 
Her work is compelling precisely because it marries theoretical sophistication with a powerful 
representation of a primal, Nietzschean connection with natural forces. This is particularly true of 
her use of classical imagery, which draws on anti-enlightenment traditions in which madness is 
related to visionary experience and a pre-linguistic connection with the natural world. As I discuss in 
my introduction, there have been relatively few critical responses to Thompson's work, although this 
is now beginning to change. In particular, she has attracted the attention of critics such as Timothy C. 
Barker, Sarah Dunnigan and Monica Germanà, all of whom emphasise the connections between her 
work and the Gothic mode. The hope is that drawing together her interest in the irrational and the 
rational through a discussion of both her emphasis on the connection to the natural world and her 
engagement with classical imagery, this chapter will widen the modes by which critics are able to 
engage with her work. 
 
Pandora's Box 
 
The protagonist of Pandora's Box, Noah Close, is a scientist, a plastic surgeon whose professional 
investment in the perfecting of the human form is mirrored by his desire for access to totalising and 
totalised knowledge about humanity. The text thus has at its heart a figure who neatly (both 
figuratively and literally) represents an empirical, rationalistic system of conceptualising the world. 
His primary intellectual interest is signified by his name: he is a 'knower', a subject who is dominated 
by an urge towards the rational, the structural, the concrete, and the architectural. It is no 
coincidence that his namesake is the patriarch who was tasked with finding, capturing and classifying 
every form of animal in the antediluvian world: his entire worldview is based on the desire to 
classify, explain, and create knowledge. His surname gestures towards the limits of these systems of 
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knowledge: he is closed to forms of experience that do not fit his sense of how the world operates. 
Noah, then, is the model of a good empiricist—a scientist much like Adam Verver in The Existential 
Detective. Over the course of the novel, Noah refuses to countenance the presence of the irrational , 
the occult, and the unexplainable, insisting throughout that there must be a rational explanation for 
the mystery of his wife Pandora's disappearance, the visionary abilities of Venus Dodge, the psychic 
detective he hires to help him find her, and the presence of the sinister and enigmatic Lazarus who 
he perceives in some dim way to be connected with Pandora's death. The text shows that Noah's 
rationality is predicated on the silencing of the 'irrational' other figured through the mysterious 
Pandora. It fails completely, collapsing into madness, when she disappears. 
 
The novel establishes Noah's investment in the rational and the scientific early. His world, the 
narrator says, is 'certain and complete', a structure into which his patients slot 'like pieces into a 
jigsaw' (p. 17). His desire for flawless, perfectible knowledge manifests itself in his conviction that, 
given enough data, he would be able 'to unravel the mystery of what it means to be human' (p. 13). 
In its exclusion of those modes of knowledge associated with the body, with the affect, and with the 
non-linguistic, there is a element of clinical sterility, of deathliness, to this worldview which is very 
clear in Noah's presentation throughout the text, and which is echoed in the way that the vast 
majority of his professional life takes place in that paradigmatically sterile and deathly space, the 
hospital. 
 
Thompson's characterisation of Noah's worldview finds its theoretical counterpart in Toril Moi's 
critique of strictly empirical knowledge. Moi, speaking of the French feminism which married an 
epistemology informed by the poststructuralist critiques of rationalism mentioned above with a 
particular emphasis on the assumptions about gender and epistemology which underpins them, is 
well placed to critique Noah's understanding of the world. She begins by noting that 'the patriarchal 
philosopher... starts from the imaginary assumption that his knowledge can or ought to be 
complete; a flawless structure without lack.'8 The comparison with both Noah's world and his 
scientific project is striking: his intention is to 'unravel the mystery of what it means to be human' (p. 
13). However, as Moi goes on to observe, such a conception of knowledge exhibits a striking 
contradiction at its centre. Despite its pretensions to objectivity and completion, both philosophy 
and science, Moi contends, are 'activities based on the recognition of lack: it is the lack of knowledge 
which spurs the philosopher on to the conquest of new insights.'9 The central observation here is 
that Western philosophy proceeds from the ‘imaginary’ assumption that knowledge can or ought to 
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be complete, despite the obvious fact that were that the case, there could be no recognition of lack 
at all.  
 
This lack becomes apparent in the first section of the novel, in which we are given a sketch of Noah's 
relationship with his wife, the eponymous Pandora. He discovers her standing burning in a blue fire 
that does not harm him as he pulls her from the flames on his doorstep. After this initial encounter, 
Noah recreates her body from a hideous mass of scar tissue into a 'disturbingly perfect' vision of 
femininity (p. 24), and then marries her. The text suggests that his desire and love for his wife is 
inextricably bound up in the way he imagines himself as 'having created her, forged her out of fire' 
(p. 21). The aspects of Pandora that, he feels, 'add up to her' are all the parts of her that he has 
created: 'her smell, her limbs, her smile' (p. 21). Despite this confidence in his own absolute ability to 
know Pandora, however, Noah soon begins to discover disquieting evidence of her separateness. It 
is as his unease about the incompleteness of his knowledge of his wife develops that she begins to 
receive mysterious letters, letters 'in the same handwriting' which cause her to give 'the same smile' 
each time she reads them (p. 25). This enigmatic smile is not, the narrator says, so much given as 
taking 'something away' (p. 25): this something is precisely his confidence in his ability to know her 
completely, to understand the depths of her subjectivity. In the intimation of sexual jealousy here, 
knowing is also implicitly aligned with controlling. Initially, then, Thompson appears to figure 
Pandora precisely as she is named: she elicits from Noah the sense of absence, loss, and nullity 
which is comparable to the intellectual 'lack' or aporia identified by Moi as at the heart of Western 
rationalism, and which she contends is also figured through the body of women. 
 
Throughout the novel, Thompson foregrounds Pandora as a figure for this abstract lack. She is silent 
throughout, suggesting that she is in some way beyond or above language, discourse, and the 
reasonable, and, as we can see above, Noah consistently sees her only in terms of her body: her 
smell, limbs, smile are what add up to her. As Elaine Showalter argues, there is a ‘fundamental 
alliance between women and madness' in which women are 'typically situated on the side of 
irrationality, silence, nature and body, while men are situated on the side of reason, discourse, 
culture and the mind'.10 For Foucault, too, madness is silent: its inability to be understood through 
language and reason is its fundamental feature. Speaking of Pandora's silence, Noah comments: 
That she was mute only appealed to his sense of justice. How could someone who appeared 
to him so full of wisdom be cursed with words? He never wondered about it—that she came 
to him with no friends, no family, no history.... Her blankness offered him relief. 
 (p. 21) 
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This scene clearly draws on the association of the ideal of women with silence throughout Western 
philosophy. Anne Karpf, in her The Human Voice: The Story of a Remarkable Talent, goes into the 
history of feminine silence in depth. She characterises that relationship like this: 'According to 
Aristotle, "silence is a woman’s glory". Sophocles' Ajax declares "Silence gives proper grace to a 
woman." As a 16th century writer on rhetoric put it: "What becometh a woman first, and best of all, 
is silence. What second, silence. What third, silence. What fourth, silence."'11 Pandora's mutism, 
then, is not an iteration of subjective madness, but the very silencing of the irrational on which 
Noah's rationality is based. 
 
The association between the linguistic, cultural and political silencing of femininity has led to the 
madwoman becoming an 'emblematic figure' for contemporary feminists; in particular, Showalter 
argues, to those who posit the madwoman figure as the female author's double, 'the incarnation', as 
she puts it, of the 'anxiety and rage' of the female author's 'desire to escape male houses and male 
texts' (Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar's seminal text The Madwoman in the Attic (1979) is a 
prominent example here).12 The relationship between madness and silence within the novel draws 
on the insights of the French feminists Hélène Cixous and Luce Irigaray: in 'The Laugh of the 
Medusa', Cixous draws attention to the oppressive history of women's speechlessness and urges 
them to 'break out of the snare of silence'.13 One of Cixous's central theoretical insights is that 
language functions through 'dual hierarchical oppositions' in which 'ordering intervenes' and this law 
of duality 'organises what is thinkable'. In this hierarchised pairing, the feminine part of the dyad is 
always subordinated.14 She thus clearly links the silencing of women to the binaristic modes of 
thinking associated with Western philosophy. If man is defined by his rationality, women, as his 
binary other, must be irrational: in some way, then, mad. This is a radical madness on which sanity is 
predicated, rather than the madness formulated by Elaine Showalter which is recognised as an 
escape route for those who have no way of voicing protest, or of articulating their selfhood.15 For 
Showalter, the silence of madness is constitutive of 'the impasse confronting those whom cultural 
conditioning has deprived the very means of protest or self-affirmation'.16 
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In Pandora's Box, Thompson is very clearly drawing on the French tradition of thinking about 
madness in order to stage a disruption of this gender binary. This is signalled through the mysterious 
apparition of the figure that Noah moulds into Pandora, Venus's ambivalent gendering, and both 
Lazarus's transvestism and the fact that 'he' is in some way the same entity as Pandora. Thompson, 
then, is attempting what Luce Irigaray has described as the effort to 'disconcert the staging of 
representation...starting from an "outside" that is exempt, in part, from phallocratic law'.17 Écriture 
féminine, for Irigaray, is the attempt to found a literature that functions outside the parameters of 
masculinist, rationalised discourse. In other words, it is the attempt to imagine a world from a space 
of the imagination, one which is not subject to the same empirically defined norms as Western 
philosophy. It is also an attempt to revivify this world: to imbue it with an acceptance of the bodily, 
of the physical, of those elements which are paradigmatically irrational, into the sterile and deathly 
world of rational discourse. In this reading, Thompson's irrationality is linked to the imagination: to a 
world beyond, in Irigaray's words, the scientific realm as 'an irrefutable criterion of truth'. 18 By 
extension, her rationality is linked to deathliness: to the exclusion of the appetitive body and the 
transcendent soul.  
 
We can see feminine madness as a form of visionary insight in the figure of Venus Dodge, whose 
psychic powers of foresight allow her to envisage a  
 river of blood which flowed through the desert thick and still-moving. No natural life 
 inhabited the river or lived in its vicinity. The river and the country it flowed through were 
 places of death, the river causing destruction to whatever it touched. One night, limbs, 
 structures, protuberances, began to grow upwards out of this blood. These forms came 
 together in the body of a woman... as she rose up out of the river it was as if she were 
 made of glass. Because she was transparent it looked like the river of blood was flowing 
 through her veins. Only if people dared to walk up close to her could they see she had no 
 face.  
 (p. 70) 
As I discuss in relation to Will's visions in The Existential Detective below, this form of imaginative 
inhabitation of another reality is suggestive of a form of madness very different to Noah's. Clearly, 
this vision is related to the role of the body— a body which is not living, but which is formed of 
horrifying constituent parts (like the smell, limbs and smile which 'add up' to Pandora) that finally 
form, not a living person, but a figure made entirely of glass. Despite the fact that this figure is 
faceless, Noah immediately concludes it is Pandora, thus explicitly drawing attention to the 
deathliness inherent in his rationalised, positivistic mode of understanding her being in the world. 
The vision draws upon the conception of the schizophrenic world outlined by Sass: the 'place of 
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death' evokes his sense of the lifelessness of the pre-psychotic trema, while the glass-like and 
faceless figure both suggest the sense of depersonalisation attendant on schizoid experience. 
Venus's vision, then, is a representation of Noah's world. She grasps the relationship between the 
rational and the deathly. Thus, despite the fact that Venus's visions echo the characteristics of 
schizophrenic experience delineated by Sass, the text does not ask us to read Venus as mad in the 
same way that we are slowly being invited to understand Noah as such. Venus intuits a link between 
Noah's quest to find his wife and gendered violence, allowing her a realisation that is denied to Noah 
until the very end of the novel. 
 
The binaristic planes of reality (possible/impossible, true/false, man/woman, speech/silence) on 
which Noah exists, and which is symbolised by his relationship with Pandora,  collapses in the 
aftermath of her disappearance. The subordinated, silent half of the dyad has disappeared, leaving 
Noah utterly bereft. His sense of loss is not simply one of grief or mourning; it addresses his very 
sense of subjectivity and is construed as something akin to a 'soul -death' described by Louis Sass as 
symptomatic with schizophrenic experience. Quite simply, Noah feels himself to have simply ‘gone’ 
or ‘disappeared’: 
 He had been left with a series of gestures. It wasn't a question of pulling himself together. 
 He had tried and had been left with a cobweb, a cat's cradle, with empty squares between 
 lines of string. 
(p. 49) 
This is an excellent description of how Sass describes madness, explaining that whether it has been 
seen as lack of affective engagement, a failure of language and symbolic representation or the loss 
of freedom of action, it has always been ‘conceptualised as a diminishment or overwhelming of 
one's very personhood.’19 Such diminishment is very clear here: the self, previously sensed or 
intuited as present, solid and impenetrable, is suddenly recognised as absent, diminished to the 
point of non-existence. And yet, clearly, in some sense Noah does continue to exist, since there is a 
part of him which is able both to sense and to articulate this absence. It is this, then, that marks his 
madness: he is undergoing a form of living death. Thus, the absence of genuine personhood, Moi's 
'lack' or Cixous's 'silence' is not safely contained within the figure of Pandora, but insinuates itself 
into Noah's sense of his own being. Noah's experience of madness thus links him with the figure of 
Pandora: it is a moment in which he begins to recognise what it is to not be fully human. 
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Like many of the mad figures under discussion in this thesis, after this intimation of his own soul-
death, Noah attempts to 'pull himself together': in other words, to reassert his power as the bearer 
of privileged masculine rationality. However, in so doing he comes to realise that his own 'self' is 
somehow 'empty'. The comparisons of his selfhood to 'a cobweb', a 'cat's cradle' or 'empty squares 
between lines of string' are all significant (p. 49). The moment is a postmodern form of the 
'individual disintegration' which defines madness for Corrine Saunders and Jane Macnaughton.20 
Equally, it could be read as an iteration of the 'negative symptoms' identified by Charley Barker as 
characteristic of postmodern madness, such as blunting of affect, poverty of thought and apathy.21 
The analogies by which he figures his sense of himself echo the straight lines to which Noah is so 
attuned, as if he not only sees his world in such terms but conceptualises his selfhood through them 
too. The suggestion that his subjectivity is somehow cobweb-like both indicates the fragility of his 
state of being, and directs the reader towards a gothic sense of deathliness of the kind associated 
with the haunted house or the graveyard. The cat's cradle comparison is also highly suggestive. It is 
indicative of a sense of self which is both a puzzle and a delicately balanced trap. At this point, he 
believes himself to know what the puzzle is, too: he needs Pandora to resolve the puzzle, to 'find 
himself' once again, and to find his way back from the soul-death he is experiencing. In this 
characterisation of madness, Noah may be able to reassert his sanity through the application of his 
intellect: he sees his madness is a puzzle to be solved, and if he can do it he will be able to reassert 
normality. As we can see from Venus's vision, however, his madness is far more fundamental than 
that: the recognition of the emptiness of his subjectivity is not simply attendant on losing Pandora, 
but a fundamental feature of a mode of viewing the world which excludes the bodily, the irrational, 
and the feminine. 
 
Unsurprisingly, then, Noah's need to assert his intellectual powers and find clearly defined answers 
to his questions about his wife's disappearance is thwarted. Indeed, the desire is, it is suggested, in 
itself mad. This is most clearly indicated by Noah's abduction of Venus Dodge. When she regains 
consciousness after a blow to the head, her very first address to him is to demand 'are you mad?' (p. 
65). The answer to this question is in fact yes, he is. However, his madness is not solely a psychotic 
break evinced through the 'soul-death' described above. Rather, he is mad because, despite the 
uncanny appearance of the 'disturbingly perfect' woman he later makes his wife,  he has failed to 
grasp the fundamental insufficiency of his own mode of understanding the world. It also draws 
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attention to the ethical dimensions of his insanity: his madness is dangerous, allowing him to ignore 
all the claims to respect and decency placed on him by other characters within the text.  
 
The unity of the Pandora/Lazarus figure is revealed at the moment that Noah murders Lazarus, thus 
destroying Noah's illusion that throughout the novel he has been searching for justice for Pandora at 
precisely the same point at which he realises that there is no clear distinction between the realms of 
the masculine and the feminine. It is at this point that he begins to fear he may be going mad, 
despite the fact that the reader is aware that he has been going insane for some time. This suggests 
that his sense of sanity is entirely dependent on a concrete and inviolable distinction between 
masculine and feminine; in other words, it is predicated on the binary logic of masculine and 
feminine which Thompson has spent so much of the novel dissecting. Ironically, the moment at 
which he fears he is going mad is in fact the moment at which he becomes sane, as it is at precisely 
this point that he recognises the way that he has conceptualised the world up until this point is 
utterly moribund. The realisation, which he recognises as madness, is in fact more like an epiphany: 
it is here that he realises that an entire system of thought, the patriarchal 'grid' represented by the 
'empty squares' through which he envisages his own psyche, is fundamentally unable to provide him 
with a workable sense of subjectivity. The gendered epistemology he lives by created Pandora: she is 
the embodiment of the absence identified by Moi. It is also the cause of her disappearance: the 
'perfect' vision of femininity that he has created is revealed to be untenable. Pandora's 
disappearance, then, is a metaphor for the collapse of the gendered binary between logic and 
reason on which his very sense of subjective coherence depends. 
 
Shoshana Felman, writing of the relationship between fiction, madness and philosophy, argues that 
the madman and the philosopher are diametrically opposed to one another: 
 The philosopher ends up getting his bearings, orientating himself, in his fiction: he only 
 enters it in order to abandon it. The madman, on the other hand, is engulfed by his own 
 fiction... madness is the non-mastery of its own fiction.22 
Rather than being a philosopher, Noah is revealed as a madman. His fiction, which is that the 
entirety of the world can be rationally explained, is all -encompassing, and is based on the assertion 
of a gendered binary which collapses when the silenced, 'irrational' other on whom it depends 
disappears. Madness thus stands revealed as a form of privilege: the privilege of simply silencing 
those aspects of the world which one does not wish to acknowledge. Furthermore, the 'pure' and 
'streamlined' conviction with which Noah pursues his goal of the ultimate truth of his wife's 
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disappearance is presented not simply as a dubious adjunct to a commitment to a particular form of 
knowledge, but specifically as an aspect of his privileged position as an educated white man (p. 85). 
Throughout, the certitude with which he pursues his ends—which is a product of his social 
situation—actually further exposes him to the charge of madness. This indicates that rather than 
situating the (educated, white and middle-class) male as the bearer of a scientific rationalism, such 
figures are in fact most likely to be the ones to deviate from reason 'confidently and with firm 
conviction'.23 
 
In this respect, the novel can thus be read as a rather neat inversion of Showalter's aforementioned 
argument that women have been situated on the side of 'unreason, madness and the body'.24 
Although it is undeniably true that the women in the novel are situated on the side of silence, nature 
and the body, it is the male figure, who, although undoubtedly associated with reason, discourse, 
culture and the mind, is revealed as insane. Of the three novels discussed in this chapter, Pandora's 
Box is clearly the most heavily informed by the postmodern epistemological concerns with 
rationalised and binaristic modes of thought. The entire text can be read as an exploration of the 
implications and tensions within these highly theoretical discourses. In interview, Thompson has 
explicitly drawn attention to her early novels' preoccupation with gender roles, acknowledging that 
'gender is an important part of my earlier books. In Justine and Pandora’s Box there is a questioning 
of narrow categories'; and indeed, it is difficult not to notice the attentiveness with which Thompson 
addresses gender.25 As I go on to argue in the next two sections, it is as if this text clears the ground 
for Thompson's later work, in which her representations of madness, although clearly informed by 
the theorisation of gender and rationality, begin to concern themselves with the ramifications of a 
rationalistic modes of thought in the spheres of both aesthetics and broader political questions. In 
particular, her exploration of fascism and appeasement both fall under the rubric of different forms 
of madness.     
 
The Falconer 
 
In The Falconer, the book’s primary exploration of insanity comes in two forms. The novel continues 
Pandora's Box's fascination with hallucinatory experiences, this time attributed to the heroine, Iris  
who comes to Glen Almain under the guise of working as a secretary in order to discover the truth 
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behind her sister Daphne's disappearance. The Melfort family for whom she works is haunted by 
madness, from the psychological breakdown of the fragile, neurasthenic Louis, to the insanity which 
drives Lord Melfort and his older son Edward into the hands of the Nazism. I want to begin my 
analysis of the family with a memorable scene in which Iris observes a small room containing a 
cabinet of curiosities, which serves as a retreat for the fragile, neurasthenic Louis. A psychological 
casualty of the First World War, Louis is an example of one of the psychiatric patients who ushered 
in the era of what Elaine Showalter calls 'psychiatric modernism', in which therapeutic practices 
moved away from a biological (and highly gendered) understanding of hysteria. Throughout, 
Thompson presents Louis's gender performance as highly ambivalent, situating the text in a way that 
makes it clear that the association of masculinity with the rational and femininity with madness is 
under scrutiny.26 
 
The room itself is a paean to the rational: the ceiling is decorated with a detailed trompe l'oeil of 
stellar constellations, and the floor is chequered white and black 'like a chess-board' (p. 40). The 
references are to fields which are paradigmatically both rational and related to the creation of 
patterns and movement: both the chessboard and the star-map are indicative of a concern with 
knowing the correct move, plotting the true course, and making the most rational decision.  The 
contrast between the decor of the room and its contents, which include 'hybrid creatures, the 
fingers of saints, and poison antidotes taken from the stomachs of Persian goats' prompts Iris to ask 
herself how Louis might categorise his curios, concluding that the room is 'a deeply irrational place, 
made to look rational with its particular categorisation and ordering' (p. 40). This comment draws 
attention to what might be termed the rhetoric or figurisation of rationality: the room, as Iris 
observes, is highly irrational, but nonetheless appears to be rational because it is arranged in a way 
that signifies order. Its irrationality is signified precisely because it fails to acknowledge that the 
items within it are simply not available to the ordering, rationalising impulse that the novel attempts 
both to represent and disavow. Here, then, Thompson is addressing similar concerns to those of 
Pandora's Box. 
 
As I mentioned in the introduction, I see this novel as an exploration of less paradigmatically 
postmodern iterations of madness than Pandora's Box. In my view, the novel is indicative of 
Thompson's developing interest in madness as an expression of instinctual, mystical and 
undifferentiated forms of experience. This is perhaps indicated by the curios above, all of which have 
affinities with the irrational and mystic. Although her interest in over-valorised forms of rationality is 
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still clearly present, as we can see from the section analysed above, the development of Iris's 
understanding of the world, as well as the forms of over-rationalised experiences in the novel, can 
be more productively understood as informed by the Dionysian ecstatic madness and Apollonian 
aesthetic discipline as theorised in Friedrich Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy (1872). This is largely 
because the text very clearly signals its investment in classical forms, and in particular, the classical 
dialectic between the Apollonian and Dionysian realms of experience he delineates. Both Iris and 
Daphne are named after figures in Greek myth; Iris, the rainbow goddess, is the messenger between 
the world of gods and the world of men in The Iliad (although not The Odyssey, in which that role is 
played by Hermes). The Daphne myth is equally significant: In Ovid's Metamorphoses, Daphne, a 
wood nymph, metamorphoses into a laurel tree after Eros punishes Apollo for scorning his powers 
by compelling him to love Daphne and Daphne to hate him. While in conversation with Iris, Edward 
explicitly draws attention to both these myths. There are casual references to both the Daphne myth 
and the Dionysian tradition throughout the novel: before attending a dance with Edward, Iris 
encounters Louis and his younger sister, Muriel, who looks, Iris thinks, like 'a nymph turning into a 
tree, her thoughts growing as convoluted as the twisting vine', thus referring directly to Daphne's 
metamorphosis into a laurel tree (p. 98). Equally, while attending the dance with Edward, the 
narrator comments that Iris sees the dance as 'a third person... no, more than a person, a laughing 
god that lived in their steps and moving bodies. A laughing Bacchanalian god was dissolving the 
material world around them' (p. 101).27 The text, then, does more than simply draw on the tradition 
of Bacchanalian insanity and Apollonian discipline: Thompson explicitly signals the significance of 
Nietzsche's thought to the novel. 
 
In the Nietzschean  formation, the Apollonian tendency is one of 'form',  'freedom from wilder 
impulses', 'measured restraint' and the 'principium individuationis' (principle of individuation) of the 
human psyche, which, Nietzsche argues, is represented through the 'plastic' arts such as statuary 
that give formal, comprehensible expression to the only partially comprehensible 'realities of the 
everyday'.28 The Apollonian is thus quite clearly associated with Edward Melfort. Not only does he 
consistently attempt to present himself to Iris as the voice of reason, contrasting her 'hysteria' with 
his own rationality or 'freedom from wilder impulses', but Thompson makes the parallelisms 
between Edward and Apollo abundantly clear: not only is he in love with a figure called Daphne 
(who, like the Apollo of myth, he loves to the exclusion of all others, even after her metamorphoses), 
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but he is actually a sculptor himself. Furthermore, he sculpts a figure of Daphne, although into stone 
rather than wood, further echoing the Apollo/Daphne myth. 
 
That said, Thompson's presentation of the Apollonian aspects of existence is substantially more 
ambivalent than Nietzsche's. Rather than the 'pleasure and wisdom and beauty' of the Apollonian 
concern with 'calm repose' achieved through attentiveness to aesthetic form, Edward Melfort's 
Apollonian tendencies mask a political ruthlessness and unimaginative rationalism highly redolent of 
Noah's stringent rationality in Pandora's Box.29 My suggestion here is that Thompson's version of the 
Apollonian continues her critique of the insanity of overly rationalised modes of discourse, while 
giving her more space to explore the transcendent, mystic aspects of experience which fall under the 
rubric of the Dionysian frenzy or madness, particularly hallucinations. The Falconer thus draws 
together Thompson's previous, more typically postmodern concerns with rationality and madness, 
with an older tradition of commentary on madness that allows her to consider experiences such as a 
sense of unity with nature or natural phenomena for which there is perhaps somewhat less room in 
poststructuralist theory. This is clearest in Thompson's presentation of Iris. Like Noah, her trajectory 
throughout the novel is one in which she begins by rejecting any forms of experience other than 
those available to rational inquiry. As in the presentation of Louis, this destabilises the association of 
masculinity with rationality and femininity with the irrational. However, as the novel progresses, she 
begins to accept the presence of modes of being unavailable to rationalised modes of thought 
through her experiences of Dionysian madness, hallucinatory visions, and a transcendent 
communion with nature.  
 
Iris's initial impatience with that which falls outside the realm of what can be rationally explained 
come to light in an exchange with Lady Melfort, in which Iris tells her employer that she believes 'in 
rational thought. Only with reason can mankind progress. As long as we have reason, we  have 
nothing to fear. Reason will always master emotion' (p. 15). Iris's commitment to the rational plays 
out in the formal qualities of the text. Like Louis, she is initially invested in the rhetoric or formalism 
of rationality, thus suggesting that she, like the Apollonian dream artists, teases meaning and 
structure from what Nietzsche calls the 'partial comprehensibility of everyday reality' (p. 21). For 
example, on the first page of the novel Iris encounters a 'finely drawn' man who seems 'slightly 
abstract, as if his face was an idealised version of a more primitive self' (p. 1).  Both the idealisation 
and the abstraction here gesture towards an Apollonian sensibility, as does her later attention to the 
'careful incoherence' of dahlias and hollyhocks, and the 'interweaving patterns' of the roses, 
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lavender and box-hedges' (p. 4). She also notices the 'triangular face' and 'angular features' 
characteristic of members of the Melfort family (pp. 5-6). However, Iris's search for significance 
amongst these abstracted formal features begins to collapse as the patterns she sees emerging 
become increasingly enigmatic, obscuring rather than lending clarity to her search for the meaning 
of her sister's disappearance. The relationship between this mode of spatial conceptualisation and 
Iris's rationalism is made most explicit in her conversation with Hector, the gardener, in which she 
glances out of the window 'towards the wild fields beyond the garden. The fields were dissected by 
the small wooden windows of the greenhouse, and she felt as if she were looking at a puzzle made 
up of very small squares' (p. 16).  
 
These formal qualities do not leave the reader with the impression that these puzzles have a 
solution; rather, they become enigmatic in their own right, resistant to any form of meaning she may 
attempt to impose on them. The experience has redolences with schizophrenia: In Madness and 
Modernism, Louis Sass quotes Giorgio de Chorico as commenting of his schizophrenic trema that it 
gave the impression that 'there are more enigmas in the shadow of a man who walks in the sun than 
in all the religions of the past, present and future.'30 For Chorico, these enigmas were not there to be 
solved: rather, he experienced them as 'an eternal proof of the senselessness of the universe.'31 The 
basic contention of Madness and Modernism, as Sass himself says, is that schizophrenic experience 
can be understood as the result of Apollonian rather than Dionysian urges, 'a heightening rather 
than a dimming of conscious awareness, and an alienation not from reason but from the emotions, 
instincts and the body.'32 We can see this Apollonian alienation at play as Iris first arrives at Glen 
Almain. She notices the ‘stone statues of men and women, mottled by age, stood elegantly 
positioned about the gardens, as if in a petrified dance’ (p. 4). Similarly, she reflects, ‘sometimes she 
felt like King Midas. Everything she touched turned to gold. Her inability to love transformed 
everything it touched into metal’ (p. 7). Almost all the references to  the plastic arts function in a 
similar way: an oil painting hanging on the wall depicts Lord and Lady Melfort ‘standing amongst 
classical ruins in a desert landscape’ (p. 8) bespeaks desiccation and lifelessness, and, according to 
Iris, the face of Louis seems as if it ‘had been sculpted away’, similarly evoking a sense of sculpture 
as in some way deathly (p. 9). Rather than the 'pleasure and wisdom and beauty of the principia 
individuatis' described by Nietzsche, we once again see here the principle of individuation's ossifying 
and petrifying forces; the tendency towards coldness, isolation, lack of emotional engagement and 
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spontaneity which are also characteristic of Edward and which lead Iris toward a formalistic 
rationalisation which has strong affinities with how schizophrenic experience is delineated by Sass.33 
 
Nietzsche contrasts this Apollonian tendency with Dionysian madness. In his 'Attempt at Self-
Criticism', an introduction he wrote to The Birth of Tragedy appended in 1886, he describes the 
break with Apollonian concern with form as a simultaneous sense of 'tremendous horror' and 
'blissful rapture' which 'rises up from the innermost depths of man, even of nature, as a result of the 
same collapse of the pincipium individuationis'.34 Nietzsche argues that this Dionysian madness 
reflects 'the earlier Hellene's good severe will towards the image of everything fearful, evil, 
enigmatic, destructive, disastrous' originated in 'joy, in strength, in overflowing health, in an excess 
of abundance'.35 He ends by asking if it is not possible to have ‘healthy neuroses’: neuroses that 
allow the neurotic an access of understanding that would not otherwise be available to them.36 
Rather than Venus's hallucinations in Pandora's Box, then, which merely allow her insight into the 
deathliness of Noah's worldview, insanity here is linked with desire: for Nietzsche it is a life-affirming 
longing, a movement towards either beauty or ugliness, but always towards some form of 
experience. Associated with the Bacchanalian revels celebrating Dionysian abandon, it is orientated 
towards the sensuous dissolution of individual identity and towards a transcendent, mystical unity 
with the crowd and with nature.37 Although, as we shall see later, the Dionysian is associated with 
violence towards others, it is in some respects a life-affirming experience rather than the 'death-in-
life' form of madness evinced by the Apollonian rationalism of Iris's earlier experiences, and the 
forms madness has taken in my discussions in other chapters. 
 
Iris's trajectory can therefore be understood as a move from Apollonian restraint toward Dionysian 
abandon provoked by her sexual desire for Edward, her affinity for the natural world surrounding 
Glen Almain, and the dissolution of identity she experiences both in her hallucinatory identifications 
with her dead sister Daphne and with the mythological 'Beast' of Glen Almain (p. 54). She is gripped 
by strange urges to 'bring Daphne [her sister] back from the dead' (p. 118), and, when she realises 
she is in love with Edward, begins to see visions of Daphne 'calling to her through her black eye of 
jealousy. And where once the black eye seemed solid, now it seemed hollow' (p. 119).  The black eye 
represents Iris's desire to become Daphne, or to be like Daphne; the fact that it now 'seems hollow' 
is suggestive of the possibility of passing through the eye and in some way becoming Daphne's 
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double. These experiences at times provoke her into believing that she may be running mad. 
Towards the end of the novel, she 'keeps seeing Daphne in the glen' and asks Hector, the head 
gardener, if she is not in fact 'going mad' (p. 93). Hector's response to this is that 'there's a fine line 
between insanity and fantasy. It's just your imagination' (p. 93). Later, she believes that she must 
leave Glen Almain or she 'will risk losing' her mind (p. 95). This is insanity in a very different form to 
the Apollonian over-rationalisations described above: in its visionary abandonment of discrete, 
individual identity it is clearly drawing on the dissolution of selfhood in a Dionysian form. 
 
This fall away from a rationalist, structural mode of viewing the world is reflected in Iris's visual 
imagination: where once all was abstract clarity, her thoughts are now blurred and hazy, full of the 
low 'hum' of the bees and choked with the pollen that makes the air dense (p. 94). Instead of 
understanding her surroundings as comprised of discrete, individual objects and people, she begins 
to feel the pressure of proximity and association. Her thoughts are no longer clearly delineated but 
slippery and changeable. So, for example, she believes that stealing Daphne's dress and wearing it to 
a ball that Edward has invited her to will ignite his previously dormant desire for her (p. 100). Iris 
develops a sense of luxurious languor: she feels that she is 'disappearing into the sensation of the 
night sky', and her hair 'gradually uncurled itself from her chignon to fall in tendrils about her face' 
(p. 100). This part of the text links an impression of mixed identity with the natural world: the 
tendrils of her hair are suggestive of plant-life, and, obviously, there is a strong sense of 
commingling, of identities dissolving and falling into each other. The sense that her mind is losing its 
clarity and distinction is accompanied by violent and irrational impulses: angered by Louis, she asks 
herself whether even she could 'murder in a moment of madness, a moment of passion?' (p. 99). 
The call of the irrational, the mysterious and the supernatural becomes hallucinatory: her attempt to 
leave Glen Almain is foiled because she cannot help but be drawn back by its voice, which calls to 
her 'like the undulating note of the curlew' (p. 95). 
 
Thus, Iris's encounters with the possibilities of Dionysian madness liberate her sensibility from its 
insistence on the Apollonian rational. In this sense, the hallucinatory moments within the text are 
figured as in some respects salutary, both in terms of Iris's own sense of selfhood, and particularly 
her sexuality, and allow her space to recognise her ethical intuitions about the repellent nature of 
Nazism and the Melfort's involvement in it. However, the Nietzschean ecstasy of madness is highly 
ambiguous, representing an unnerving dissolution of identity as well as a liberation from rational 
modes of thought. This is indicated by Iris's strange, troubling dreams, in which she imagines herself 
to be pursued by the beast of Glen Almain. As in the Dionysian ecstasies, the boundaries between 
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human and beast start to blur; her dreams are so intense that she begins to feel that she is 
becoming the creature, asking 'was she the beast, or the beast her?' (p. 55). Discussing this section 
of the novel in Contemporary Scottish Gothic, Timothy C. Barker draws attention to Iris's 
metamorphosis, arguing that her 'attention to the natural world becomes a way to trace changing 
conceptions of the self, environment and nature', thus challenging the radical separation between 
human and non-human worlds.38 Thompson's vision, Barker suggests, is one in which animality is 
multiple, and elides the distinction between one and many. Although I broadly agree with this claim, 
Barker here seems to miss quite how disquieting Iris's sense of her affinity with the beast is: it is not 
simply a 'tracing' of the changing relationship between human and animal, but a collapsing of the 
distinction between the two. This then, is the threatening form of Dionysian madness, which 
represents both an opening out of experience, and a threat to the stability of Iris's status as a human 
being. As such, Thompson does not ignore the deathly, violent aspects of Dionysian experience, but 
simply presents them as the antithesis of the Apollonian forms of madness mentioned earlier. 
 
Throughout the novel, the innovation Thompson has made is to concretise the logical and scientific 
formalism of the enlightened, rational mode and its Dionysian opposite through her use of visual 
analogy. Unlike Nietzsche's version of the Apollonian, however, Thompson, as in Pandora's Box, 
suggests that Iris's concerns with formalism, 'measured restraint'—the rationalism which makes the 
everyday comprehensible—is underpinned by an overwhelming desire for power and control. The 
connection is made explicit in her conversation with Heinrich Berger, the mysterious German who i s 
revealed to be a spy working for the Nazi authorities. The relation between understanding and 
domination is drawn out by Iris's comment that the British attitude towards the natural world is one 
in which 'we tend to think we have dominion over it' (p. 94). Iris's worldview previously to her 
encounter with Dionysian hallucinatory madness combines a tendency to see the world as if 
applying a grid-reference to it—almost as a concretisation of the logocentric 'grids' discerned by 
Luce Irigaray—with a deadening, depersonalising attitude towards the world in which she is unable 
to form connections with the other figures within the novel, or to the natural world. Her vision in 
this part of the novel, then, is imbricated in an ideological attitude towards the world which is 
interested in it only in terms of a puzzle to be solved, or an intellectual problem to which a solution 
would provide something useful.39  
                                                                 
38
 Timothy C. Barker, Contemporary Scottish Gothic: Mourning, Authenticity and Tradition  (London: Palgrave, 
2014), p. 117. 
39
 Irigaray, p. 28. 
159 
 
Initially, then, Iris's relation to the natural world can productively be read as the aesthetic 
manifestation of an 'enlightened science' which 'contributes only the idea of systematic unity, the 
formal elements of fixed conceptual coherence': what Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer in The 
Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) call 'the schematism of pure understanding', rationalism untainted 
or unencumbered by emotions.40 It is striking that when Iris realises that the Melforts are colluding 
with the Nazi authorities, and that Edward allowed Daphne to die in order to keep the family's secret 
from the British authorities, that she declares to Edward that 'it is you who have lost your mind' (p. 
131). Nazism, then, is represented in the novel as an insane ideological formation. This is also 
foregrounded earlier on in the novel. Although it has not yet been described in terms of insanity, 
Lady Melfort identifies the lethal contradictions of totalitarian ideology and links this with a 
conflicting or problematic relationship with 'reason' on the one hand, and the natural world or 
'instinct' on the other. While speaking to her husband, she says: 
The Nazis are full of contradictions. Herr Hitler loves to say that he 'thinks with his blood'. He 
boasts of Germany's romantic neopaganism, her worship of forests and nature and strange 
beasts. Yet their dogma is rigid and ideological, their horrible architecture full of straight 
lines. National Socialism is profoundly unnatural. Instinct and reason, reason and instinct. 
They are false opposites. We live them both. We should deny neither.  
 (p. 50)  
Here, Lady Melfort identifies the hypocrisy at the heart of National Socialism. Although the imagery 
used by the Nazis evokes the Nietzschean Dionysian—the worship of forest and nature, strange 
beasts and the romance of the blood—this rhetoric is actually deployed in the service of the 
unrelenting logic of the absolute annihilation of opposition: an Apollonian stringency alluded to here 
by the 'horrible architecture full of straight lines' and the rigid and ideological dogma of fascism. 
Here, then, we see a rhetoric of romanticism or paganism to match the rhetoric of rationality 
deployed by Louis, Iris and Edward throughout the text. 
 
This tension is represented by the Melfort's collusion in Berger's plot to develop biological weapons. 
In her representation of the ploy to weaponise the natural  world, Thompson echoes a long history of 
ambivalence about technological development most famously articulated by thinkers associated 
with the Frankfurt school. As I mentioned above, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer comment on 
totalitarian and totalising uses of technology in The Dialectic of Enlightenment. Marcuse, in his early 
essay 'Some Social Implications of Modern Technological Efficiency', argues that   
 National Socialism is a striking example of the ways in which a highly rationalized and 
 mechanized economy with the utmost efficiency in production can also operate in the 
 interest of totalitarian oppression and continued scarcity. The Third Reich is indeed a form of 
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 “technocracy”: the technical considerations of imperialistic efficiency and rationality 
 supersede the traditional standards of profitability and general welfare. The organization of 
 the governmental, industrial and party bureaucracy—all of which constitute the daily 
 implements of terror—follow the lines of greatest technological efficiency.41 
Marcuse’s critique here focuses on technology as a system of domination, arguing that the 
'rationalised' and 'mechanised' economy is organised such as to constitute the 'daily implements of 
terror'. As Douglas Kellner argues in his introduction to the essay, this early work 'perhaps 
underplays the obvious irrationality of National Socialism'.42 The irrationality, however, is not lost on 
Lady Melfort. It was also addressed by Hannah Arendt, who, in 'On The Nature of Totalitarianism: An 
Essay in Understanding', speaks of how 'the operation that both Hitler and Stalin performed on their 
respective ideologies was to take them dead seriously, and that meant driving their pretentious 
implications to their logical extreme'.43 This stringent logicality, she argues, 'permeates the whole 
structure of totalitarian movements....Everything that stands in the way of this kind of reasoning—
reality, experience, and the daily network of human relationships and interdependence—is 
overruled'.44 Again, then, this suggests a kind of Apollonian madness. Rather than being able to tease 
out the half-understood meaning of life through an attentiveness to formal questions and aesthetic 
concerns, this 'form of reasoning'—the 'straight lines' of totalitarian domination —ignores 'reality, 
experience, and the daily network of human relationships' alluded to by Arendt above. 
 
In her article on Thompson, Sarah Dunnigan argues that the novel's position on rationality is that 
'war...is the abandonment of reason'.45 I would repurpose this insight by arguing that throughout the 
text, war stands as the perversion of reason, in which two forms of logic—both of which can be 
valuable on their own terms—mutually reinforce one another in the most destructive way possible. 
The logic of Nazism is revealed to be a form of insanity based on deliberate ignorance of reality 
yoked with a rhetoric of the natural—the romance of blood, soil, forests and strange beasts—to 
produce a form of insanity which both deliberately ignores the reality of everyday expe rience and 
performs the contradiction of harnessing 'natural' impulses toward violent destruction in the  service 
of absolute domination.  
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Neither Fascism nor its avatar in the novel, Edward Melfort, is associated solely with Dionysian or 
Apollonian forms of madness: although Edward's characterisation is quite clearly informed by the 
characterisation of Apollonian tendencies, he is also in some respects a Dionysian figure. He returns 
from the First World War unscathed because he finds it 'easy to kill',  and, Louis suggests, is 'a man 
only of his senses, of his own pleasure' (p. 98). His physical vitality, too, speaks to what Nietzsche 
describes as the 'healthy neuroses' of Dionysian madness.46 Equally, in some instances, as in Iris's 
moments of hallucinatory madness, irrational experience works to allow the subject access to forms 
of life not previously available to them. Iris's madness tempers her rationalism: in other words, to 
use Marcuse's term, it becomes 'critical rationality' which is capable of questioning the assertions of 
the privileged, aristocratic and masculine power of the Melforts and asserting her sense of ethical 
balance. 
 
What is both intriguing and unsettling about The Falconer is that, unlike Pandora's Box, it disrupts 
our sense that these two  modes of understanding the world are necessarily antagonistic. The 
interplay between rational and instinctual forms of experience are presented as mutually informing 
one another, and indeed, madness can be derived from either form. Importantly, while the radical 
distinction between the two is presented as inherently problematic, a synthesis of these modes of 
experience does not guarantee sanity either. As in Lanark and 1982, Janine, both Edward's madness, 
and the madness of fascism, is linked to the desire to dominate. However, Thompson's work stands 
in marked contrast to Alasdair Gray's, in that in Gray's work there is a strongly implied set of 
normative assumptions about what the 'right' and the 'good' is, and in which madness is figured as a 
deviation from it. In Thompson, however, madness can entail either deviance from the good or a 
recognition of it: it is thus ethically neutral, allowing either an access of insight or the potential for a 
destructiveness which is enhanced by the ruthless efficiency of its own logics. 
 
The Existential Detective 
 
This problematisation of rationality is evident throughout The Existential Detective. The detective of 
the title himself, William Blake, is rational by profession, yet Thompson's choice of name clearly 
indicates her concern with visionary hallucinations. Like his namesake, Will Blake is subject to 
visions. Furthermore, the text tells us that he has been prescribed antipsychotic medication, and 
barely makes a distinction between these fits and his 'memories, imagination and thoughts' (p. 25). 
This, then, is a representation of what we might describe as florid madness. In his introduction to 
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William Blake: Selected Poetry and Prose, David Punter suggests that Blake should be understood to 
belong to ‘the small and rather little-read band of mid-eighteenth-century poets of madness and 
dissolution—Chatterton, Smart, Cowper—while being vastly superior to them in his powers of 
integration’, rather than in his usual position as a precursor to the Romantic movement.47 The 
relationship between the poet's madness and his poetry is also discussed by Michael O'Sullivan. He 
draws on Blake's comment in 'There Is No Natural Religion' that 'man’s perceptions are not bounded 
by organs of perception; he perceives more than sense (tho’ ever so acute) can discover' to argue 
that for him, hallucinations have objects that are ‘of a different order of significance from the 
objects of perception'.48 
 
It is this 'different order of significance' that Thompson emphasises in naming her detective Blake. As 
with Iris's hallucinatory madness, the namesake gestures towards liminal forms of knowledge that 
cannot be fully integrated into a rational system of meaning. In this reading, his madness figures 
those parts of life and experience which are simply too complex, or too unbearable, to be thought 
through in rational terms. Although his visions are in some sense delusory, they nonetheless inform 
his practice as a detective and allow him to apprehend the murderer, Adam Verver. The 
hallucinations thus fall somewhere between the gift of insight or prophecy and a complete failure of  
his reason. There are numerous instances of this throughout the text. For example, Blake ’s intuition 
that his personal life is in some inscrutable way significant to the case is simultaneously delusional 
and accurate: his daughter, the missing Emily, was abducted by Adam Verver (who had been having 
an affair with Olivia, Will's now ex-wife) and had lost her memory after a struggle to escape from the 
cellar of an arcade in which the Verver family have an interest. Throughout the novel he hallucinates 
encounters with his daughter, in which she repeatedly tells him that she has been close to him all 
the time. As in Iris's visions of Daphne, this hallucination is mad and yet true. Will, then, is both mad 
and not mad—occupying, as Thompson so brilliantly puts it, 'the narrow edge just before the 
vertiginous drop, still in the part of the Venn diagram where sanity and insanity converged' (p. 90).  
 
Like Iris in The Falconer, Will's sense of the physicality of the world reflects the way that he 
conceptualises his life. Unlike Iris's habitual conceptualisation of the world in terms of grids, dots, 
lines and maps, however, Will sees people in terms of their indeterminacy: he consistently interprets 
faces in terms of disguises and masks. Louise Verver, the missing woman at the heart of the case in 
The Existential Detective, has 'an extremely smooth, moulded face, like a mask' (p. 3); equally, the 
young woman whom he meets at Granny's Attic, the dive bar he drinks in, seems as if she is 'made of 
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metal' (p. 21), and he thinks of youth as 'a good disguise: its puppy fat and smooth skin were like 
blank pages' (p. 3). Later, the same woman is described as unsettling because although Will tries to 
'see the reality of her face below the artfully applied make-up... it seemed she could read him but he 
couldn't read her at all' (p. 94). Will’s intuition that there is more to these women than meets the 
eye is echoed in his own sense that there was a  
circularity and self-referential aspect to the case that troubled him… his ability to solve cases 
depended on being unseen, a watcher unobserved. Were these references to himself—as in 
Louise's address book, or the paperweight—just coincidences? Perhaps he was trying to 
create patterns out of chance, find significance in the random. He had to sift out deliberate 
intention from happenstance. Perhaps he had become oversensitive to a design that didn't 
really exist. Coincidences, as always, were traps for the unmindful and the superstitious. 
 (p. 46) 
Later, he idly inverts the globe to find his name engraved in tiny letters on its base, causing Adam to 
comment that he ‘must be seeing things’ and Will to decide that he ‘must have hallucinated the 
words’ (p. 49). Coincidence, then, begins to feel like madness. Speaking to his ex-wife the next day, 
he realises both that ‘he sounded insane’ and ‘how close to the edge of madness he had grown’ (p. 
91). 
 
This mysterious woman is at the heart of the text. Mystery is neither known or entirely unknown: 
rather, it is an unknown which both invites and is resistant to explication. Furthermore, 
mysteriousness is not necessarily about the absence of knowledge of a specific subject or person, 
but rather about a sense or intuition that the person who senses the mystery does know something 
about them. In Will’s case, the mysteriousness is derived from the very fact that he intuits that the 
women with which he is involved have something to hide: like the circularity and self -referential 
aspects of the case, they are significant in a way which he has yet to discover. His attempts to 
remind himself that ‘coincidences are traps for the unmindful and the superstitious’  is an attempt to 
ward off the madness of oversignification in which he begins to believe that everything is significant 
to the case. Will’s sense of his own madness is essentially paranoid: like Leo Bersani’s reading of 
Thomas Pynchon’s narrator in Gravity’s Rainbow  (1973), he seeks ‘other orders behind the visible’.49 
To borrow from Patrick O’Donnell, Blake sees ‘the multiple stratifications of reality, virtual and 
material, as interconnected or networked’.50 
 
As the novel progresses, however, what we discover is that these coincidences are, in fact, 
significant. The singer, Louise Verver and his missing daughter Emily are one and the same: a fact 
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which he intuits in his profound attraction to the singer, and yet does not consciously recognise. In 
this sense, the mysteries of Will’s own relation to the case is similar to what Slavoj Žižek in his 
celebrated discussion of Donald Rumsfeld’s characterisation of the risks of military involvement in 
Iraq has referred to as 'unknown-knowns'. Žižek argues that such ‘unknown knowns’ are ‘things we 
don’t know that we know… [this]is precisely the Freudian unconscious, the ‘‘knowledge which 
doesn’t know itself.’’51 Blake's visions and his intimations of mysteries are Thompson's 
representation of this form of experience; his hallucinatory visions communicate something to him 
that on some level he already knows. They offer access to this form of unknown-known, descending, 
as Corrine Saunders puts it, into that madness in 'the very darkness [of which] illumination may be 
found'.52 In this, then, Will's insanity speaks to Charley Barker's assertion that 'madness has been 
appropriated or reconstituted to suit different approaches to knowledge and modes of being in the 
world'. 53 
 
This hallucinatory, mad mode of knowing, then, stands in contrast to the role that Blake also fulfils 
the role of the supremely rational man. Not only is professional snooping associated with rational 
explanation; it is in some respects the rational profession par excellence, as we can see if we turn to 
Arthur Conan Doyle's characterisation of Sherlock Holmes's working life in The Study in Scarlet 
(1887). Holmes sees his job as to read 'The Book of Life': 'an observant man' can, he contends, 'learn 
by an accurate and systematic examination of all that came in his way' everything he needs to 
know.54 Holmes exists in a world in which 'a momentary expression, a twitch of a muscle or a glance 
of an eye' can fathom a man's 'innermost thoughts'.55 As Holmes blandly puts it, if the detective is 
good enough, deceit becomes an 'impossibility' and the conclusions he draws will be as 'infallible as 
so many propositions'.56 The figure of the detective, then, makes everything available to rational 
explanation.  
 
This is represented by the jigsaw puzzle sent to Will by Adam at the beginning of the text. It 
functions in a similar way to Noah’s conceptualisation of his life as a 'puzzle' into which his patients 
slot like the individual pieces, standing as a figure for the completable, rational system of knowledge 
identified by Moi as characteristic of logocentric thought. Verver, the sinister computer scientist who 
we later discover abducted Emily, Will’s daughter, and Jade, the child of a prostitute involved with 
                                                                 
51
 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Philosophy, the Unknown Knowns and the Use of Public Reason’, Topoi 25 (2006), 137-142 (p. 
137). 
52
 Saunders and Macnaughton, p. 6.  
53
 Barker, p. 3. 
54
 Arthur Conan Doyle, A Study in Scarlet (London: Penguin, 2009), p. 20 
55
 Conan Doyle, p. 20. 
56
 Conan Doyle, p. 13. 
165 
 
the case and a friend of Olivia’s, stands as the figure of a rationality gone insane. Verver is a scientist 
whose experiments in computer technology lead him to abduct children in order to monitor their 
behaviour. He also murders his own mother and Mikhail, an employee at the amusement arcade at 
which the children are secreted, in order to preserve his business interests. Will's profession as a 
detective thus links him to Adam: they both use their rational faculties to seek out the truth. 
 
Adam's intellectual endeavours with computers are directed towards the project of 
depersonalisation, of making the human resemble the machine, commenting to Will that 'computers 
don't want anything from you. Humans have their own desires and needs, that's what makes them 
so difficult. With machines you don't have to try and work out what they want. They just give and 
give. Like whores' (p. 47). We can see this tendency very clearly in Adam’s flat, in which there is no 
trace of a personality, no sense of any interiority that could properly be called an identity. He 
conceives of the world largely in terms of straight lines, recalling, again, both Nazism's 'horrible 
architecture' The Falconer (p. 50), and Noah in Pandora’s Box. His flat is a palace of minimalism, a 
'place of rectangles' in which there is 'no sign of disorder' and the rugs lie ‘perfectly lined to the 
edges of the wall' (p. 46). His choice of an amnesiac wife is similarly suggestive, indicating that his 
preferences are for relationships with people who are as streamlined and as impersonal as a 
machine. The name Adam Verver thus becomes highly ironic: named after one of the four 
protagonists of Henry James's The Golden Bowl (1904), a novel well known for its intense 
preoccupation with the interiority of its characters, Adam in The Existential Detective appears to 
have no interiority at all. Adam, then, thus returns us to the question of insanity and rationality I 
have outlined in both Pandora's Box and The Falconer. The key difference, however, is that Adam 
very clearly flags for us his desire to treat other humans as forms of machine which will just 'give and 
give' (p. 47). In both Edward and Noah, however, the assumption that others are there simply to 
service their own desires is implicit in their madness. There is a sense, then, that where Noah may be 
merely a product of the epistemological system in which he is imbricated, Adam's madness is 
actually evil: rather than simply being unaware that he is treating the others in his life as not fully 
human, he actively seeks out ways to do so. 
 
The insanity indicated by Adam's desire for knowledge echoes the characterisation of mass-
murderers in Mark Seltzer’s Serial Killers: Death and Life in America's Wound Culture (1998). 
Speaking of the relationship between the figure of the serial murderer and machine culture he 
argues that: 
 serial sexual violence - its maladies of agency, its addictive relation to mass-produced images 
 and representations, its identification of destruction and possession, its logic of killing for 
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 pleasure - depends on an intricate rapport between murder and machine culture. It depends 
 not least on the intimacies between graphic violence and the technologies of registration, 
 recording and reproduction.57 
Seltzer's argument is that the serial killer is a product of what he terms 'the pathological public 
sphere' (the title of the first section of the book) which is comprised of postmodern (non)subjects 
anxious about the failure of a sense of individual personhood. The serial killer 'makes visible an 
experience of typicality at the level of the subject'. They are 'defined by such a radicalised 
experience of typicality within'.58 Simply put, "murder by numbers" (as serial murder has been 
called) is the form of violence proper to statistical persons.'59 Seltzer makes explicit the link between 
the desire for knowledge represented by 'technologies of registration, recording and reproduction' 
and the 'graphic violence' of the serial killer figure. He also links this to the sense that, in the 
machine age, everyone is implicated in the presence of these figures. The anxiety surrounding serial 
killers is that in the 'pathological public sphere' of the machine age, they could be any of us, and thus 
in some way represent all of us. This lack of identity allows the serial killer to become an everyman: 
‘the serial killer is always "the stranger beside me" or "everyone’s next-door neighbour", "average-
looking" or "just like you and me"'.60 This absence is foregrounded by Thompson, too: speaking of 
Adam, Will muses 'psychopaths were not complex. They had no imagination. They just had absence 
and their own desires' (p. 149). Such figures disrupt our sense of discrete individual identity, thus 
becoming an iteration of the anxiety about the 'disappearance of the individual subject' outlined by 
Jameson and other theorists of the postmodern.61 In engaging with the figure of the serial killer, the 
innocent person becomes implicated in their violence. It is not simply that the serial killer is mad, but 
that the figure of the serial killer is in itself a maddening one: it prompts an over-identification in 
which the reader or detective does not simply fear them but fears that they might become them.  
 
The blurring of identity implicit in the serial killer as characterised by Seltzer plays out in The 
Existential Detective in the central confusion between Adam and Will. As the novel progresses, the 
two characters seem to be exchanging places. After a conversation with the singer at Granny's Attic, 
Will walks to the end of the promenade to ask 'the oracle'—a  fortune-telling attraction on the 
pier—who the murderer is: 'a few minutes later, the oracle churned out its answer: you are' (p. 97). 
It is also represented by the fact that Will, like Adam, is obsessed with 'the truth'. Again and again, 
the novel reiterates this preoccupation: speaking of Emily's disappearance, the text has it that 'it was 
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the truth Will was in love with' (p. 30). Of his love for Olivia, he says 'wasn't that an element of 
human desire, to work out, decipher, uncover, reveal'? (p. 35), and, musing again on the connections 
between the case he is working on and his daughter's disappearance, he says 'he felt that 
Edinburgh... held like an oracle all his secrets in his heart. That if he just walked round the grand self -
important squares of the New Town for long enough on a cold afternoon with a sunless sky, all the 
answers would be given to him' (p. 73). His desire for knowledge, then, matches Adam's own, and 
indeed, Will ends the novel by murdering Adam: detective becomes murderer, and murderer 
becomes victim. The question the novel raises, then, is one of a profound, radical evil which infects 
those around it. 
 
This slippage also raises questions regarding the nature of justice in the text: in murdering Adam, 
Will replicates one of the crimes that Adam committed. These confusions of identity, the 
'disappearance of the individual subject', to use Jameson's terms, complicate the nature of justice: 
how is it possible to discern what is just if subjectivity has become so indeterminate?62 This issue is 
signalled by the references to the Electra myth in The Existential Detective: there is a mural of 
Clytemnestra's murder by Orestes in the amusement arcade in which Verver hides his abductees, 
and it is also the picture on the jigsaw he sends to Will. In Eric Dodd's reading of the Electra myth, 
two modes of justice confront one another: the logic of vengeance is shown to be a self-reproducing 
spiral, while the newer form of rationalised justice instantiated by Euripides's next play, The Libation 
Bearers, gestures towards what we would now recognise as a more humanist mode of justice in 
which the state decides how crime should be punished and forgiveness meted out.63 The mural, and 
its representation of the jigsaw puzzle Adam sends Will, thus both indicate that the central question 
in The Existential Detective concerns justice: specifically, the limits of a rational ethics. In a world in 
which identity is as amorphous and fluid as The Existential Detective, how is the desire not just for 
knowledge, but for justice, to function? 
 
What perhaps is extraordinary about The Existential Detective is that, although Thompson constructs 
a world in which an appeal for justice simply does not make sense—a world in which the murderer 
and detective exchange places, and the two missing women turn out to be the same person, neither 
of whom have died—nonetheless, the novel does not, I think, abandon the search for justice 
entirely. Although the text undeniably evokes the failure of individual subjectivity evoked by 
Jameson, especially in the presentation of Adam, Thompson is very far from presenting us with the 
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'blank, atonal perspectives and fragile, glassy visions' of Bret Easton Ellis.64 Indeed, the 
meaningfulness and importance of the desire for justice is at the very heart of the novel. Despite the 
confusions of identity I have just delineated, there is a central distinction between Adam and Will, 
which is that Will searches for justice, despite the fact that, in the world in which he exists, it fails to 
make sense. Equally, his hallucinations appear to be attempting to lead him to just conclusions. To 
return, then, to Thompson's brilliant formulation, it is the search for justice that is both mad and not 
mad: occupying the space in the Venn diagram at which sanity and insanity converge.  
  
Conclusion: Thompson's Fragile Rationality 
 
In conclusion, then, the representation of justice in The Existential Detective raises the issue with 
which I started this chapter, which is the tension between Thompson's postmodernist tendencies on 
the one hand, and her interest in the primal, the atavistic and the animal on the other. As I have 
shown, Thompson draws heavily on a variety of postmodern theoretical concerns; in all her novels, 
her representations of madness are indicative of a decidedly poststructuralist mistrust of the 
criterion of objective truth and empirically verifiable fact. Particularly in her earlier work, this is 
strongly linked with the French feminist concern with how rational sanity is constructed through the 
exclusion of the irrational, mad and feminine other. However, her representations of subjectivity are 
somewhat more difficult to characterise as completely informed by poststructuralist paradigms. 
Although there are undoubtedly instances of subjective dispersal, of moments when the characters 
lose their sense of discrete individual identity, these occasions speak as much to a Nietzschean 
dissolution of selfhood as they do to the schizophrenic lack of ability to grasp one's own past and 
present as theorised by Jameson.  
 
The representation of subjectivity is further complicated by the way that the 'different views' of the 
characters are concretised throughout the novels in the visual modes by which the characters grasp 
the world—a fact which is perhaps alluded to in the optical associations of Iris's name in The 
Falconer. The unusual aesthetics of her novels operate as an extended metaphor which emphasise 
the different ways that the protagonists see things. In other words, they work to link a compromised 
or uncertain grip on reality with a very specific, individual mode of being. This indicates that if there 
is an epistemological impossibility of consensus or consistency throughout the novels, their 
aesthetics do give us some sense of subjective coherence. These features flicker, change, shift and 
turn, not quite indicating either postmodern schizophrenic dislocation nor an entirely humanist 
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understanding of a fixed and stable sense of selfhood deviated from through experiences of 
madness. In fact, those subjectivities that we see falling into true madness—such as Noah's, Adam's 
and Louis's—are those that are most dependent on rational modes of ordering experience and 
which are not open to change. By contrast, those figures who are open to mad modes of experience, 
such as hallucinations, are paradoxically more likely to maintain the crucial sense of personhood, of 
the stability necessary to be legible as human agents.  
 
Thus, although the questions of subjective stability are vastly problematised within all the novels, 
Thompson's representations of madness do retain a sense of a commitment to a problematised but 
nonetheless important sense of individual identity. What is at issue here is, I think, a sense of 
functionality. Although Iris and Will both experience hallucinations, undergoing forms of psychotic 
experience, their openness to accepting that not all their experiences can be understood on the  
basis of the rational—particularly in the way that their hallucinatory experiences are figured as 
salutary for both of them—allow them to cope with their experiences of madness. Those figures that 
understand their lives purely through rationalised means, specifically Noah and Adam, are far more 
vulnerable to complete subject collapse or to charges of utter abandonment of the human world. 
Noah and Adam's characterisation thus push at the reader's understanding of what it is to be human 
in a way that neither Iris nor Will do. This, then, is Thompson's fragile rationality. 
 
This is reflected in the modes of justice represented in the novel. As we can see from the reading of 
The Existential Detective proposed above, as the symmetrical patterns in the novels yield no larger 
meaning, so the desire to create a complete, systemised mode of justice never leads to a concrete 
conclusion. Nonetheless, this search for justice is a crucial element of all the texts under discussion 
here, suggesting again, that, although vastly problematic, it is vastly importantly: indeed, it is this 
which maintains their humanity. Between Noah and Venus in Pandora's Box, Iris and the world in 
which she finds herself in The Falconer, and Will and Adam in The Existential Detective, there is 
simply a gap of comprehension which is represented, in the novels, by the modes through which 
they grasp and interact with their life worlds. The key to the effect of these novels, then, is precisely 
the fact that these modes of experience never resolve into one another, leaving a hermeneutic gap 
which cannot be filled through ingenious critical manoeuvres. This hovering between different forms 
of knowing and the insistence on the value of ethical judgements even as they are losing their 
power, is the key to the novels: both these issues represent the way that the characters within the 
novel occupy the space of the Venn diagram in which sanity and madness converge. 
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I would like to end by drawing attention to the way that this is also true of the reader.  It is striking 
that the congruences and coincidences suggesting the presence of some kind of meaning which is 
beyond our ken have precisely the same effect on the readers as they do on the characters within 
the novel. Similarly to the celebrated reading of The Turn of the Screw offered by Shoshana Felman 
in Writing and Madness, in which the narrative of the story turns on precisely the same ambiguity 
which gives it its aesthetic effect, in Thompson's work the power of the texts is partially derived from 
the fact that the gap between the modes of knowing and understanding that Thompson frequently 
pits against one another are never resolved for the reader either. As well as representing the 
madness, then, the novels also function mimetically, giving the reader a sense of the same 
intellectual blockages that the characters themselves experience. 
 
As such, the novels are not simply representations of mad experience. Unlike the work of Alasdair 
Gray, Janice Galloway and the gothic novelists discussed earlier, the affective experience of reading 
the novels is similar to those the characters themselves are undergoing. The texts thus to some 
degree negate the distinction between reader and character (another instance of the blurring of 
identity which is such a characteristic feature of her work). In this respect, the novels are 
comparable to Alan Warner's These Demented Lands (1998). However, where Warner's text 
functions through the typically postmodern technique of a sensory or textual overload leaving the 
reader profoundly disorientated and unsure how to navigate the novel, in Thompson's work we are 
left with the impression of a pattern which we cannot fully grasp. Part of the texts' power, then, 
derives from the fact that the readers are uncomfortably close to the protagonists themselves: like 
Noah in Pandora's Box, the effect of the texts mean that we are left, intentionally, unable to 
distinguish 'fact from fancy' (p. 42). 
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Conclusion: The Contents and Discontents of Madness 
 
My contention throughout this thesis has been that the representations of madness in Scottish 
writing are not centrally concerned with what it is to be Scottish. Instead, the texts address 
themselves to how experiences of psychic dissolution or the failure of the self derive from the vast 
array of experiences signified by what Alasdair Gray has called 'bad mental states'.1 These mental 
states are, in Susan Sontag's terms, 'awash with significance': they are concerned with fundamental 
literary, ethical, and epistemological questions, such as how we can define the human subject, what 
it means to lead what Lauren Berlant refers to as 'the good life' and what forms of human 
experience are available to which forms of human knowledge.2 These novels respond to questions as 
fundamental to human existence as the relationship between unreason and personal autonomy, 
insanity and knowledge, the phenomenology of affectlessness, how mad experience can be 
aestheticised, and the ways in which madness may be understood as related to concepts of justice 
and rationality. 
 
Discontented Nationalism 
 
The hope, then, is that by avoiding reading madness with reference to national concerns, I have  
demonstrated that it is possible to produce fruitful interpretations of the texts in question, and 
developed space for the discussion of Scottish literary texts a propos theory not usually deployed by 
devolutionary critics, particularly in the field of the medical humanities, affect theory and 
ecologically orientated criticism.3 The initial decision to attempt to write about a theme—madness— 
which has long been strongly associated with Scottish writing was motivated by what I see as a need 
to shift or extend the focus of the devolutionary model of criticism; a need which is now recognised 
by many critics working in the field, particularly Gerald Carruthers, Kirsten Stirling, Carole Jones and 
David Punter, each of whom have gestured towards an impatience with the nationalist or 
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devolutionary 'impasse' and acknowledged that 'the need to disaggregate political from cultural 
nationalism has become apparent'.4 
 
As I noted in the introduction, representations of madness in Scotland have been particularly subject 
to nationalist forms of criticism; letting go of the necessity of linking the two has, I think, allowed me 
to outline some of the intriguing ways in which Scottish writers have engaged with the questions 
raised by representations of insanity and unreason in Scotland over the past thirty years. In the last 
analysis, I hope that this thesis represents a contribution to a new form of criticism which can build 
upon or expand the insights of the nationalist or devolutionary approach while tentatively feeling its 
way out of the 'impasse' of devolutionary criticism identified by Gerald Carruthers.5 It is my belief 
that by moving away from the concern with the state of Scotland, and with Scottish independence, 
that has dominated Scottish criticism (but not Scottish writing) over the past few decades, we may 
be able to develop new ways of thinking and writing about the genuinely astonishing writing that 
has emanated from Scotland, and that will continue to do so in future. There is, I argue, no longer a 
need for the anxiety identified by Matthew Wickman that the category of Scottish nationhood 'in 
some ways threatens its own grand narrative of enlightened diversity with the spectre of 
dissolution'.6 Much of the anxiety regarding the question of nation in Scottish writing appears to be 
generated by this notion: the idea that, should critics stop looking at it, the Scottish nation would 
disappear altogether, dissolved, as Wickman says, into ‘enlightened pluralism', with no place for any 
discussion of the nation whatsoever. Instead, we now have space to be attentive to the concerns 
raised by the texts in question which do not necessarily have to do with national issues. 
 
Madness in Theory 
 
One of the key themes of this thesis, which I would like to draw out in the conclusion, has been the 
relationship between poststructuralist theory and madness, specifically schizophrenia. As I have 
pointed out throughout, the models of schizophrenia offered by the Fredric Jameson, Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari emphasise affectlessness and the failure of a sense of unified subjectivity as the 
central characteristics of this experience. In devolutionary criticism, this postmodern emphasis on 
the schizophrenic has been allied with the critical formation of antisyzygy to construct an association 
between postmodern writing and Scottish identity. The assumption underlying this characterisation 
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of Scottishness is that it entails a divided or negated subjectivity, in which the wholeness or unity of 
classical liberal conceptions of selfhood are undercut by a dual identification with both English and 
Scottish culture. In other words, Scottish writing has been positioned as addressing itself largely to, 
as Carole Jones puts it, the 'fractured instabilities of Scottish identity, which was now seen as 
positively and fashionably postmodern'.7 In these readings, the fragmentary nature of Scottish 
identity is understood as placing Scottish writers in a privileged position to reflect on what James 
Annesley refers to as the 'twists and turns' of the postmodern condition, engaging in particular with 
the 'anxieties about subjectivity, representation and the relationship between text and context' 
characteristic of the theoreticisation of fictions which, in Jamesonian terms, 'replicate—reproduce—
reinforce the cultural logic of late capitalism'.8 I gave the most thorough outline of this theoretical 
move in my chapter on Alasdair Gray: in Scottish writing itself, it has been most explicitly theorised 
by Eleanor Bell in her 2004 monograph Questioning Scotland (2004). However, many of the readings 
offered in this thesis have suggested that the paradigms offered in classic postmodern texts are not 
entirely equal to the experiences of madness represented in them. In the novels of Alasdair Gray, 
Alan Warner and Alice Thompson, the presentation of madness does not appear to be fully 
theorisable with recourse only to the postmodern paradigms of affectlessness, apathy and 
subjective decentring, although it is undeniably the case that such concerns still have weight 
throughout the texts. Rumours of the death of the (Scottish) subject, it seems, have been somewhat 
exaggerated.  
 
This is clear in the trajectory I traced in the novels of Alasdair Gray. Throughout his work, I have 
outlined a decided commitment to precisely the notion of 'true' personhood, authentic experience 
and an 'oldfashioned' ethically centred experience of which postmodern theory is hi ghly suspicious 
(1982, Janine, p. 182). This is also clearly the case in Elspeth Barker and Janice Galloway's interest in 
representing a tough, functional female autonomy, particularly in both their insistences on the need 
for human warmth, connection, and possibility. Alice Thompson's highly theoretically sophisticated 
novels somewhat complicate this model, but nonetheless in all of them there appears to be an 
insistence that the 'light and shade' of subjective instability should be acknowledged, recognise d and 
lived with in a way that lends some coherence to the individual's lifeworld. Her insistence on the 
importance of the search for justice, even if that justice is inevitably flawed and incomplete, and her 
engagement with transcendent, even mystic, forms of hallucinatory mad experience suggests a shift 
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 Fredric Jameson, 'Postmodernism and Consumer Society', in The Consumer Society , ed. by Hal Foster 
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in emphasis from the highly theoretical fiction of her earlier work, and is held in tension with her in 
some respects very postmodern representations of decentred, enigmatic subjectivity.  Even in those 
fictions which do appear to be dominated by postmodern paradigms of madness and subjectivity, 
such as Bathurst's and Alan Warner's, there is to some degree a representation of the desire to 
escape the affectless, disengaged and decentred selfhoods by which postmodern writers and 
theorists have been preoccupied. 
 
Madness and Affect 
 
This indicates then, that, as Timotheus Vermeulen, Robin Van Den Akker and Linda Hutcheon have 
all suggested, although many of the concerns and formal innovations of the postmodern movement 
remain, we are no longer precisely in a postmodern moment.9 Rather, the questions which 
poststructuralist theory has raised and with which postmodern fiction has engaged are currently 
recognised as being part of a broader set of theoretical and literary practices which allow space for a 
concern with issues not normally considered germane to the postmodern project, such as belonging, 
embodiment, issues of affect and emotion (as opposed to the 'waning of affect' we see in Jameson), 
and a return an interest in the possibility of transcendent experience.10 
 
 It seems, then, that neither postmodern theory or liberal humanist doctrine can quite do critical 
justice to the modes of insanity under discussion throughout this thesis. It is thus perhaps worth 
drawing attention to some of the affinities between my work and an emergent critical paradigm on 
which I have drawn throughout this thesis, particularly in my use of Sianne Ngai's work in Ugly 
Feelings (2005) and Lauren Berlant's Cruel Optimism (2011) in the chapters on Alan Warner and 
Janice Galloway. This is the study of emotions, a field which, although most of the commentators on 
it insist on its diversity and resistance to overarching definition, appears to Melissa Gregg and 
Gregory J. Seigworth to be particularly concerned:  
 to unfold regimes of expressivity that are tied much more to resonant worldings and 
 diffusions of feeling/ passions [than its postmodern precursors]—often including 
 atmospheres of sociality, crowd behaviours, contagions of feeling, matters of belonging... 
 and a range of postcolonial, hybridized, and migrant voices.11 
Throughout this thesis, I have attempted to offer readings that are attentive to precisely these 
issues. Both the liberal humanist model of selfhood, and its postmodern dissolution, currently 
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appear unequal to the ways in which a subjectivity in crisis is represented and understood. It is 
neither entirely a case of the deviation from a liberal humanist conception of the coherent, 
privileged and stable actant, nor the generalised postmodern 'maladies of agency' characterised by 
Mark Seltzer or the 'schizophrenic as the representative postmodern subject' identified by Angela 
Woods.12 Throughout this thesis, I have tried to show that the representations of madness are 
intimately related to the inability to navigate the 'atmospheres of sociality', 'crowd behaviours' and 
'matters of belonging' mentioned above. They are key to my readings of Gray, Galloway and Barker 
in particular. Throughout, then, I have attempted to understand the madnesses under discussion 
throughout this thesis as tied to the 'resonant worldings' represented in the individual texts.   
 
Equally, it is important to recognise that the textual features stressed by affect theory— its 
attentiveness to the experience of emotion, to political issues, and to the importance that an 
individual lifeworld has to a character's sense of subjective stability or threat, are issues that have 
been raised in critical responses to madness long before affect theory became a recognised 
theoretical formation. For example, as I mentioned in my introduction, both Elaine Showalter and 
Phyllis Chesler stress the importance of one's subjectivity being socially recognised before it is 
sensed, lived and understood as complete. Equally, both Louis Sass and Richard P. Bentall emphasise 
the distressing affective aspects of schizophrenic experience as key to understanding its nature. 
There is a significant affective aspect to the forms of madness theorised as in some way positive, 
too: the Nietzschean madness which stresses a connection to the natural world which I discussed in 
my chapter on Thompson relies on an affective sense of belonging and embededness in a specific 
environment. It stresses the celebratory, the joyous and the collective in a way that is very much of 
piece with the interest in 'sociality' and 'contagion of feelings' mentioned by Gregg and Siegfield 
above. Furthermore, the creative madness of the visionary artist discussed in Chapter Three is both 
dependent on, and dismissive of, the quotidian and everyday world which is also a major concern of 
affect theory. 
 
The project of affect theory is also, I would argue, useful  in thinking through how Scottish criticism 
might attend to 
 to the hard and fast materialities, as well as the fleeting and flowing ephemera, of the daily 
 and the workaday, of everyday and every-night life, and of "experience" (understood in ways 
 far more collective and "external" rather than individual and interior), where persistent, 
 repetitious practices of power can simultaneously provide a body (or, better, collectivized 
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 bodies) with predicaments and potentials for realizing a world that subsists within and 
 exceeds the horizons and boundaries of the norm.13 
In this concern with the interior and exterior effects of 'repetitious practices of power' affect theory 
is  a rich vein of thought in which to situate writing which has previously been understood with 
reference to a nationalist or devolutionary paradigm. The model proposed above allows for an 
understanding of a collective 'world' which need not necessarily be understood through the 
somewhat abstract and difficult to conceptualise 'imagined community' of a nation such as that 
theorised by Benedict Anderson, but rather through the daily and the workaday experiences, the 
'everyday and every-night life', which contribute, in the texts I have been responding to here, to the 
sense that life has somehow become unliveable: to a subjectivity under such a degree of strain that 
it either fails altogether or functions constantly in a state near to collapse. Such a way of 
understanding mad experience allows, then, an attentiveness to how questions of belonging 
pertaining to issues of national identity are imbricated in the everyday lifeworld of the characters 
represented.  
 
That said, there are certain aspects of mad experience I have discussed throughout this thesis which 
affect theory is ill-equipped to address. In particular, it does not address the notion of madness as a 
form of radical evil indicated by the representation of Adam Verver, Caz in Special and Alasdair 
Gray's sense of madness as having intimately to do with the sense that Thaw had 'done something 
foul' (p. 350). In its insistence on the constitutive nature of the body, the study of emotion is also , 
perhaps, not fully equipped to do justice to forms of madness figured as the distressing divorce of 
mind and body theorised by Louis Sass and Maud Ellman. This, then, is the central contention of this 
thesis: that representations of madness in literary texts al lows us to address issues such as the limits 
of personhood and subjectivity, which are not available to considerations outside the aesthetic 
realm. The presentation of the mad subject reflects a concern with the absolute limits of 
personhood, with experience which transcends the limits of the body and of knowledge: in short, 
with deathliness.  
 
Romanticism and Madness 
 
To conclude, then, I would like to draw attention to the critical paradigm of 'metamodernism' 
theorised by Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin Van Den Akker. This, they, suggest, is informed both 
by the postmodern concern with subjective decentering and epistemological indeterminacy, but, in 
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an attempt to move past the political and affective impasses it connotes, develops into a form of 
'neoromanticism' which emphasises the connection between the human subject and the natural 
world, empathy and emotional resonance, and a recentering of political and ethical engagement in 
aesthetic practice. As they put it, they see a shift from 'tactics such as pastiche and parataxis for 
strategies like myth and metaxis, melancholy for hope, and exhibitionism for engagement'.14 It is my 
suggestion that all the representations of madness in this thesis exhibit, at some level, precisely this 
movement towards myth, hopefulness and engagement. Although throughout this thesis madness 
has centrally addressed itself to the notion of 'death-worlds' rather than 'lifeworlds', of subjectivity 
entering into a kind of living death, even the darkest of the fictions under discussion here, Special 
and The Existential Detective, allow space for the hope that some kind of return or escape from the 
twists and turns of madness in which the protagonists are enmeshed is possible. 
 
At the end of Madness and Modernism, Louis Sass proposes that the responses to madness he 
discusses can be categorised as either 'hypermodernist' or 'post-romantic'.15 The hypermodernist 
tendency, he argues, is represented in the intensification of modernist concerns in the postmodern 
moment. He positions Jacques Derrida as the hypermodernist par excellence, arguing that his 
'complete refusal of the legacy of romanticism' means that he does not 'attempt to put us back in 
touch with ourselves by recalling us to some deep sense of groundedness and unity'.16 In this, his 
work stands in contrast to Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleu-Ponty and Ludwig Wittgenstein, for 
whom the modernist and schizophrenic modes of hyperreflexivity would, according to Sass, involve 
'transformations or even perversions of authentic human experience—an existence that, at its most 
fundamental or essential level, would be characterised by a sense of contact, by active engagement 
and participation in meaningful social action rather than by doubt, distance and unreality'.17  
 
It is my contention, then, that despite the theoreticisations of madness in Scottish literature which 
contend that it has to do with a profoundly alienated or divided being— what Sass, speaking of 
Derrida, calls a 'philosophical faith in, and preference for, what might be termed an alienated, 
schizoid mode of being' which leads to a 'falling away, or falling apart, of standard forms of 
meaning', I would suggest that in fact the modes of madness under discussion in this thesis all 
indicate an impetus which stands in tension with, or even opposes, this project. Despite their 
engagement with the deathly collapse both of individual subjectivity (Gray, Galloway, Barker, 
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Bathurst) or meaning (Thompson, Warner), there is nonetheless an identifiable impetus towards a  
recognition of what Renée, in The Diary of a Schizophrenic Girl, calls 'the transcendent significance of 
being part of humanity.'18 As Morvern says, 'after all the making sure no tenderness could get taken 
by surprise. It still finds a way through' (p. 106). It is this possibility of tenderness, of a world of 
warmth and colour and human connection, that remains as the desirable end point throughout 
these texts.
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